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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to establish a critical methodology which reads for fictional worlds in 
literature and film. Close readings of literary and cinematic texts are presented in support of the 
proposition that the fictional world is, and arguably should be, central to the critical process. These 
readings demonstrate how fictional world-centric readings challenge the conclusions generated by 
approaches which prioritise the author, the reader and the viewer. I establish a definition of 
independent fictional worlds, and show how characters rather than narrative are the means by 
which readers access the fictional world in order to analyse it. This interdisciplinary project engages 
predominantly with theoretical and critical work on literature and film to consider four distinct 
groups of contemporary novels and films. These texts demand readings that pose potential 
problems for my approach, and therefore test the scope and viability of my thesis. I evaluate 
character and narrative through Fight Club (novel, Chuck Palahniuk [1996] film, David Fincher 
[1999]); genre, context, and intertextuality in Solaris (novel, Stanisław Lem [1961] film, Andrei 
Tarkovsky [1974] film, Steven Soderbergh [2002]); mythic thinking and character’s authority with 
American Gods (novel, Neil Gaiman [2001]) and Anansi Boys (novel, Neil Gaiman [2005]); and 
temporality and nationality in Cronos (film, Guillermo Del Toro [1993]), El espinazo del diablo (film, 
Guillermo Del Toro [2001]), and El laberinto del fauno (film, Guillermo Del Toro [2006]).  
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Introduction 
 
In this thesis, I seek to establish the ways in which fictional worlds are represented in literature and 
film, how these worlds are linked to our own, and the consequences of making the fictional world 
both the point of departure and the destination in critical readings. My aim is thus to establish a 
critical methodology in which the fictional world is central to our experience of the texts discussed 
in the chapters that follow. Conventionally, the actual world – ‘our’ world – is deemed to provide 
the presiding frames of reference for acts of criticism. In such approaches, the context and intention 
of the author or creator, the context and desires of the reader or viewer, and the intertextual 
relations created by both are dominant. These ways of reading are highly productive, and I do not 
dismiss their relevance to the critical act. In the study that follows, however, I redirect their 
attention from the worlds of author, reader and viewer to the fictional world represented by the 
text. 
This thesis is in two parts. The first provides an account of theoretical approaches to 
fictional worlds, using interdisciplinary concepts from literary theory, film theory, and philosophy 
to establish the independence and individuality of fictional worlds, and to form a critical 
understanding of characters as the reader or viewer’s primary point of access to the fictional world. 
I evaluate theoretical approaches to medium, genre, adaptation, myth, and time which are central 
to the critical analyses which follows. Although this first section looks closely at a variety of 
theoretical approaches, my aim is not to make claims or cover analytical ground in particular fields, 
but to apply and modify established perspectives in order to define and test the critical scope of 
the proposed methodology.  
 The second part of this thesis presents critical analyses in four chapters, looking at four 
groupings of contemporary texts which serve as crucibles for my fictional world-centric approach. 
Each group of texts are chosen to highlight different aspects of fictional world engagement, and to 
give a broad range of texts with respect to medium, geography, language, and subject. Chapter One 
of Part Two looks at two iterations of Fight Club: Chuck Palahniuk’s 1997 novel, and David Fincher’s 
1999 film.1 Both Fight Clubs feature unreliable narration which obscures the reality of the fictional 
world. Despite the opaque subjectivity of the narration, the fictional world becomes clear by 
centering the experience of the characters in the critical reading. Chapter One therefore concludes 
                                                          
1 Chuck Palahniuk, Fight Club (London: Vintage, 1997).  
Fight Club, directed by David Fincher (Fox 2000 Pictures, 1999), film.  
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that the narration does not dictate the reality of the fictional world, but rather that the fictional 
world is the reality against which the narrative is measured.  
 Chapter Two considers three different texts titled Solaris, and each seems to demand a 
contextual reading which prioritises the actual world rather than the fictional one. In each case, I 
take a contextual approach and apply it to the fictional world. Stanisław Lem’s Polish novel is a 
staple of the science fiction genre.2 While theoretical approaches to genre prioritise the 
connections between texts and the reader’s perceptual connection between them, by looking at 
Kelvin’s experience of reality, it becomes clear that classificatory views of genre fade. At the same 
time, conceptual ideas around generic reading can be productive when they are applied to 
characters. Criticism around Andrei Tarkovsky’s Russian film tends to center on Tarkovsky’s role as 
an ‘auteur’ director, and the film’s contextual relevance as a Cold War text.3 These areas of 
consideration are almost exclusive to the actual world reception of the text; and yet, these 
approaches can lead a critical reader to aspects of the fictional world which demonstrate their own 
contextual frames of reference, distinct from those of the actual world. Finally, Steven Soderbergh’s 
Solaris exists academically as an American remake of European fictions, intrinsically linked through 
our experience as viewers to Tarkovsky’s and Lem’s works.4 By acknowledging the actual world 
resonances which guide our viewing experience, considering adaptations as related works can 
illustrate the individuation of fictional worlds and emphasise the experiential subjectivity each 
character has in relation to their own reality. 
 The third chapter takes as its starting point the status of fictional world realities and 
characters established in Chapter One and the consideration of contextual readings explored in 
Chapter Two to analyse two novels by British-American author Neil Gaiman. Both American Gods 
and Anansi Boys are novels which engage intimately with the mythic, relying on our experience of 
mythology and fantasy to justify the scope of the supernatural within the narrative.5 Such a depth 
of information and connotation imported by the reader into the story seems to preclude a fictional 
world-centric approach. However, a fictional world-centric reading proffers an alternate conclusion 
in each case. In American Gods, the apparently mythic loses some of its deific authority as it 
becomes clear that the gods are as real as the human characters. By centering the experience of 
the character Shadow, the ancient gods which populate the novel are shown instead to be alternate 
                                                          
2 Stanisław Lem, Solaris, translated by Joanna Kilmartin and Steve Cox (London: Faber and Faber, 2016).  
3 Solaris, directed by Andrei Tarkovsky (Mosfilm, 1972), film. 
4 Solaris, directed by Steven Soderbergh (Twentieth Century Fox, 2002), film.  
5 Neil Gaiman, American Gods (New York: HarperTorch, 2001).  
  Neil Gaiman, Anansi Boys (New York: HarperTorch, 2005). 
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expressions of the real, accessible to any character with (the right) eyes to see. In Anansi Boys, the 
tropes and forms of myth remain powerful within the fictional world, a power which characters like 
Spider and Fat Charlie can control using a powerful voice. This powerful voice can bend reality 
simply by speaking words aloud, a convention which I call mythopoeic voice. In each case – the 
reality of apparent gods in American Gods and mythopoeic voice in Anansi Boys – the nature of the 
mythic within fictional worlds is exposed by acknowledging and analysing the expectations we as 
readers bring to a fictional text.  
 The fourth and final chapter of this project looks at three films by Guillermo del Toro in light 
of the three previous chapters. Each of these films manifest complex and changeable expressions 
of time, seemingly at the mercy of the filmic medium. In each case, a child seems to be at the centre 
of the temporal distortions. In the film Cronos, I consider how the time of the narration can differ 
from the time of the fictional world, reinforcing the individuation of the fictional world through the 
character of Aurora. 6 This film also looks at the transnationality of cinema, considering if and how 
the fictional world might respond to a transnational context. El Espinazo del diablo, hereafter called 
The Devil’s Backbone, presents a tripartite experience of time which centers on the behaviour of 
characters who come into contact with the ghost child Santi. 7 Both The Devil’s Backbone and El 
laberinto del fauno (hereafter called Pan’s Labyrinth) – Mexican-Spanish productions set during the 
Spanish Civil War – seem to necessitate historically-oriented readings.8 These postmemory texts 
(texts which re-imagine and re-remember a traumatic past) therefore seem to be rooted in our 
world. By applying a fictional world-centric methodology which centralises the experiences of the 
characters, these films can occupy an alternate contextual sphere which derives from the reality 
experienced by characters. In particular, the young Ofelia in Pan’s Labyrinth creates her own 
referential context through mythopoeic voice. As a result, a confluence of opposing temporalities 
buffet her through the fictional world in opposition to what a reader might expect from a film 
structured like a fairy tale. In the final section of this chapter, I look closely at the way in which 
Ofelia’s mythopoeic voice alters her experience of the fictional world, and how her subjective 
experience relates to its objective reality.  
   
                                                          
6 Cronos, directed by Guillermo del Toro (CNCAIMC, 1993), film. 
7 The Devil’s Backbone, directed by Guillermo del Toro (El Deseo, 2001), film. 
8 Pan’s Labyrinth, directed by Guillermo del Toro (Estudios Picasso, 2006), film.  
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Part One: The Sum of its Parts 
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Although the idea of fictional worlds initially seems a straightforward concept – in its connection to 
creative terms like ‘worldbuilding’ – the term ‘fictional world’ is as amorphous as it is descriptive. 
Theorists have used the term and its genetic relatives, such as ‘story world’, ‘film world’, or ‘world 
of the text’, to signify a wide variety of concepts and an equally varied usage. I will be working with 
a definition of fictional worlds loosely derived from the philosophical concept of possible world 
theory and the literary theory of Thomas G. Pavel, Marie-Laure Ryan, and Lubomír Doležel.9  
Doležel states that “specific features of fictional worlds of literature cannot be derived from 
the possible-world model of formal semantics, yet they can be identified only against the 
background of this model frame.”10 In short, the philosophical concerns around possible worlds 
cannot define the literary model of fictional worlds, but the possible worlds model is nonetheless 
the best way to propose fictional worlds in terms of literary and film theory. The differences 
between possible world philosophers are many, but they all work within a theoretical framework 
in which all possibilities exist, and each possibility exists in its own world, called a possible world. 
Fictional worlds can be thought of as some such possible worlds. According to David Lewis, all 
possible worlds are equally real: they are considered to be the ‘actual world’ (the ‘real’ world) by 
its inhabitants.11 Primarily concerned with the possibility of truth statements for possible worlds, 
Lewis’s model, like all models which give individual ontological status to possible worlds, requires 
modal statements.12 Modal prefixes preface a statement, qualifying it in relation to the world to 
which it refers, and the realm of possibility, impossibility, or necessity to which it belongs. This 
allows for true statements to be made about the contents of a world that is not our own. For 
example, in our world, it is a lie to say that there is a venomous breed of bird called a ‘scorpion 
hawk,’ but in the world of the novel The Lies of Locke Lamora, it can be said that there exists a 
venomous bird called a scorpion hawk.13 Indeed, the bird figures prominently in the dénouement 
of the novel’s plot. Modal statements are essential for the philosophy of possible worlds, but in 
literary and film theory which does not hinge upon true statements, or the discussion of factual or 
                                                          
9 Thomas G. Pavel, Fictional Worlds (London: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
Marie-Laure Ryan, “Fiction, Non-Factuals, and the Principle of Minimal Departure,” Poetics 9 (1980): 403-
422. 
Lubomír Doležel, Heterocosmica: Fiction and Possible World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1998). 
10 Lubomír Doležel, “Mimesis and Possible Worlds,” Poetics Today 9 (1988): 486.  
Quoted in Marie-Laure Ryan, “Possible Worlds in Recent Literary Theory,” Style 26, no. 4 (1992): 430. 
11 David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973).  
Referenced in Ryan, “Possible Worlds in Recent Literary Theory,” 529.  
12 David Lewis, “Truth in Fiction,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 1 (1978): 41.  
13 Scott Lynch, The Lies of Locke Lamora, from The Gentleman Bastards Sequence (New York: Bantam 
Spectra, 2006).  
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counter-factual statements, modals are usually not necessary and can be cumbersome. For this 
reason, I will not be relying on modals in my discussion, since my interest is in the potential of 
literary and film theory within fictional worlds rather than philosophical questions.  
A contrasting possible worlds theory posed by Nicolas Rescher posits that possible worlds 
have a different ontological status than our world, because our world is independent, whereas 
possible worlds derive from mental activity such as storytelling or dreaming.14 Rescher’s position 
claims that possible worlds are dependent on conditions in our world, whereas Lewis believes that 
each possible world is as real as every other. My aim is not, however, to intervene in debates about 
the ontological status of possible worlds, but to use “the background of this model frame,”15 as 
Doležel puts it, to establish the boundaries within which my thesis can be applied. I will be referring 
to fictional worlds as individuated and independent from our world, meaning that they are distinct 
from our experiential reality, and that events within our world do not alter existing fictional worlds. 
I will use the term real with respect to fictional worlds and their contents not to stake an ontological 
position, but to promote a discourse in which fictional worlds can be studied independently of the 
actual world without repetitive qualifications. The term ‘actual world’ is often used in the Lewisian 
sense, to refer to the world that is seen as ‘real’ by its inhabitants (whether that is our world, or 
another possible world).16 However, since my project is critical rather than philosophical, in the 
sense that it focuses the critical possibilities of reading within fictional worlds rather than the 
philosophical question of their ontological status, I will be referring to our world as the ‘actual 
world,’ and sustaining the term ‘fictional world’ to refer to the world that is described by a text and 
where the inhabitants behave as if their world is real.17 I do this primarily to limit any confusion of 
terms, and to maintain as clearly as possible the critical distinction between what domains of 
knowledge belong to our world and to the world of the fiction. In the fictional world of Fight Club, 
                                                          
14 Nicholas Rescher, “The Ontology of the Possible,” in Logic and Ontology, ed. Milton Munitz (New York: 
New York University Press, 1973), 166-81.  
Referenced in Ryan, “Possible Worlds in Recent Literary Theory,” 530. 
15 Doležel, “Mimesis and Possible Worlds,” 486. 
16 For example, Marie-Laure Ryan uses the term ‘actual’ in this sense. With reference to direct quotations, I 
will qualify which ‘actual world’ I am referring to as necessary going forward. 
17 The term ‘storyworld’ is often used interchangeably with ‘fictional world’ in possible world literary 
theory. However, I will not be using the term ‘storyworld,’ since certain aspects of my project (as in 
Chapters One and Four) distinguish the properties of the fictional world from the contents of the story and 
narrative, and I do not wish to muddy this distinction through ambiguous terminology. I also do not wish to 
conflate ‘fiction’ with ‘story,’ and so will avoid ‘storyworld.’ ‘Film world’ is common in film theory to 
describe the world of a given film. This term creates a dependent referential linkage between the fictional 
world and the medium of the narrative which is accessed by the audience. I will therefore limit my use of 
terms other than ‘fictional world’ in the course of this thesis. 
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discussed in Chapter One, I can therefore say that Marla Singer is real and chain smokes real 
cigarettes. I can also say that Marla Singer is not real in the actual world.  
Approaches to possible worlds in literary and film theory describe fictional worlds as worlds 
that derive from the text which describes them.18 This type of framework for fictional worlds 
mandates a medium-specific understanding of fictional worlds, such that the quality and content 
of the fictional world depends on the medium of the text and the form of the narrative/narration. 
Literature and film present narrative through very different mediums, but the reality of a fictional 
world depends on its fictionality, not on its narrative medium. The text, as a material object, differs 
between the mediums: paper and ink, print, or digitized text for literature, and images (and often 
sound) displayed on a screen for film. The forms of narration are similarly medium-specific (this is 
further explored in Chapter One). These manifestations of text and narrative belong in our world. 
They are the ways in which we read, view or hear aspects of the fictional world in the context of 
the actual world. However, my understanding of fictional worlds as individuated and independent 
implies that it is the content of the fictional world – for example, the details and conditions as they 
are experienced by the characters, which will be discussed shortly – and not the way in which we 
access the description of it in narrative and text that is relevant. As a result, the reality conditions 
of fictional worlds are distinct from the content and form of narrative and textual medium. By the 
phrase ‘reality conditions,’ I mean the totality of information which constitutes the reality of the 
fictional world; this includes physical and natural laws, events, states of affairs, and constituents.19  
Thomas G. Pavel’s Fictional Worlds works within a referential semantic tradition to bring 
together philosophical and literary views on fictionality and fictional worlds. Pavel’s work deals with 
philosophical questions around fictional worlds, and their relevance to a literary theorist’s potential 
use for a fictional world; with this in mind, he differentiates between “an external approach to 
                                                          
18 Pavel, Fictional Worlds, 42. 
19 In most cases, physical and natural laws are parallel in the actual and fictional worlds. The existence of 
conditions like gravity, momentum, weather, and so forth are taken for granted by readers because of their 
ubiquity and self-evidence in our experience. Characters also seem to take this type of law for granted. 
Readers will only posit changes to natural and physical laws if required by the text, a premise which will be 
explored shortly in reference to Marie-Laure Ryan’s theory of minimal departure. Although many of these 
fictional world reality conditions are similar to those of the actual world, they are not the same. Where a 
reader might use the similarity as a means to collapse the fictional world into their experience of the actual 
world, there remains a clear separation between the actual and fictional. For example, although Buzz 
Lightyear uses gravity, aerodynamics and momentum to “fall with style” in John Lasseter’s Toy Story (1995), 
it is not necessary – or likely – that exactly the same natural features which generate these forces in our 
actual world are those at work in the film. This would mandate that exactly the same universe and all of its 
contents are those experienced by the toys. Considering animated toys are not rampant in our world, it is 
possible – and likely – that the physical environment within Toy Story generates similar effects to ours 
without being dependent on the actual world for these laws. 
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fiction, which aims at gauging it against the nonfictional world, and an internal approach whose 
purpose is to propose models representing the user’s understanding of fiction.”20 He states that 
three essential aspects around the concept of the fictional world need to be differentiated: 
“metaphysical questions about fictional beings and truth; demarcational questions regarding the 
possibility of establishing sharp boundaries between fiction and nonfiction, both in theory and in 
practical criticism; and institutional questions related to the place and importance of fiction as a 
cultural institution.”21 The first two questions will help to inform my functional understanding of 
fictional worlds. The third question as to the institutional existence of texts is entirely concerned 
with the realm of the actual, and is tied to Pavel’s statements about “models representing the user’s 
understanding of fiction.” Although there will be links to socio-cultural, political and intertextual 
concerns in Chapters Two and Four in particular, Pavel’s third question is not exceptionally useful 
in establishing a fundamental structure of fictional worlds as I use them this my thesis. I have 
discussed the importance of demarcational questions above, with the conclusion that fictional 
worlds are individuated and independent. The metaphysical question regards the concept of truth 
and the role it plays within the fictional world. Pavel argues that  
Global truth is not simply derived from the local truth-value of the sentences present 
in the text. […] Moreover, a text can possess more than one level of meaning. […] It 
is therefore useless to set up procedures for assessing the truth or falsity of isolated 
fictional sentences.22  
Unlike possible world philosophers (such as Lewis),23 Pavel argues that the truthfulness of ‘micro-
truths’ (single statements) can be potentially irrelevant when faced with ‘macro-truths’ (the text as 
a whole).24 In this case, Pavel associates meaning or allegory with truth. He proposes that the text 
provides such an effect of cohesive reality that truthfulness can only be interpreted through 
reference to the totality of the text and to its larger social context. This is a crucial step for the 
theory of fictional worlds outside philosophy. Pavel’s arguments around macro-truths reflects his 
contemporary critical environment, which includes the formal and poststructuralist traditions 
which are derived from semiotic roots. In this discussion, the concept of macro-truth - expanded to 
include constituents and laws which are not directly stated by the text – can enable a discussion of 
fictional reality which can accommodate for characters who have altered perceptions (such as the 
                                                          
20 Pavel, Fictional Worlds, 43. 
21 Pavel, Fictional Worlds, 12. 
22 Pavel, Fictional Worlds, 17. 
23 Lewis, “Truth in Fiction,” 37-46. 
24 Pavel, Fictional Worlds, 17.  
16 
 
Narrator in Fight Club) or for characters who are unable to access the totality of a fictional reality 
(such as Shadow in American Gods). Statements regarding these characters can therefore be true 
of their experience but not necessarily true of the fictional world. This can be done without 
undermining the cohesiveness of the fictional world as a composite of reality conditions by 
encouraging a comprehensive view of a fictional world as a functioning reality rather than a 
prescriptive view of fictional worlds as limited by the content of their text. 
Doležel determines that truthfulness is linked to cognition: “Fictional texts as performatives 
are outside truth-valuation; their sentences are neither true nor false. This property of fictional 
texts, […] is a precondition of their world-constructing power.”25 Doležel takes a significant step 
away from Pavel’s position, dismissing the requirement of (philosophical) truth statements 
altogether when referring to the fictional world. He bases this upon the premise that there is a 
reciprocal necessity between textual activity and world construction. Such a reciprocity would 
mean that because the author was neither lying nor telling the truth while constituting the world 
through textual activity, there is no truth-valuation to be had. This position privileges the 
performative act, which here refers to all forms of fictional text, ranging from oral storytelling 
through written text and including audiovisual mediums like film.26  He does argue, however, that 
non-constative statements about a fictional world may be true or false.27 My approach looks away 
from textual statements and inward towards the fictional world, so a renaturing of this perspective 
is required. I agree with Pavel that truth in fictional worlds does not belong to the statement. I also 
agree with Doležel that truth statements have no value when referring to the textuality of the 
fictional world. However, as will be explored shortly, I do not agree that truth or authentication 
should reside with the author or text. In contrast, truth in fictional worlds relates to the internal 
coherence of their own reality conditions. Unless proven otherwise (by an unreliable narrator, by 
counterfactual information, or by other means), given fictional facts form the basis of determining 
truthfulness in the fictional world.28 
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privileges the position of the author/creator. In itself, referring to texts describing fictional worlds as 
performances is counterproductive for my position. However, the shape of Doležel’s logic is broadly helpful 
in structuring my own understanding of fictional worlds as having reality based on their fictionality. 
27 Doležel, “Possible Worlds of Fiction and History,” 806. 
28 Note that the term ‘truth,’ ‘true’ and ‘truthfulness’ are used in this project as general terms referring to 
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as used by David Lewis. 
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Fictional beings (including characters) form part of the metaphysical question asked by 
Pavel. The importance of character is explored throughout this thesis, but Chapter One specifically 
addresses the question of how it is made manifest. I will outline here the theoretical concerns which 
form the preliminary framework for that discussion. Pavel examines the position of fictional beings 
in fictional worlds through a semantic analysis of naming. He comes to the conclusion that “within 
fiction names work like usual proper names, that is as rigid designators attached to individuated 
objects, independent of the objects’ properties.”29 This indicates that a character’s name, like a 
name in the actual world, does not include reference to their properties, physical or otherwise. 
Pavel also calls for an abandonment of ‘blocks’, events or situations which create a referential 
history for non-real or fictional beings: “fictional beings do not necessarily come into existence 
through individual gates or blocks in their referential history; rather, their fate is linked with the 
movements of populous groups that share the same ontological destiny.”30 He argues for an 
“internal model” of fictional worlds in which fictional beings’ individuation and existence is relative 
to others, and therefore subject to degrees. 
Ruth Ronen elaborates on fictional facts: “fictional facts do not relate what could have or 
could not have occurred in actuality, but rather, what did occur and what could have occurred in 
fiction.” Fictional facts are things which did, does, or will occur in the fictional world in accordance 
with the fiction’s other reality conditions.31 She examines models for fictional characters, pointing 
out that perspectives like Pavel’s “[do] not necessitate ‘absolute’ existence. Fictional entities are 
only ascribed a selective set of properties as a symptom of their being existent without existing.”32 
She argues that characters (fictional entities) do not exist in (our) reality, even though they are 
existent within their own fictional world. As a result, they do not face the same requirements, 
privileges and properties as us. Fictional beings in Pavel’s model exist on a scale between actual and 
fictional, “reflecting the type of commitment one makes in introducing an entity.”33 Ronen’s 
statement speaks to the idea of indeterminacy, or incompleteness; in fiction, “fictional entities can 
have the property ‘p and  ̴p’ because there is no referent in relation to which either p or  ̴p can be 
determined.”34 She insists that there is a problem making truth statements about fictional 
                                                          
29 Pavel, Fictional Worlds, 37. 
30 Pavel, Fictional Worlds, 42. 
31 Ruth Ronen, Possible Worlds in Literary Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 9. Original 
emphasis. 
32 Ronen, Possible Worlds in Literary Theory, 118. 
33 Ronen, Possible Worlds in Literary Theory, 118. 
34 Ronen, Possible Worlds in Literary Theory, 109. 
In philosophy, the letter ‘p’ can stand as a marker for any proposition. ‘  ̴p’ is a negation of the proposition.  
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characters based on indeterminate facts: characters have nothing to refer to in order to either 
prove or disprove the veracity of a given proposition. Their difference from us by virtue of their 
fictional nature as existent without existing means that we cannot evaluate the truth about a 
fictional entity. Because of this, a given proposition can be both true (‘p’) and not true (‘  ̴p’). Like 
Pavel, Doležel believes that incompleteness can exist in degrees, is dependent on the author, and 
can be an aesthetic choice: “the fiction writer is free to vary the number, the extent, and the 
functions of the gaps [incompleteness]; his choices between gaps and fictional facts are determined 
by aesthetic factors […].”35 This view of characters as fluidly incomplete based on the author’s 
decisions answers the problem of indeterminacy in terms of literary theory.  
Both Pavel and Doležel’s perspectives privilege the author and the text, as is necessary 
when examining the fictional world in a textual or formal analysis. However, it is insufficient when 
the fictional world becomes the point of critical reading. Fortunately, from this perspective, the 
problem of incompleteness becomes less influential. The argument around incompleteness 
features significantly on our status as ‘existing’, which enables us to evaluate the truth and reality 
of things in our world by virtue of their being consistent or inconsistent with our own existence. 
When considering fictional entities from within the fictional world, however, the primacy of the 
existence of our world (considered through the author and reader) is displaced. Characters might 
be existent without existing from our point of view, but this condition is shared by all other 
constituents and aspects of the fictional world. It can therefore be said that they can indeed have 
a referential matrix, just not one that exists in the same way that we exist. Their reality, their 
incompleteness, and their truth value extrapolated from our text-based knowledge becomes 
inconsequential. Put bluntly, fictional characters are as real as they seem to be to themselves and 
to other characters. Although this is a fine point to distinguish, it becomes increasingly important 
when a characters’ perception of their own world differs from that experienced by everything else 
within that world. Films like Peter Weir’s The Truman Show (1998) capitalise on this distinction. 
Truman unknowingly lived his entire life in a film set for the entertainment of other members of 
the fictional world. He is real within the fictional world – he exists in the same way as other 
characters exist, and this is fundamentally unaltered. However, his perception of his own reality, 
himself included, is fundamentally at odds from that of all other constituents of the fictional world. 
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35 Doležel, “Possible Worlds of Fiction and History,” 794. 
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It is therefore possible, within the above argument, to say that Truman exists as a complete entity 
and experiences true events, despite the fact that his own referential matrix is false.  
The next concern Pavel has for fictional worlds is that of demarcation: “questions regarding 
the possibility of establishing sharp boundaries between fiction and nonfiction, both in theory and 
in practical criticism.”36 Although Pavel discusses several factors, the most important for this study 
is that of distance. Pavel states that “fictional distance appears to boil down to difference and, in 
order to be manageable, difference must be kept to a minimum.”37 By this statement, Pavel signifies 
that the actual and fictional worlds are linked, and their ‘distance’ from each other is founded 
exclusively on that which is different in the fictional versus the actual. Marie-Laure Ryan clarifies a 
similar point through the principle of minimal departure, arguing that as readers “we reconstrue 
the world of a fiction […] as being the closest possible to the reality we know. This means that we 
will project upon the world of the statement everything we know about the real world, and that we 
will make only those adjustments which we cannot avoid.”38 By this she means that there is 
propositional overlap between a model world (most often the actual world) and the alternate 
possible world (the fictional world), and any deviation from this overlap is equivalent to what is 
specifically identified as different in the text.39 While I agree with this principle with respect to how 
we as readers and viewers interpret the fictional world, I would emphasise that fictional worlds are 
independent worlds, meaning that they do not interact with our world. Some texts do explore the 
distinction between the actual and fictional world, but this is quickly collapsed. An example of this 
might be Mel Brooks’ Blazing Saddles (1974), in which the final chase sequence involves the 
characters ‘breaking out’ of their film onto the Warner Brothers studio campus, and carrying out 
their land dispute through other sets. These situations clearly reference the gap between the 
fictional and the actual by rupturing the third and fourth walls. However, this apparent distinction 
does not bridge the gap between worlds. The sequence may have been shot on the actual Warner 
Brothers studio lot, but once the lots and sets are ‘in’ the fictional world, they are distinguished by 
use and reference as fictional through participation in fictional events. The gap between the actual 
and the fictional is therefore maintained, and the implied bridge collapses back into the referential 
matrix of the fictional world. Despite this clear and persistent distinction from us, fictional worlds 
are not autonomous worlds.40 Were the fictional world autonomous, it would not have any 
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connection to the actual world. This is impossible: the text sketching the events of the world is 
necessarily created, exists, and received in the actual world. The independent fictional world can 
be perceived from our world in narratives in texts, but the reader’s perceptions, desires, or 
perspective cannot change the fictional facts within the text or the laws and states of affairs within 
the fictional world.41 Further, as Ronen states, fictional worlds “are not more or less fictional 
according to degrees of affinity between fiction and reality: facts of the actual world are not 
constant reference points for the facts of fiction,” and furthermore, “facts of the actual world have 
no a priori ontological privilege over facts of the fictional world.”42 Instead, the reader must 
acknowledge that the text exists in the actual world, but must behave as if the fictional world is 
nevertheless autonomous.43 
To synthesise the above discussion, the view I will be putting forward here can be 
extrapolated from the principle of minimal departure. Ryan defines this principle thus: “whenever 
we interpret a message concerning an alternate world, we reconstrue this world as being the 
closest possible to the reality we know.”44 Given that fictional worlds are different from the real 
world, the principle of minimal departure claims that our world and fictional worlds are as similar 
as possible. We perceive our world to be real, and characters in fictions behave as if they perceive 
their worlds to be real. We know or assume through lived experience and learned knowledge that 
the world is consistent and predictable beyond our experience and outside of our presence. This 
knowledge is based on our understanding of the states, laws, and events which dictate our reality 
(the factual domain).45 Characters in fictions also behave as if they know, or can assume, that there 
can be a predictable reality beyond their immediate experience based on their own factual domain. 
They also behave as if they can anticipate future events which have not yet happened (the 
actualisable domain), implying a cohesiveness between their understanding of reality and the 
causal links which are outside of their direct control.46 Fictional worlds manifest as complex realities 
with both factual and actualisable domains, of which the narratives we read or watch provide only 
partial information. An example of this would be Dan Trachtenberg’s 10 Cloverfield Lane (2016). 
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The characters are abducted and trapped in a bunker by a stranger and are told that there is an 
apocalypse outside the bunker, so they cannot leave. The abductees have no evidence as to 
whether the apocalypse is real or not, or what the nature of it might be should it be real. Despite 
having no proof, the characters spend the duration of their time in the bunker theorizing what the 
situation might be outside the door, demonstrating that they have made the basic assumption that 
there is a world they cannot know outside the bunker door. They assume that there are forces at 
play of which they have no experience and in which they are not active participants. At the end of 
the film, having overcome their murderous captor, the survivors escape the bunker, only to be killed 
by rampaging aliens. Evidently, the characters are not only aware of reality beyond their 
experience, but also that there are conditions of the fictional world reality beyond the scope of 
their knowledge. Considering that the fictional world manifests as a reality with both factual and 
actualisable domains, that characters behave as if they consider their world to be the actual world, 
and keeping the principle of minimal departure in mind, it follows that the critical position needs 
to be flipped toward the fictional world in order to generate conclusions beyond the limitations of 
the material text.  
Narrative and narration are actual world constructs which provide information about the 
fictional world for readers and viewers. According to Edward Branigan, “narrative is a perceptual 
activity that organizes data into a special pattern which represents and explains experience,” a 
constantly evolving framework that orders events and actions into a comprehensive and causal 
story.47 Although there are many different explanations as to what narrative may be, Branigan’s is 
clear, concise, and useful. It illustrates the constructed and individualised nature of narrative, and 
allows for the distinction between narrative and the fictional world in both literature and film. 
Narration is the way that this information is conveyed to the audience but does not prescribe events 
in the fictional world; it is an inefficient way to access the fictional world. Whether the approach to 
narrative focuses on questions of form and content (formalism and structuralism), signification 
(post-structuralism), or organisation and patterning (cognition theory), acts of narration are 
structurally linked to author, reader and viewer by virtue of its textual nature. Certain approaches 
– affect and sense theory, for instance – encourage active resonance with the experience of the 
fictional world, but even these originate and return to the actual world. Narrative and narration 
thus creates a causal and aesthetic system which allows the reader or audience to perceive the 
fictional world, but they cannot directly affect its reality conditions. This would appear to create a 
problem of access: since readers and viewers can only directly participate with narration and 
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narrative, and narration and narrative are not part of the fictional world, it stands to reason that 
they cannot interact with the fictional world. The answer to this dilemma, proposed in this thesis, 
is that characters perform this bridging function, creating an experiential reflection through which 
reader and viewer can engage with the fictional world: a process of projection which initiates the 
possibility of access to the fictional world as another reality.  
Theories of character tend to focus on its composition or construction. For Uri Margolin, 
James Phelan, Peter J. Rabinowitz, Robyn Warhol, and Brian Richardson, characters are an 
accumulation of traits, and are secondary to the narrative itself.48 This perspective is neatly stated 
by Margolin (1986), who believes that characters are a cumulative product of characterization and 
character-building across the narrative:  
Character […] is a signified, for which some other textual elements serve as signifiers. 
Within the (re)constructed narrative universe, characters and character traits are not 
primary. They presuppose other representational elements, such as actions, events 
and settings which are more fundamental as regards the ontology of the narrative 
universe.49  
In this model, characters are a functional requirement of narrative, and therefore cannot have the 
depth and mental properties of an actual person.50 Furthermore, a character cannot be fully 
composed until the narrative has finished and all of their textual attributes are discovered.51 In a 
later study (1990), Margolin refers to characters as non-actual individuals, which are “of some 
domain(s) of [the] possible world, and in it/them, it can be uniquely identified, located in a 
space/time region, and endowed with a variety of physical and mental attributes and relations.”52 
They are therefore distinct from others in their world (individuals can be “uniquely identified”), 
their world is non-actual (“member of some domain(s) of [the] possible world”), and non-actual 
individuals are constructed by a series of traits and actions (“a variety of physical and mental 
attributes and relations”). He posits three primary constitutive conditions that are necessary for the 
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fictional character. These are existence (which is composed of the referential systems of the text),53 
individuality (which includes both individually constant and universal traits),54 and distinctness and 
singularity from other individuals who coexist.55 For Margolin, characters are functional signifiers 
which are incidental to fictional narratives, do not have mental faculties, and can be fully described 
with categorical traits that are the cumulative effects of textually prescribed attributes.  
 Other theorists are similarly preoccupied with categorisation and functional analysis. In 
Narrative Theory: Concepts and Critical Debates, James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz state that 
characters are compilations of particular attributes, which “do resemble possible people, they are 
artificial constructs that perform various functions in the progression, and they can function to 
convey the political, philosophical, or ethical issues being taken up by the narrative.”56 In this model, 
these bundles of attributes exist to fulfil narrative and symbolic functions, based on different 
relations between the three components of character: mimetic (“resemble possible people”), 
synthetic (“artificial constructs”), and thematic (“to convey […] issues being taken up by the 
narrative”).57 As with Margolin, characters are a subset of the narrative itself, and constituted only 
by the traits implied by the text. Brian Richardson agrees with Phelan and Rabinowitz, adding that 
there should also be an intertextual component to character;58 Robyn Warhol takes an extreme 
stance in this direction, stating that “characters are marks on the page, made up of the alphabetical 
characters […]. They have no psychology, no interiority, no subjectivity. Characters are the 
representational effects the novelist creates in structuring the novel.”59 For Warhol, the 
personhood of the individual is removed from the concept of character: characters are determined 
and confined to textual content, and individuals are defined by their distinction from other 
characters and from the world around them.60 Each of these above models view characters as 
subsets of the narrative, subject to categories and subcategories which enable the theorist to 
reconfigure and structure character under the terms of the actual world and with respect the 
receiver. 
 These models are useful in textual analysis. In this type of critical reading, characters do not 
need to be more than that which is ascribed to them by the text, because the narrative is what is 
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being interrogated. They become less useful when the contents of the fictional world are examined 
separately from the narrative. Within the context of the fictional world, characters do seem to have 
their own mental processes, interiority, and subjectivity. Some elements of the above approaches 
will be useful in the chapters that follow, such as Margolin’s primary constitutive conditions: 
existence, individuality, and distinctness/singularity.61 These conditions can be outlined by the state 
of the fictional world as it exists beyond the narrative. Characters as individuals are internally 
coherent beyond their narrative functionality, and can generate or manipulate actions, events, and 
settings as much as they are generated by them, in the same – or even more spectacular – ways 
that we generate or manipulate our actual world.62 
 There is therefore a contradiction between the importance and essentiality of character 
within narrative, and the individual agency of the character within the fictional world. To address 
this contradiction, Murray Smith discusses the concept of twofoldness,63 as first proposed by 
Richard Wollheim.64 Twofoldness, or ‘seeing-in,’ is concerned with visual depictions of characters. 
It acknowledges the seeing of the surface on which the image is represented (such as the canvas of 
a painting), and the recognition of the object that is being shown (such as the character being 
painted). In Richard Wollheim’s words, “when we look at a picture, we see what the picture 
represents in the surface marked by the artist, and such seeing-in contrasts strongly with our 
ordinary experience of ‘seeing face-to-face.’”65 Smith emphasises that the two aspects do not 
negate each other; instead, “we apprehend both aspects of character simultaneously; neither 
aspect is eliminable from our experience.”66 The ineliminable nature of the surface may seem 
contradictory to the direction of my argument, but I largely agree with Smith and Wollheim. The 
reader’s and viewer’s engagement and understanding of character is fluid, and is in constant flux 
between the two aspects.67 It is impossible to ignore the construct of the text being read or 
watched, because this is the way in which the character, and the fictional world, is being conveyed. 
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However, it is necessary to acknowledge the distinction between “the surface marked by the artist” 
and “what the picture represents in” such a surface. Approaches to character as part of a 
constructed narrative are bound to the marked surface. In order to see-in, a methodology in which 
characters are approached as real within the fictional world is essential. Models like Margolin’s non-
actual individuals, and the compilation model of Phelan, Rabinowitz, Warhol and Richardson 
explore the marked surface in detail; seeing-in can provide critical readings that go beyond it. 
It is possible to have a character experience constituents and events differently than the 
way in which a reader might access the narrative, which is a prominent feature of genre when 
considered from within a fictional world. Textual elements such as genre are often overt, 
manifesting in every aspect of the text. Formal and structural approaches are based on ‘after the 
fact’ information, and arise after a critical analysis of the text.68  As such, they are not fundamental 
to a deeper understanding of the text, or of the fictional world. They are, however, fundamental to 
a deeper understanding of the critic’s particular point of view of literature. More communicative 
and meaning-oriented techniques situate the meaning derived from genre-influenced readings 
with the reader or critic themselves.69 They decode the importance of generic affiliation based in 
the information derived away from the text proper, rather than towards it. The actual world 
orientation is equally prevalent in approaches which focus on language use,70 socio-political 
impact,71 and intertextual or historical resonances with other similar texts for genre theory and 
criticism.72 Many of the hallmark components of individual genres hinge on the reader’s ability to 
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recognise familiar generic traits and to note intertextual resonances that invest generic 
components with meaning. In science fiction theory, for example, Darko Suvin posits that the 
substance of science fiction is that which is most distant from the ‘zero-world,’ which is the world 
of the author.73 This encompasses hallmark genre traits such as aliens and faster-than-light travel 
in science fiction, which are foreign from our reality. A similar framework is given by Kathryn Hume 
in her book Fantasy and Mimesis, which posits a ‘consensus reality’ which is “the reality we depend 
on for everyday action. We agree that food, oxygen and liquid are necessary for life; that bodies 
fall; that stones are solid and hard; that humans die.”74 Consensus reality is therefore our mutual 
reality, and literature’s interest comes from “the artistic motives for literary departures even from 
such basic realities as these.”75 In particular, the speculative genres such as fantasy and science 
fiction which appear in discussion in this thesis are largely defined by their departure from some 
aspect of the actual world. These examples of basic generic definition evidence the way in which 
genre reading centralises the world of the author and reader. All textual aspects which are relevant 
for each critical perspective is accounted for, except for the fictional world. Within the fictional 
world, the concept of genre dissolves into the reality conditions. Generic tropes (the space stations 
in Solaris, for example) are not a generic tendency but a reality, and unworthy of note. 
In this respect, the critical weight of genre dissolves into the fabric of reality in the fictional 
world. This is not to say that genre does not exist on the level of the fictional world. Characters in 
fictional worlds carry concepts of genre that influence their interactions with other characters and 
objects (such as Carmen’s disdain for Ofelia’s fairy tales in Pan’s Labyrinth in Chapter Four). Just as 
their world is not the same as the actual world, their concepts of genre are not the same as ours. 
Their ideas are informed by different texts, different histories, and different biases. They may 
resemble those of our world, but cannot be the same because of the different conditions of their 
reality. In Chapter Two, I will focus on the genre of science fiction with respect to Solaris, explore 
the nature of the science fictional world, and demonstrate that a fictional world-based critical 
perspective provides an expanded scope for genre theory. 
Chapter Two will also explore remakes, adaptation and versioning from the perspective of 
the fictional worlds of Solaris. My intention here is not to cover ground in the field of adaptation 
studies, but to use specific theories of adaptation to consider adaptation from within the fictional 
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world.76 This can be difficult, as an analysis of adaptation necessarily reflects upon the links between 
the new and the source text – a connection which is overtly tied to the actual world. A range of 
scholars have sought to emancipate the adaptation from its dependency on source material, and 
such a perspective can be tempting. Sarah Cardwell’s is one such approach, which leans towards 
considering adaptations “as films (or programs) in their own right – that is, not in relation to a 
source book.”77 This approach is particularly helpful in that it moves away from others which are 
focused on fidelity, medium-specificity, and comparison.78 At face value, this statement seems best 
able to allow for a fictional world-centric reading, since isolating an adaptation removes any 
problems of actual world resonance. This does, however, completely eliminate the necessity of 
questioning adaptations as adaptations, obfuscating or eliminating the important question of 
intertextual awareness rather than providing an alternative. Brian McFarlane aptly points out that 
once a viewer becomes aware of the source-adaptation relationship, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to remove this equation from the consideration of the adapted text:  
The film has the right to be judged as a film; then, one of the many things it also is an 
adaptation […] That is, the precursor literary work is only an aspect of the film’s 
intertextuality, of more or less importance according to the viewer’s acquaintance 
with the antecedent work.79  
The knowledge of source texts – or in the case of Soderbergh’s Solaris, source texts and previous 
adaptations and versions – becomes embedded in the rest of the contextual information which is 
at play when viewing an adapted film. Linda Hutcheon provides an exploration of adaptation which 
provides a useful starting place for the consideration of adaptation from the perspective of 
individuated fictional worlds. She believes that the inherent relationship between source and 
adaptation is a productive one: “an adaptation is a derivation that is not derivative – a work that is 
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second without being secondary. It is its own palimpsestuous thing.”80 The analogy of a palimpsest 
implies that the source material is embedded in the fabric of the adaptation, but that the process 
of creating an adaptation shapes it into something entirely new and distinct from the source. 
Hutcheon’s position, while hinging like others on the information of the actual world, provides the 
best point of departure for a study of fictional worlds in adaptations as adaptations while preserving 
the integrity of all texts involved.  
Following on the above discussion on the properties of fictional worlds, and using 
Hutcheon’s ideas of adaptation as palimpsest, discussing fictional worlds in adapted texts becomes 
clearer. As above, fictional worlds are individuated and independent worlds, regardless of the links 
the reader or viewer might form between it and the actual world. Hutcheon states that “adaptation 
is repetition, but repetition without replication. And there are manifestly many different possible 
intentions behind the act of adaptation: the urge to consume and erase the memory of the adapted 
text or to call it into question is as likely as the desire to pay tribute by copying.”81 She acknowledges 
that it is difficult to know the intention of the process of adaptation, but whatever its intent, the 
produced work is individuated: a repetition without replication. This leaves the linkages between 
the fictional worlds of adapted texts. Distinguishing independent fictional worlds in such texts 
depends on departures and deviations in reality conditions, including states of affairs, events, 
characters, and objects. With such criteria, it is possible to distinguish between adaptations and 
variations which depict distinct fictional worlds (through a difference in reality conditions) and 
those which do not. While comparing adaptations and evaluating their fidelity is not particularly 
helpful from the perspective of fictional worlds, it is an approach which can help to identify the 
areas of distinction between fictional worlds. Among the more obvious distinctions are those which 
are medium-specific. These distinctions are not useful with my approach, as discussed above, since 
the form of narration belongs to the actual and not the fictional world. Instead, it is the distinction 
in reality conditions which is helpful, since the reality conditions of the fictional world are essential 
in its constitution and cohesion. In Fight Club, for example, the novel has Tyler planning to destroy 
the Parker-Morris building and the neighbouring museum.82 In the film, however, it is the 
headquarters of several notable credit card companies which are destroyed. Similar sequences of 
events take place in both worlds, and all of the natural laws seem to be consistently parallel. And 
yet, there is a fundamental distinction: in one world, two buildings are targeted, whereas in the 
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other the entire skyline is leveled. The planning, execution, and resulting realities are fundamentally 
distinct. Although the film is clearly an adaptation of the novel, it becomes obvious in this 
destructive difference that the reality in which the characters participate in the film is not altered 
by the plans made in the novel. Although Fight Club clearly demonstrates the palimpsestuous actual 
world relationship between an adaptation and its source text, so too does it also define their 
individuation and distinction from each other.  
It is also tempting here to lean on indeterminate truths as an easy way through the problem 
of similar fictional worlds. Indeterminate truths in fiction relate to statements which cannot be 
verified as true or false because of the incompleteness of fiction. For distinctions in the adaptations 
of Fight Club, for example, it is possible to point to fundamental differences in the ending. In 
Palahniuk’s novel, The Narrator finds himself in a mental hospital, whereas Fincher’s film ends with 
Marla and the Narrator witnessing the destruction of the city.83 It cannot be said that in the film the 
Narrator does not find himself in a mental hospital after these events. It cannot be said because 
there is no evidence against the Narrator’s time in a mental hospital in the film, just as there is no 
evidence for it. It simply is beyond the scope of fictional facts made accessible by the narrative. 
Because of indeterminate truths – and the inadequacy of narrative to represent the totality of a 
fictional world – it could be easily argued that all fictional worlds can be assumed to be distinct. It 
would follow that the primary point of individuation between fictional worlds could be that of 
indeterminate truth, since it is impossible to prove similarity or difference based on the information 
in the text. This position does, however, seem equally counterproductive as it is useful, since the 
opposing argument could just as easily be made. This position of exploiting the idea of 
indeterminate truths in fictional worlds is simply not practically helpful; it dismisses the question 
rather than responding to it. Using indeterminate truths as a practical argument also enables the 
critical reader to discuss fictional worlds in her own frame – to access the fictional world she wants 
– rather than to consider the reality conditions and states of affairs that can be verified. 
I return here to Linda Hutcheon’s view on adaptation, in which “although adaptations are 
also aesthetic objects in their own right, it is only as inherently double – or multilaminated works 
that they can be theorized as adaptations.”84 Although this thesis is focused on finding a way into 
– and through – the fictional world, when it comes to adaptations as adaptations, texts are indeed 
“inherently double – or multilaminated.” In the pursuit of considering adaptations from the 
perspective of the fictional world, it is therefore helpful to consider “our memory of other works 
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that resonate through repetition with variation.”85 In this case, fictional worlds in texts which are 
adaptations, versions, or otherwise palimpsestuously related with another can be distinguished by 
a comparison of fictional worlds with the intention of practical analysis. Such a comparative analysis 
can help to differentiate between changes in the actual world existence of the text versus those of 
the fictional world. Changes in the fictional world in subsequent iterations might include changes 
in events, states of affairs, or even reality conditions. Changes in the actual world text which may 
not subsequently result in changes in the fictional world can include digital remastering, marketing, 
DVD formatting, or even omission (omission would make said omitted element an indeterminate 
proposition, if there is no direct proof that said event or fact was indeed absent from the 
adaptation’s fictional world).  
The Star Wars franchise, for example, is notorious for its versions and variations which 
produce distinct fictional worlds. Star Wars: Episodes IV-VI saw fundamental changes and re-
releases after three prequel films were made. In the 1977 theatrical release of Star Wars: Episode 
IV – A New Hope, in a cantina on a planet names Mos Eisley, Han shoots an alien named Greedo 
dead before he has a chance to shoot back.86 In the 1997 DVD release, the scene is altered so that 
Greedo shoots first, and in the 2004 DVD release, Han and Greedo shoot simultaneously.87 It is 
impossible for three counterfactual situations to be true: Han shot first, Greedo shot first, no one 
shot first. The only possible solution is that alterations like this one (and many others across the 
trilogy) alter fictional facts which constitute reality conditions of each film, establishing alternate 
fictional worlds for each version. Versions which do not represent distinct fictional worlds have 
additional (or removed) narrative information which does not alter the reality conditions already 
described by the previous edition. The Fellowship of the Rings, part one of The Lord of the Rings film 
trilogy, for example, was released on DVD in both theatrical and extended versions.88 In the 
extended editions, the reality conditions of the fictional world are unaltered, the only difference 
being that the viewer has access to more information about the fictional world through extended 
scenes. Editions can also depict the same fictional world, despite their publication differences: in 
America, J.K. Rowling’s first Harry Potter novel was released as Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s 
Stone, while it was released in the UK and elsewhere as Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone.89 
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This change had reportedly been made for marketing reasons, due to a suspicion that the term 
‘sorcerer’ sounds more magical for an American readership.90 There is no difference to the fictional 
world as it is described by the contents of the narrative in either edition: all differences lay with 
publication, word choice and reader reception. Each edition and subsequent publication of the first 
Harry Potter novel describes the same fictional world, because there is no departure from 
established realities and the way in which these realities are manifest within the fictional world. 
This remains for other such alteration in subsequent publications, including correction of spelling, 
grammar, and form, marketing, alteration to title, and addition of footnotes, glossaries, maps, and 
appendices.  
As seen above, fictional worlds in adapted texts are independent worlds whose intertextual 
resonance belongs to their actual world relationships. They can – and should – therefore be subject 
to the same fictional world-oriented critical methodology as non-adaptive texts. The above 
approach of using the actual world textual resonances of adaptations to parse information about 
the individualised fictional world does, however, give rise to the problem of referring to fictional 
worlds from adapted texts without referring to the fictional world itself as ‘adapted.’ As is most 
common in film studies when referring to adaptations of the same title (like Solaris), films are 
referred to by the author or director’s name (for example, Soderbergh’s Solaris). This is effective in 
differentiating between the texts themselves, but presents some complications within a fictional 
world-centric methodology. Referring to a fictional world by an author or director’s name ties the 
fictional world itself to the actual world through the creator. While the creator is responsible for 
the narrative and the text which describes the fictional world, s/he is not responsible for the reality 
of the fictional world. The film – and not the fictional world – is Soderbergh’s Solaris. A possible 
solution to this would involve a prefixed phrase in the modal style, such as “in the fictional world 
as it is described by the text of Soderbergh’s Solaris.” While this rectifies the problem of conflating 
fictional world and text, it is unwieldly and not wholly unproblematic, considering the vast number 
of crew required to ‘author’ a film, graphic novel, or other forms an adaptation might take. Another 
common method of differentiating adapted texts is referencing the date of publication or release 
(such as Solaris (1961)). This method is more concise than the above prefacing statement, and 
removes the problematic issues around single authorship. However, it binds any discussion of the 
fictional world to the historical, social and political context of the text, which again refocuses 
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criticism on the actual world.91 These fictional worlds described in adapted texts are their own 
independent worlds, and not versions of a single world. It seems, then, that it is nearly impossible 
to avoid embedding actual world information into the referential language around adaptations, and 
traditional ways of identifying texts (by author, director, or date) must still be used. However, I 
propose that these identification markers should only be used with the distinct understanding that 
they are being used as ‘tags,’ and not vessels for the fictional world. This will help maintain a clear 
focus on the fictional world as it differs from the actual world. 
Now that the status of fictional worlds in adaptations has been addressed, the earlier 
discussion around characters as points of access into fictional worlds becomes complicated with 
respect to adaptations. Reality conditions do not flow between adaptations; changes to one world 
will not enact change in another established fictional world. This applies also to characters, which 
maintains the internal integrity of fictional worlds and their occupants. As Margolin points out (page 
23), constitutive conditions for characters are that they exist, they are individual, and they are 
distinct/singular.92 There are characters which do not fulfill these requirements across texts, and 
fail one or more condition through similarity across consecutive texts. These characters can be 
called trans-world, transient, or counterparts.93 Transworld characters derives from the philosophy 
of possible worlds, in which one individual can exist in more than one world, as an “identity across 
possible worlds.”94 Transient characters are characters of one world which appear in others, and 
counterparts are individuals who are the closest possible (ie – more similar than any other 
individual) to a specific individual in a particular world and “is our substitute for identity between 
things in different worlds.”95 Margolin brings these perspectives together when referring to 
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prototypes, where “the first story or primary source of information about this IND [individual] 
defines the original or home world of the IND to which it is native. When the ‘same’ IND occurs in 
other story worlds, he is an immigrant in each of them;” in so doing, the ‘prototype’ develops 
‘surrogates’ or ‘counterparts’ which inhabit other story worlds.96  
In the comic Deadpool Kills Deadpool, for example, Deadpool kills other Deadpools by 
breaking into their worlds.97 Deadpool can kill off other counterparts without fundamentally 
altering their existence in their own fictional worlds described in their own comic books. This is 
because, while he may have been in their story world, he stayed in his own fictional world. Most of 
the dead Deadpools are counterparts of themselves, as they appear in their own graphic novels in 
their own continuities. Following through Margolin’s position in application to adaptations, 
however, the implication is that adapted characters are ‘surrogates’ of the original ‘prototype,’ 
therefore rupturing the individuation and independence of fictional worlds in adapted texts. I 
suggest that labels such as transient, transworld, counterpart and prototype are useful within the 
scope of a fictional world, such as in Deadpool Kills Deadpool. They are less useful, however, 
between fictional worlds. I therefore propose to consider characters in fictional worlds as 
individuals and, as when discussing the fictional worlds of adaptations, only use the actual word 
resonances of adaptation when it is a useful tool for critically parsing fictional world facts.  
Having established the way in which I will be addressing fictional worlds, characters, and 
adaptations, I will now turn to the question of complexities within fictional worlds. Chapter Three 
of this project will take a modified view of what Daniel Yacavone terms the world-in view of fictional 
worlds. Yacavone contrasts the world-in view with the more usual world-of view. He describes the 
world-of view as seeking  
to describe and understand the nature and comprehension of fictional, narrated, or 
so-called diegetic worlds of represented places and events in a common space and 
time inhabited by characters, which are […] referenced and communicated through 
a film’s audiovisual form. These accounts are largely self-limited to what films are 
                                                          
96 Margolin, “Individuals in Narrative Worlds,” 864-5. 
Note that I am using story worlds here as worlds distinguished by particular plots and stories, as opposed to 
fictional worlds which are distinct fictional realities. Multiple story worlds can exist within the same fictional 
world, as will be seen in the case of the Deadpool comics, and later with Pan’s Labyrinth in Chapter Four. 
97 Cullen Bunn, Deadpool Kills Deadpool, issues 1-4 (New York: Marvel, 2013). 
34 
 
about in terms of a story rather than what they also are, as created, unified works 
[…].98  
Yacavone differentiates between the formal aspects of narratives which describe storyworlds 
(world-of), and what fictional worlds are as holistic created worlds, as well as what they might 
mean.99 As described in the above sections detailing my critical approach, the world-in approach is 
crucial for recognising the internal cohesiveness and reality conditions of the fictional world. Yet for 
Yacavone, this world-in distinction is still tied to interpretive models, referring to fictional worlds as 
products of “unified works” that might carry a discernable meaning. This model clearly does not 
serve for my critical requirements of independent fictional worlds. However, Chapter Four explores 
the concept of flexible fictional realities, which can be manipulated by the characters themselves 
using properties of the mythic. In this context, characters struggle with the distinction between the 
world-of and the world-in, engaging directly with the authorial process of creating.  
  The mythic perspective mediates the distinction between the world-of and the world-in 
points of view. Recognition and engagement with the mythic in literature requires a clear 
distinction between the concepts of fantasy and the concept of myth.100 For Tzvetan Todorov, the 
fantastic is an ephemeral experience, a moment of hesitation: “the fantastic occupies the time of 
uncertainty, from the moment we choose one or the other response, we leave the fantastic to enter 
a neighboring genre, the uncanny or the marvelous. The fantastic is that hesitation experienced by 
a person who knows only the laws of nature, confronting an apparently supernatural event.”101 The 
hesitation manifests when the reader encounters something which they cannot explain, and 
therefore must come to the conclusion that it is either uncanny (the supernatural explained as the 
natural) or the marvelous (the supernatural accepted as supernatural). According to Todorov, once 
this decision is made, the work ceases to be fantastic. This definition is useful, as it touches on the 
paradox of fantasy as a transient concept, particularly when the marvellous appears within a 
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fantastic text in the form of myth. By extension, Todorov’s work exposes the tension between the 
position of the reader and the fictional world of the text. The fantastic and other fantasy elements 
are not considered so within the fictional world, but from the perspective of the reader and their 
understanding of their own reality conditions, including natural laws and states which do not align 
with those of the fictional world. Kathryn Hume obliquely refers to the emphasis fantasy literature 
places on the understanding of the actual world on the part of the reader. She calls this ‘consensus 
reality,’ a term which implies that we (as members of the actual world) form collective assumptions 
and rules concerning how our world works.102 Fantasy (as a speculative fiction) is therefore a 
knowing departure from this consensus reality. 
Myth presents an interesting case from within fictional worlds, since myth in the actual 
world is not easily defined or encapsulated, and therefore can be difficult to distinguish under the 
umbrella of fiction. Northrop Frye says of myth that “when what is written is like what is known, 
we have the art of extended or implied simile. And as realism is an art of implicit simile, myth is an 
art of implicit metaphorical identity.”103 He considers myth to be analogous to experience, but not 
its mirror. He goes further to say that “myth, then, is one extreme of literary design; naturalism is 
the other, and in between lies the whole area of romance, using that term to mean, […] the 
tendency […] to displace myth in a human direction and yet, in contrast to ‘realism,’ to 
conventionalize content in an idealised direction.”104 For Frye, then, myth is not at odds with 
rationality or truth, but with realism. Although Frye’s perspective depends heavily on a structural 
(albeit a partially meta-structural) reading of myth as a literary form, his perspective proves useful 
when considering how mythic inclusions can distort a characters’ relationship to their own 
perception of reality. In novels like American Gods and Anansi Boys, the mythic is part of the reality 
conditions of the fictional world, and there is no avoiding it. In these situations, then, in order to 
accommodate the mythic, it is necessary for aspects of the fictional reality to be displaced “in an 
idealised direction.”  
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Paul Ricoeur takes another perspective on the mythic, stating that it is “a disclosure of 
unprecedented worlds, an opening on to other possible worlds which transcend the established 
limits of our actual world.”105 Where Frye posits a continuum between our ideas of the real and the 
idealisation of myth, Ricoeur distinguishes the content of myth as alternative – another possible 
world entirely. Pavel provides a formal schema which allows for the inclusion of the mythic – which 
is, as Frye points out, at odds with realism – within a fictional world without undermining the reality 
of that world, and which accounts for Ricoeur’s position. He distinguishes between ‘flat’ and 
‘salient’ ontologies of fictional worlds, which are always presented relative to characters. The flat 
structure is “composed of just one universe containing a base, the actuality, […] [and] they allow 
for no alternative base for any movement outside the given actuality and its constellation of 
possibilities.”106 This is the primary fictional world which has its own natural laws and in which no 
element breaks those laws. Conversely, according to Pavel, a fictional world may have a salient 
structure: “we may distinguish between primary and secondary universes within dual structures, 
the former constituting the foundation upon which the latter is built.”107 Essentially, salient 
structures contain those states of affairs which are not included (or do not have referents) in the 
primary fictional world. Examples that Pavel provides for salient structures are sacred regions such 
as religion, and plural possibilities within one fictional world such as Don Quixote’s view that 
windmills are giants versus Sancho Panza’s view that windmills are windmills.108  
Pavel’s structure is very useful is positing that there can be alterations to fictional facts 
within a fictional world without fundamentally disrupting the rest of the fictional world. However, 
his rigid demarcation, while necessary when viewing fictional worlds under the umbrella of possible 
worlds theory, does not seem to accurately represent the ways in which characters manipulate and 
flex their engagement with reality. In the case of Don Quixote, for example, it is not necessary for 
there to be a salient ontology in which windmills are giants. It is entirely possible – and likely, within 
the novel – that Don Quixote perceives the windmills to be giants, while Sancho perceives them as 
windmills. Their views, while at odds, are not in violation of the reality conditions of the fictional 
world. This is increasingly obvious as the novel goes on, and Don Quixote and Sancho continue to 
be able to enjoy each other’s company, despite their radically distinct views of their world. Instead, 
I would propose that Don Quixote is constituting for himself a cohesive mythic space which 
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becomes increasingly real for him as he continues to interact with it. In this way, the malleability 
which is the privilege of fiction allows for a more flexible foundation for reality than exactly that 
proposed by Pavel. 
In addition to the important question of reality, myth in literature also seems to necessitate 
an actual world intertextual network. Brian Attebery posits that myth “designate[s] any collective 
story that encapsulates a world view and authorizes belief.”109 Attebery considers myth to be 
collective, and therefore it requires a synchronic perspective, which is counterproductive for my 
position in that it prioritises the actual world. He does go on to state that myth in literary texts is 
mythology robbed of its historic and cultural purpose: “literary texts do not come immersed in 
belief systems, ways of life, and interpretive schemata, as do myths in oral cultures. That is the 
other part of fantasy’s mythic method, to provide living contexts to replace the ones stripped from 
mythic texts.”110 He sees the mythic in literary texts as a bare version of contextualised traditional 
storytelling and performance, seeming to imply that literary texts have done a violence (“stripped 
from”) to traditional storytelling in the process. He does, however, posit that the literary text 
establishes a different context within which the myths maintain an altered ideological and social 
power.  
Attebery’s proposition that contemporary literary myths constitute alternative contextual 
spheres for mythology is evident in contemporary literature. Selected retellings like Roger D. 
Abraham’s African Folktales, Neil Gaiman’s Norse Mythology, and Steven Fry’s Heroes and Mythos 
tell ancient stories for consumption by a contemporary audience, through which the modifications 
of ancient stories participate in a contemporary social and intertextual context, renewing their 
relevance and longevity.111 Novels like Margaret Atwood’s The Penelopiad engage readers in a 
political feminist twist on the familiar story of The Odyssey, and others like Rick Riordan’s The 
Lightning Thief re-engage younger generations in classical mythologies by modernising its setting 
and targeting a younger audience with teenage characters.112 I argue that Attebery does not go far 
enough in this direction. In a text, familiar mythic connections do reinforce intertextual connections 
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and dependencies. In a fictional world, the mythic can take on a more pragmatic and flexible stance. 
In Ryan North’s graphic novel The Midas Flesh, for instance, King Midas’ touch is so potent that it 
turns the entire planet Earth to gold.113 His preserved body (the only thing saved from the ‘gift’) is 
discovered far in the future, his finger harvested by the interspecies crew of a space ship to be used 
as a transfiguring weapon against other spacecraft. The Midas Flesh put classical myth in dialogue 
with the intertextual spheres of science fiction, visual arts, popular culture, and (quasi-) scientific 
discourse (Midas’ flesh is not decomposed after thousands of years because his golden touch means 
that no bacteria or other decomposers survived contact). The Midas Flesh also shows a fictional 
world existence for Midas’s golden curse which does not depend on any linkages with its many 
traditional manifestations, and which enables the laws which govern Midas’ curse in the graphic 
novel to differ from those in the classical myth. In the graphic novel, Midas’ power turns everything 
he touches into gold. In addition, objects made golden turn everything that they touch into gold. As 
a result, within minutes of obtaining his ‘gift’ of golden touch, the entirety of Earth and everything 
on it was turned to gold and thus destroyed. This also means that the slightest touch of Midas’ flesh 
could be used as a powerful weapon, where one touch would turn an entire ship and its crew into 
metal. This law is part of the reality of the fictional world. Earth is entirely gold, and the crew of the 
spaceship use a severed finger to destroy an attacking spacecraft. There is no necessity for the 
traditional myth to exist in the context of the fictional world because the context and ideology in 
The Midas Flesh are the only operators for the characters within the fictional world. The reality of 
the completely destructive Midas touch in The Midas Flesh is therefore in no way contingent upon 
the limited effects of Midas’ curse in the classical tradition. 
In Chapter Three, I suggest the existence of mythopoeic voice, where a character creates a 
mythic reality by speaking or willing it into being. This is an extension of the flexibility and 
independence of fictional myth, seen above. Characters with mythopoeic voice construct mythic 
spaces which are embedded within the fictional world itself. This mythic space is not a ‘salient 
structure,’ syphoned off of the reality of the fictional world, but Pavel’s conceptualisation can once 
again be useful here. As will be evidenced in Anansi Boys and Pan’s Labyrinth in the upcoming 
chapters, manifestations of mythopoeic voice are indeed interactional, as characters directly 
manipulate created objects and are even lost in mythic time. However, with a slight nod to Pavel’s 
model, it is also possible to note that these constructions of mythopoeic voice do not necessarily 
fundamentally or permanently alter the reality conditions of the fictional world. When the mythic 
becomes part of the reality conditions within the fictional world (whether it is for one character or 
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many), seeing the fictional world from Yacavone’s world-in perspective becomes increasingly 
necessary. The contexts of the fictional world become the consensus reality against which fantastic 
and mythic inclusions are judged, and the role of the actual world reader dissolves behind the 
fantastic voices of a mythopoeic character.    
It is therefore possible that the fictional world might be distorted or distended by a non-
consensus inclusion, such as with elements of the mythic or mythopoeic voice. It is also possible 
that the reader or viewer might perceive such a distortion of the consensus reality or reality 
conditions of a fictional world without that distortion manifesting in the same way within the world 
itself. Chapter Four looks closely at time in film, which is one of the ways in which these distortions 
might present differently for the audience than for the characters themselves.  In the discussion of 
Cronos, The Devil’s Backbone, and Pan’s Labyrinth I will be extending the views already discussed 
in this section to include considerations of time within the fictional world. In particular, I will be 
reflecting on the concepts of distinction (Currie and Cardwell), duration (Bergson and Deleuze), and 
experience (Mroz) as they can be applied to the fictional world. 
Gregory Currie points out that narrative arts like film have a different temporal nature than 
many other art forms. Unlike some less temporal art forms (for example painting or sculpture), in 
which time is related to aging (time elapsing in our world, resulting in the painting itself getting 
older), in narrative arts (like film and literature), time unfolds.114 This is to say, there are “temporal 
relations between constitutive elements of the work,” meaning that there is a temporal relationship 
within the elements of the fiction itself, as well as the temporal relationship of the physical text 
with our world.115 Film therefore “represents time by means of time,” using images that take up 
time on screen (elapsed real-world time) to represent fictional happenings that would unfold in 
story-time.116 It is important here to make clear the distinction between the image content (the 
actors, sets, and other real-world contents of the image itself) and the representation of the fiction 
(the characters, fictional world, and other elements of the fiction).117 In this case, we are discussing 
the representations of the fiction and not the content of the image. Currie uses this point of view 
to address what he calls the Claim of Presentness by considering the relevance of using tense to 
think about film. The Claim of Presentness is a position which arises from earlier claims as to the 
status of time in film, and argues that film is a persistent experience of present tense.118 Brian 
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Henderson provides an alternative to the perceived insistent present of film by proposing that films 
are inherently tenseless.119 However, by doing so he glosses considerations of both the duration of 
the narrative, as well as time elapsed offscreen (such as during jump cuts). Similarly, David Bordwell 
established a descriptive system of time in which the time of the viewer’s interpretive action, as 
well as the mechanical time of the film, generates a more fluid concept of film time that is freed 
from the concept of tense.120  
The positions of Henderson and Bordwell, however, require that the viewer imagines that 
they are watching the fictional events from within the story world itself, experiencing them as they 
actually unfold.121 Currie does not believe that films are inherently tenseless. Instead, he argues 
that “the failure of cinema to represent fictional events as tensed is a failure to represent them as 
tensed from the perspective of the viewer, not from that of the characters.”122 Here, Currie carefully 
distinguishes between the temporal experience of the viewer, and the temporal experience of the 
characters. Sarah Cardwell joins Currie in this view, stating that arguments such as those explored 
above tend to obscure important ideas with respect to film time and actual world time by conflating 
them.123 Currie’s and Cardwell’s arguments realise the importance of renaturing the critical 
language around temporality in film in order to recognise the distinction and independence of 
worlds. This is an essential distinction, one which places the experience of film time within the 
fictional world, untouchable by the temporal flow of the actual world. It is therefore Currie’s 
position, supported by Cardwell’s, which will influence my analysis in Chapter Four. 
Although Currie and Cardwell’s emphasis on the fictional world’s unfolding experience of 
time is crucial, philosopher Henri Bergson’s concept of duration will also feature in my analysis in 
Chapter Four. Duration and ‘clock time’ form polarities within Bergson’s work. He believes that 
duration is an expression of psychic time, a project of mental synthesis,124 whereas clock time is a 
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magnitude, and therefore measurable.125 For Bergson, duration is oriented on the experience of 
the present: “the real, concrete, live present – […] necessarily occupies a duration. […] What I call 
‘my present’ has one foot in my past and another in my future.”126 He refers to the present as a 
composite of past and future, because the exact ‘present’ image is impossible moment to capture; 
in the act of considering it or vocalising it, it becomes a past memory of sensations that are no 
longer being experienced.127 But the present cannot be restricted to the past, or it would cease to 
be ‘present.’ As such, it is also bound to the future, which feeds the continued experience of 
‘present,’ keeping it from being the exclusive domain of the sensory past. Bergson considers the 
present to be in essence sensory-motor,128 highlighting his belief not only in the continuous (non-
discrete) nature of the present, but also that duration (being the experience of the present) is 
intrinsically connected to mental synthesis, the psychic and rhythmic experience of time. It is 
therefore directly opposed to ‘clock time,’ calendar time, or chronological time. By positioning 
measurable time against duration, Bergson implies that measurable time is homogenous, 
conceptually dependent on space (for example, the frame rate of a film).129 His perspective on film 
considers it to be a clock experience of time, rather than one of duration; he believed that its 
production method breaks down movement and experience into static single frames, which are 
then re-imbued with movement when it is run through a projector.130 This led him to the conclusion 
that film time is not the interpenetrative continuum of the time of human consciousness.131  
 Gilles Deleuze addresses Bergson’s ideas that duration is not part of film time, and 
distinguishes between the Genettian term ‘duration’ (as measurable) and the Bergsonian term 
‘duration’ (as a mentally synthesized continuum).132 Like Bergson, Deleuze sees time as a split: “it 
splits in two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present pass on, while the other 
preserves all past.”133 There is a split between the present and the past which composes the present 
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(Deleuze calls this moment the ‘crystal-image’), similar to how Bergson frames his idea of the 
present that is the foundation of duration. This is “the perpetual foundation of time, non-
chronological time, Cronos and not Chronos.”134 Deleuze and Bergson therefore agree on the 
nature of the ‘present’ experience, whether it is duration or the crystal-image, and that this is 
connected to the experience of time passing, as well as the concept of time as a continuum. 
However, Deleuze disagrees with Bergson on the nature of time in film. Whereas Bergson sees 
cinematic images as a mechanical breakdown and illusory re-constitution of motion, Deleuze sees 
mobility, the essence of movement, as the fluid manifestation of time itself within the cinematic 
image. Rather than collapsing film into story and plot, Deleuze discusses film as an experiential 
whole, of which time is a fundamental element of cinema rather than simply a by-product of the 
cinematic mechanism. Although Deleuze frees film time from mechanisation, his argument does 
not overtly allow for discussion of the fictional world since it binds time to movement and 
representation of form in a visual medium. However, using Bergson and Deleuze’s 
conceptualisations and a starting point, it is possible to extend the fracture between Cronos and 
Chronos into the fictional reality. Relocating the idea of duration (as a non-chronological experience 
of ‘present’ time) to the personage of the character rather than the viewer can enable such a 
reading. By situating the character as the one who experiences duration, any previously essential 
referential linkages from the actual world to the fictional world are broken. The passage of time in 
the fictional world therefore becomes the chronological time against which duration can be posited 
with reference to the behaviour of characters.  
Situating the character as the site of duration in the fictional world is potentially 
problematic, as the viewer does not have direct access to the subjective experience of the 
character. In this case, Matilda Mroz’s perspective proves a useful point of departure. She seeks to 
draw out “resonances,” ways in which films impact the viewer bodily and affectively.135 Mroz 
therefore does not believe in referring to film time as ‘flat,’ ‘still,’ or measurable. Instead, she talks 
about depth, movement, and flux, which allows for the abstract experience of time to recall 
Bergson’s duration more than Deleuze’s crystal-image.136 Her position is related to the sensory or 
embodied approach to temporality, and considers how time as a sensorial experience can “put 
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meaning into flux” and disrupt other theoretical approaches.137 Mroz works with Bergson and 
Deleuze’s ideas of time, but changes their application to a viewer’s film experience rather than the 
visual emphasis espoused by Deleuze. The sensory perspective which underscored Mroz’ 
arguments is concerned with the embodied viewer, prioritising her physical or visceral response to 
a film’s narration. Although the clear emphasis on the experience of the viewer here is problematic 
for my position, Mroz’ concepts of resonance and flux can help a critical audience to reflect an 
empathetic or sympathetic embodied response in the viewer onto the character’s experience. By 
‘flipping’ an embodied response into positive engagement with the fictional world, it is possible to 
consider the internal environment of a character as it relates to their experience of time, such as 
with the experience of the uncanny child Santi in The Devil’s Backbone (discussed in Chapter Four). 
This process provides a foundation on which the viewer can simulate the experience of a character 
within the reality of the fictional world and as a result, frame the effects of durational experience 
from within the fictional world. Using a highly subjective approach when approaching time in 
fictional worlds also provides grounds for an analysis which extends the limitations of narration. In 
Pan’s Labyrinth, for example, it becomes clear that the narrative continuity of the film is itself 
subjectively distorted by Ofelia’s mythopoeic reality as it fails to keep pace with the events in the 
rest of the fictional world.  
 Each of the following chapters in this thesis will apply the above theoretical material to the 
chosen texts in order to test and exemplify their use in a fictional world-centric approach.  
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Chapter One: I am Jack’s Subjective Representation of Fight Club – 
Issues of Narration and Character 
 
This chapter deals closely with questions of narration and character with respect to Chuck 
Palahniuk’s 1996 novel Fight Club and David Fincher’s 1999 film of the same name. Each text 
manifests unreliability in its narration, and therefore present a difficulty for a fictional world-centric 
approach by prioritising the reader’s or viewer’s actual world experience of the text. In Palahniuk’s 
novel, the unreliability is intertwined with the Narrator’s subjective experience, blurring the facts 
of the fictional world in a self-referential puzzle. In Fincher’s film, multiple levels of narration create 
an authoritative hierarchy, which hides and misrepresents the reality of the fictional world.  
 Building on the concepts of fictional world and character established in Part One, and using 
narrative theory and close reading, this chapter will explore how the fractures of unreliability allow 
a reader or viewer to gain access to the fictional world as it is ‘objectively’ perceived by all the 
characters, not just the subjective narrator. In doing so, this chapter will show how the character 
and their experience, even when it is not an accurate representation of the fictional world, allows 
the reader or viewer to access the reality of the fictional world.  
 
Dancing With Myself – Narration and Character in Palahniuk’s Fight Club 
 
When reading Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club, in addition to a narrator’s notoriously unreliable 
narration, a devious intent and narrative delusion have a subjective and changeable relationship 
with the reality of the fictional world. Fight Club follows the insomniac experiences of the Narrator 
as he encounters Marla Singer, a support group addict, and the enigmatic Tyler Durden. After his 
apartment is destroyed, the Narrator moves into a dilapidated home with Tyler and they form a 
men’s fight club, which grows under Tyler’s leadership into an anti-consumer culture organisation. 
The Narrator comes to learn that his insomnia and trauma led to his personality fracturing into two, 
and that he is in fact Tyler; this leads to the conclusion of the novel, in which he and Marla deal 
with the fallout of Tyler’s actions. This fractured identity is reflected in fractured narration where 
chronological and narrative continuities are altered or obfuscated for the reader. The effects of the 
Narrator’s internal subjective experience therefore obscure the reality of the fictional world as it 
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might exist from the perspective of consensus reality.138 This does not, however, indicate that the 
reader’s inferences about the lies and deceptions of the narration are the sole arbiter of what ‘really 
happens’ in Fight Club. Instead, by relocating the subjective narration within the fictional world, it 
becomes possible to understand the interplay of the Narrator’s reality and the consensus reality. 
As a notorious example of unreliable narration, Fight Club provides an excellent example 
to interrogate the assumed linkages between the fictional world, the character, narration, and the 
reader. Unreliable narration is narration which does not seem to accurately account for the states 
of affairs within the fictional world. According to James Phelan, a narrator reports, interprets, and 
evaluates.139 This therefore puts the role of the narrator – who, in the case of Fight Club, is a 
character in the story – as one whose role is to communicate directly to the reader. An unreliable 
narrator is one who fails in any or all of the three tasks in “misreporting, misinterpreting, and 
misevaluating (in these cases readers need to reject the narrator’s version and, if possible, replace 
it with another one) and by underreporting, underreading, and underevaluating (in these cases 
readers need to supplement the narrator’s version).”140 Phelan even goes so far as to say that the 
reader can – and indeed must – actively participate in the act of narration in order to access the 
story when faced with unreliable narration. In Fight Club, the narrator has a fractured personality, 
one of whom is the Narrator and one of whom is Tyler Durden.141 Only Tyler is aware of both 
personalities for the majority of the novel, and so the narration, entirely in the voice of the Narrator, 
is misreporting and misinterpreting the majority of events.  
The body of the novel is a prolonged flashback, with the ‘present’ as a frame. In this present 
frame, the Narrator is aware of his double self, and is not during the prolonged flashback. The 
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reader is not given sufficient information to know of the Narrator’s fractured personality from the 
opening frame. For this reason, the structure of the novel itself is often pointed to as the primary 
culprit for the novel’s unreliability, since crucial information is concealed for the majority of the 
work, resulting in an extended misrepresentation of events. This textual approach, however, is not 
useful for a consideration of the impact that narrative unreliability has on a critical reader’s access 
to the fictional world. This is, in part, because this structural unreliability is not relevant to the 
fictional world: the characters do not zoom forward and back in time. It is the narration of events 
which is out of order, and not the events themselves. The text-based approach hinges on the 
sequential engagement the reader has with information, which is then constantly evaluated, 
amended (if necessary) for the sake of coherence, and then reapplied to the subsequent narrative 
events and narration. Alice Jeličková, however, points out that using the reader – and their 
referential reliance on the actual world for information on coherence and logic – is insufficient. She 
argues that: 
Obviously, the clues for narrative judgements were subject to a reconsideration in 
the process of reading: our reading shifted from creating a mental image or at least 
a structure of the storyworld compatible with the ‘normal’ world – and evaluating 
the reliability of the narrator on the axis of facts – to qualifying the relation of the 
storyworld as a whole to the particular temporary social domains as well as the 
private worlds of the characters. As a result, we do not have to judge whether the 
narrator gives a reliable report on their nature, but rather whether their autonomous 
existence may be vindicated within the storyworld. The gauge of the reliability of the 
narrator obviously is not located along the axis of facts.142 
Jeličková points out that using facts about the actual world to frame a cohesive response and 
evaluation of a potentially unreliable narration is not as useful when applied to a storyworld.143 She 
advocates that the reader should “qualif[y] the relation of the storyworld as a whole” to the “private 
worlds of the characters” equally to a textual qualification. The outcome of this would be that 
unreliability hinges on “whether their autonomous existence may be vindicated within the 
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storyworld.” This approach to ‘vindication’ of the autonomous existence of “temporary social 
domains” and “private worlds of the characters” is especially helpful in texts like Yann Martel’s 
novel Life of Pi, where the conclusion of the novel throws all narrative events as they are recounted 
by Pi into doubt as to whether the subjective or objective version of an experience is more 
truthful.144 Jeličková’s position is slightly different to the one I will take, but the critical move she 
makes in reframing the source of unreliability to the fictional world is a crucial one. In a similar 
move, I will be reframing the ensuing discussion of narration and unreliability within the fictional 
world, with the goal of identifying and distinguishing the fictional world from the unreliable 
subjective reality of the Narrator. 
According to Brian Richardson, unreliable narration can reproduce a “jagged fissure within 
a single subjectivity” and can “define more sharply or collapse more effectively conventional 
distinctions between different characters, competing narrative worlds, or tale and frame.”145 This 
jagged fissure between Tyler and the Narrator becomes equally problematic for the reader as a 
direct result of the narrative focalisation of the novel on the Narrator’s experience.146 Examining 
the point of unreliability in Fight Club distils out the narrative, narration, and the contents of the 
fictional world, allowing for a more precise view of what can be achieved with these distinctions. 
The body of the novel is an extended flashback. It opens with the final confrontation between the 
Narrator and Tyler, then moves backward in time to the beginning of the causal narrative. It is 
possible to identify four types of knowledge about the story, supported by this extended flashback 
structure, some of which directly engage the reader with the reality of the fictional world, some 
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which allow the reader access to the Narrator, and some of which belong to the actual world. These 
distinctions can be related to what the Narrator behaves or speaks as if he knows. The Narrator’s 
(un)awareness of his fractured personality is the point of origin to the unreliable narration, and 
provides a point of access where the critical reader can evaluate the reality of the fictional world, 
the reality and it is perceived by the characters, and the role of narration in accessing these differing 
perspectives. 
Fight Club’s unreliable narration enforces an extreme subjective narrative voice which 
figures strongly into critical work around political embodiment,147 the individual’s role in consumer 
culture and its politics,148 and identity.149 However, it also obscures the reality conditions of the 
fictional world to an extent that it is no longer certain that the text and narrative accurately depict 
the states of affairs of the fictional world. Gregory Currie asks a key question concerning the 
relationship between fictional worlds and their texts:  
For how does a particular fictional world, w, get to be the fictional world of [the given 
text]? Not because of any straightforward fit between the meaning of the text and 
world w; we want to say that, since this is an unreliable narrative, the text 
misdescribes w. So what extratextual mechanism links the text to this world and no 
other? More than one answer is possible, but whatever answer is favoured, the locus 
of our interest in the nature of unreliability must surely be the mechanism itself and 
not the world that mechanism locates. For it is in the workings of that mechanism 
that we shall find the justification for saying, ‘the text is a misdescription of this 
world, rather than a correct description of that one.’150 
Currie here questions whether a fictional world can be represented by an unreliable narrative, 
considering that the definition of unreliability is that the narrative misrepresents that world. There 
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is a fundamental rupture here between the critical reader who analyses the world of the text and 
the critical reader who analyses the fictional world. Currie believes the conflict inherent in 
unreliable narration is between the external perspective of the ‘implied author’ and the internal 
perspective of the conceptual narrator, since the fictional world (Currie’s world w) cannot properly 
fit within such an unreliable narrative.151 This is a useful dichotomy if the goal is a medium-specific 
analysis like Currie’s because the space between these two positions is that of the text (including 
its medium) and the reader. When the goal is to glimpse reality conditions of the fictional world, 
these two positions of externalised implied author and internalised narrator are therefore not the 
most helpful. I also suggest a slight amendment to Currie’s statement that “our interest in the 
nature of unreliability must surely be in the mechanism itself,” to include that our interest in 
reliability must surely be in the mechanism itself but also that which prompts the condition of 
unreliability in that mechanism – namely, the misdescribed fictional world. I propose that it is the 
relationship between the (often internalized) subjective perspective of the narrator and the 
evidenced consensus reality of the fictional world which can be useful in this respect.  
Creating a comparison between the subjective internalised voice of the narration of and 
the consensus reality of the fictional world can only begin with the information we have access to 
– what Currie might call the mechanism of an unreliable narrative. In Fight Club, this is the form and 
voice of the Narrator. It is possible to distinguish four different aspects of the Narrator’s relationship 
to the fictional world, including his intermittent hints at the consensus reality of the fictional world. 
First, the Narrator appears to be fully aware that he and Tyler are the same person from the 
beginning of the novel. Despite this, the narration seems to deliberately conflate the Narrator and 
Tyler:  
“This isn’t really death,” Tyler says. “We’ll be legend. We won’t grow old.”  
I tongue the barrel into my cheek and say, Tyler, you’re thinking of vampires. […] 
I know this because Tyler knows this.152 
In this instance, the Narrator references the ‘objective’ or consensus reality in which Tyler and the 
Narrator are one, by stating that “I know this because Tyler knows this”, with ‘because’ forming a 
parallel between Tyler’s consciousness and his own. He acknowledges that from the perspective of 
another character, the two are indistinguishable. The Narrator also reinforces the difference in his 
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subjective experience from that of the consensus reality by clearly distinguishing between the first 
person (“I tongue the barrel into my cheek”) and the second person (“Tyler, you’re thinking of 
vampires”). By wavering between integrating and separating himself and Tyler, the narration 
therefore constructs a dichotomy between the subjective internalised voice of the Narrator and the 
Narrator’s awareness that his perspective may not be that of other inhabitants of the fictional 
world.  
A second aspect of this passage which helps to distinguish the fictional world from the 
world of the text is that the Narrator seems to authenticate Tyler’s individuality while 
simultaneously undermining the authority of his own voice. Again, Currie provides a helpful starting 
point, explaining this effect “as a result of there being a certain kind of complex intention on the 
part of the implied author. […] An agent can […] creat[e] or presen[t] something which she intends 
will be taken as evidence of her intentions, and she intends that superficial evidence will suggest 
that her intention was X, whereas a better, more reflective grasp of the evidence will suggest that 
her intention was Y.”153 Again, Currie points to the implied author, carried in the internalised 
narrative voice as a conceptualisation of character voice as the culprit. He argues that the narrator 
has a textual reader-oriented intent, which is at odds with what is actually being revealed. Currie’s 
perspective, readjusted to look at the character and the fictional world (rather than the implied 
author and the text) demonstrates that, for his own reasons, the Narrator obfuscates the distinction 
between Tyler and himself. One way in which he does this is through direct and quasi-indirect 
speech, marked in the text as punctuation. Tyler’s speech is direct, marked with quotation marks 
(“this isn’t really death”). The Narrator’s speech is not distinguished by punctuation (“I tongue the 
barrel into my cheek and say, Tyler, you’re thinking of vampires.”). This distinction overtly marks 
the separation between Tyler and the Narrator by making it unclear whether the words are spoken 
aloud or whether the dialogue is internal. Furthermore, the lack of quotation marks for the 
Narrator’s speech without other markers of indirect speech unifies the Narrator’s words and his 
subjective thoughts. By extension, this seems to put Tyler ‘outside’ of the Narrator’s internal space. 
Conversely, it also seems to imply that the narrator is aware of the conflation of the two 
personalities, and that there is someone from whom this fact needs to be concealed. Currie might 
argue that in this case, the implied author (through the voice of the narrator) seeks to fool the 
reader. This argument is not helpful within the fictional world. The tacit implication of a deception 
points to a fictional world recipient of this narrative. It therefore puts the internal subjective 
experience of the Narrator in opposition to the objective consensus reality of the fictional world, 
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making the narration unreliable with respect to the fictional world and not only on the level of the 
text and reader. Because of the extreme unreliability, the Narrator’s experience indirectly becomes 
secondary to the experiences corroborated by other characters. 
 A pivotal factor in this process of the Narrator’s narrativisation of reality is narrative 
delirium. In the context of a fictional world, it can be said, with Lars Bernaerts, that  
The delusional world of the mad subject is textually presented as an alternative 
possible world […]. Through an act of (over)interpretation the alternative world is 
linked to the textual actual world. The mad subject processes impressions from 
reality in a markedly different way, but he is convinced that his delirium represents 
the real, actual world.154  
The narration therefore is decentered not only by unreliability (both intentional and unintentional), 
but also by delirium which brings them all together within the Narrator’s subjectivity, resulting in 
an unreliable narrative delirium. Bernaerts says of narrative delirium that “the reader, guided by 
narrative and rhetorical strategies, is ushered into the delusional world of the mad character in 
much the same way as he is immersed in the fictional world. At the point where the delirium is 
introduced, a fictional, imaginative recentering takes place”; “in other words, the delirium is not 
only a reaction to reality. It also alters reality, in the sense that the mad character is led by his 
alternative view in the interaction with characters who exist in the textual actual world.”155 
Bernaerts argues here that in narrative delirium, the experience of delirium constitutes the 
elements of the narrator’s own reality, which is at a distance from the reality of the fictional world. 
A similar effect can be seen in Dennis Lehane’s novel Shutter Island, in which Teddy Daniels believes 
that he is investigating the case of an escaped mental patient.156  As the novel progresses, Teddy is 
told that he is himself a patient of the institution rather than a U.S. Marshal. The novel never clearly 
resolves which story is the ‘true’ reality of the fictional world. In Shutter Island, the details of the 
narrative delirium becomes the reason and the logic behind Teddy’s behaviour. In order to see the 
other side in which Teddy is a mental patient, a recentering of reality needs to occur in order for 
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the narrative to cope with an alternative response. As in Fight Club, the reality of the narrative is 
recentered away from the objective reality of the fictional world.  
The narrative delirium of Fight Club, combined with the Narrator’s unreliability, thus 
generates two realities. The first is the internal narrativised experiences of the Narrator, and the 
second is the non-narrativised states of affairs and reality conditions of the fictional world. The 
Narrator’s delirium, combined with the persistent misrepresentation of the fictional world 
(unreliability) results in the Narrator presenting his listener with a simulacrum-like account of 
events. However, this formulated and curated relationship to the fictional world which the Narrator 
presents is alternately reinforced and fractured by the conflict between his subjectivity and his 
ability to interact with the fictional world. The Narrator’s insomnia and dissociation leads to 
increasingly regular blackouts, during which Tyler spends more and more time directly interacting 
with the fictional world. This in turn forces the Narrator deeper into his delirium and forces him to 
renegotiate his experience of the fictional world to suit the recentered reality of his delirium. The 
Narrator’s experience is a juxtaposition of simulacrum and hyperreal, a “mode[l] of a real without 
origins or reality […] the real is produced from miniaturized units, from matrices, memory banks 
and command models – and with these it can be reproduced an infinite number of times.”157 The 
Narrator constitutes his simulacral narrative from isolated elements of the fictional world which are 
then produced and reproduced until the experience of the real becomes as subject to 
narrativisation as the simulacrum. “Tyler asked me to type up the fight club rules and make him ten 
copies. […] The paparazzi flash of the copy machine in my face. The insomnia distance of everything, 
a copy of a copy of a copy. You can’t touch anything, and nothing can touch you.”158 In this excerpt, 
the Narrator seems unaware of the conflation of himself and Tyler, his awareness buried in the 
disassociating “insomnia distance” of his own experience. The reality of the fictional world is broken 
down into discrete decontextualized experiences, like a paparazzi photograph.159 These can then 
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Kevin Alexander Boon, “Men and Nostalgia for Violence: Culture and Culpability in Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight 
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be copied and taken out of their relative contexts until the real becomes secondary to the 
experience of disassociation: “You can’t touch anything, and nothing can touch you.” The narrator 
therefore seems to undergo an increasingly repetitive process of experiencing reality in discrete 
units between blackouts, decontextualizing these experiences, repeating them as a constitutive 
element of his own self-narration of the reality of the fictional world, and then couching his 
narration in a layer of unreliability which completes the representative simulacrum.  
 At the conclusion of the novel, the Narrator is fully aware of his and Tyler’s unity. He seems 
aware of the simulacrum he has constructed in the process of his narration, which both knowingly 
and unknowingly misrepresents the facts of the fictional world. He seems equally aware of the 
damage that his hyperreal experiences have done to the simulacrum that he believed in. As these 
contradictive experiences come together, the Narrator seems to experience the real, the hyperreal, 
and the simulacrum all together. After Tyler threatens to kill Marla, the Narrator shoots himself in 
the mouth with the goal of ridding himself of Tyler:  
Of course, when I pulled the trigger, I died.  
Liar.  
And Tyler died.  
With the police helicopters thundering toward us, and Marla and all the support 
group people who couldn’t save themselves, with all of them trying to save me, I had 
to pull the trigger.160 
This moves through each of the above described barriers to the reality of the fictional world, but 
also emphasises access to a corroborating perspective. The phrase “of course” in the first line 
creates the appearance of authenticity and authority, which is then undermined by “liar.” This is 
another occasion of what Currie refers to as complex intention, where the narrator “intends that 
superficial evidence will suggest that her intention was X, whereas a better, more reflective grasp 
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of the evidence will suggest that her intention was Y.”161 The Narrator therefore seems to be 
deliberately misrepresenting the fictional world in stating that “Of course, when I pulled the trigger, 
I died.” There is also a fluid and indeterminate use of pronouns, which is also reflective of 
unreliability. There is initially a clear distinction between “I” and “Tyler,” but in the fourth line, it 
becomes increasingly unclear who is a member of “us.” The “us” could be the Narrator, Marla, and 
all of the members of the support group who sought to help him. Conversely, it could be a unity of 
the Narrator and Tyler, as the repetition of “and” (“and Marla and all the support group people”) 
implies a separation between the units who are designated by “us,” and the additional units of 
Marla and the support group.  
The Narrator therefore in part seems to be recounting the logical (simulacral) story that he 
believed, in which he is only himself and not Tyler. In stating “when I pulled the trigger, I died,” the 
Narrator is recounting a logical sequence of events which is cohesive with his experience of Tyler 
as a distinct person. He then interrupts himself, creating a fracture in the apparent truthfulness of 
his experience with “liar,” forcing himself to evaluate the veracity of the statement with respect to 
feedback from the fictional world. He continues to think and experience, he is therefore not dead, 
despite his simulacrum story necessitating it. The Narrator tries again, with “and Tyler died,” which 
stands uncorrected. Ultimately, his delirium-oriented reality becomes incompatible with the events 
of the fictional world which is filled with “police helicopters,” “Marla,” and “all the support group 
people” who saw the Narrator performing all of Tyler’s actions. Faced with this overwhelming 
assemblage of reality confirmation, the Narrator “had to pull the trigger.” 
As the Narrator awakens after his self-inflicted injury, he believes that he has died and is in 
Heaven: “the angels here are the Old Testament kind, legions and lieutenants, a heavenly host who 
works in shifts, days, swing. Graveyard. They bring you your meals on a tray with a paper cup of 
meds. The Valley of the Dolls playset.162 After the fracture and partial collapse of the Narrator’s 
                                                          
161 Currie, “Unreliability Refigured,” 22. 
162 Palahniuk, Fight Club, 207.  
“The Valley of the Dolls” denotes that it is possible that the Narrator has seen the film Valley of the Dolls 
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fictional world might have a similar film titled Valley of the Dolls. This line also obliquely refers to the 
concept of “uncanny valley,” where the gap between the real and the simulation is wide enough for the 
difference between subjects to be noted, but close enough for it to be eerie. This is based loosely in the 
ideas of the uncanny, taken from Sigmund Freud. Chapter Four deals with ideas of the uncanny with 
reference to the film The Devil’s Backbone.  
Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” in Fantastic Literature: A Critical Reader, ed. David Santer (London: 
Praeger, 2004), 74-101. 
56 
 
simulacral narrativisation of his subjective reality in the gunshot incident, the Narrator’s delirium 
no longer necessitates a recentering of reality. As Bernaerts points out:  
Through the projection of an inner world, the represented world is psychologically 
motivated and reordered. Depending on the range of the delirium, elements of the 
textual world will therefore be understood as a representation of the subject’s 
consciousness and his unconscious. Even physical objects, sounds, smells, and other 
characters may need to be revised by the reader within the context of the embedded 
narrative engendered by the mad characters’ deviant mind.163 
Narrative delirium relates the subjective experience and the resulting narrativisation of internal 
reality. In this case, the Narrator’s ability to represent his situation in his narration is distinct from 
his own delirium. This rupture between delirium and narration is evident in his juxtaposition of the 
supernatural and the real: “the angels here are the Old Testament kind […], a heavenly host who 
works in shifts, days, swing. Graveyard.” He seems to acknowledge that the objective reality is that 
he is being tended by nurses who typically “wor[k] in shifts, days, swing. Graveyard” while 
maintaining his own coherent system of reference by referring to them as angels. It is unclear as to 
whether he does this to continue to accommodate his own delusion which was so damaged by the 
gunshot incident, or whether he is again demonstrating the complex intention of misrepresenting 
the fictional world. In either sense, the result is the same in recentering the reality of the narration 
on the facts of the fictional world. The facts of the fictional world become the given, and the 
Narrator’s delusional subjective reality becomes secondary within the narration. 
  Throughout the novel, the Narrator’s voice becomes increasingly unreliable as his mental 
health worsens. This shift, while increasingly obfuscating the reality of the fictional world, 
nevertheless does not succeed in supplanting it. The Narrator’s narrativisation of his experience 
fully conceals the fictional world from the actual world reader, forcing the reader to retroactively 
alter their understanding of events concerning Tyler Durden to be performed by the Narrator 
instead. When read within the fictional world, the narration can be shown to be equally complex 
and deceptive. However, also it becomes clear that the fictional world remains a constituted reality, 
from which the Narrator must deviate. By evaluating these two realities with respect to each other 
in the body of the narration, it becomes possible to understand the workings of the fictional world 
through and in the Narrator’s telling rather than despite it. In the following section, I will be looking 
at the narration of David Fincher’s film Fight Club, with the goal of evaluating how its narration 
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relates to the reality of the fictional world when considering the differing demands of the filmic 
medium.  
 
 
Where is my Mind – Fincher’s Fight Club and Medium-Specificity in Narration and 
Character 
 
Like Palahniuk’s Fight Club, the narration of David Fincher’s Fight Club is unreliable, changeable, 
and obfuscating; in this section, I will be building on the analysis of unreliability within the fictional 
world with respect to the narration of the film.164 Unlike the novel, the film Fight Club has a visual 
representation of characters and events on-screen, radically changing the manner in which this 
unreliability manifests, as well as its direct effect. Emily R. Anderson argues that unreliable films  
Fall into two broad categories: films that mislead the viewer by underreporting the 
story, and films that lie to the viewer by misreporting the story. Critics often group 
these films together – calling them puzzle films or twist movies – but there are crucial 
differences between films that mislead an audience by encouraging it to draw false 
conclusions, and films that offer false data and thus demand misinterpretations.165  
Anderson argues that the arbiter of unreliability is the viewer (or reader). The case of unreliability 
in film is slightly different from unreliability in literature, since the site of unreliability is extended 
to include the audio-visual mechanism of film. The viewer is indeed the recipient of many aspects 
of unreliable narration which are dependent on the actual world text. These include extradiegetic 
elements of structure (such as prolepsis and analepsis), cast, camera (including movement, angle, 
focus, composition and framing), staging (including lighting and costuming), extradiegetic sound, 
and post-production (such as voice-over narration, editing, and special effects). These aspects of 
film are the most evident forms of narration, and are most often to blame for unreliable narration 
                                                          
164 Adaptation is discussed in Part One (pages 26-33) and in Chapter Two, with reference to Soderbergh’s 
Solaris. Because it is discussed elsewhere, I will not be going into great depth regarding Fincher’s Fight Club 
as an adaptation.  
165 Emily R. Anderson, “Telling Stories: Unreliable Discourse, Fight Club, and the Cinematic Narrator,” 
Journal of Narrative Theory 40, no.1 (Winter 2010): 84. 
58 
 
in film. From a fictional world-centric perspective, it is possible, however, to distinguish the reality 
of the fictional world and fictional world unreliability from unreliable narration.  
As Gregory Currie argues with respect to 
actors and characters, a narrative representation 
of the fictional world does not equate to facts 
about the fictional world.166 This distinction allows 
for crucial differentiations. The opening sequence 
of the film, for example, moves through a complex 
network of neurons and cells as they flash with electric signals, the opening credits appearing on 
the screen and heavy electronic music playing (figure 1).167 The camera pulls back, eventually 
zooming out past the skull and scalp to reveal the Narrator’s face with a gun barrel between his 
teeth. The sequence prominently features computer generated animation for the internal shots of 
the Narrator’s brain, which seems to align the narration with the actual world rather than the 
fictional one: the computer generated image is shown as a representation of the character and not 
as the character himself. The music and the cast credits reinforce this affiliation, their extradiegetic 
presence reinforcing the overtly artificial nature of the sequence. With Currie in mind, however, it 
is possible to see that this sequence does not posit that there are credits and electronic music inside 
the Narrator’s computer generated brain. Instead, this sequence represents the inside of the 
Narrator’s head. This representative relationship allows for the reality of the fictional world to be 
realised in an actual world text. The separation between representation and fact is the first step in 
distinguishing film narration from the fictional world and in beginning to understand the fictional 
world through unreliable narration. 
The most immediate access to a film’s narration is the medium-specific audio-visual 
components of the film. In the introduction, as the opening credits end, the camera zooms out of 
the Narrator’s head, eventually revealing the Narrator filling the centre of the screen with a gun 
barrel between his teeth (figure 2). The audience is not yet aware that this figure is the Narrator – 
and it is unlikely that they would be able to identify the actor as Edward Norton at this point in the 
film, given the concealment of half of his face, and the distortion around the eyes resulting from an 
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167 The piece played is part of the original score for the film titled “Intro Song (Stealing Fat)” by The Dust 
Brothers. The title of the song is metatextual, referring to Tyler’s illegal theft of human fat from a plastic 
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Figure 1 – The credits roll over the Narrator’s neurons 
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expression of terror, as well as swelling and bruising.168 The indeterminacy of the shot is 
exacerbated by a dark blue tone which reduces its contrast, making details appear less sharp.169 A 
voice-over states that “people are always asking me if I know Tyler Durden.” Another voice, this 
one diegetic, says “three minutes. This is it. Ground zero. Would you like to say a few words to mark 
the occasion?” The camera rotates and moves back, showing the Narrator in profile and a hand 
holding the gun (figure 3). The Narrator mumbles around the gun, and the voice over informs the 
audience that “with a gun barrel between your teeth, you speak only in vowels.” The gun is 
removed, and for the first time, the on-screen Narrator speaks, saying “I can’t think of anything.” 
The camera moves back behind Tyler, clearly showing his body in front of the narrator (figure 4). 
This sequence establishes four levels of narrative experience, each of which is authenticated with 
relation to the camera and the viewer’s response to it.  
 
                                                          
168 At the time of filming Fight Club, Edward Norton already played many feature roles including Aaron, a 
murderer with a split personality in Gregory Hoblit’s Primal Fear (1996), and the untrustworthy “Worm” in 
Rounders (Dahl 1998), in addition to Derek Vineyard from American History X (see footnote 159 on page 
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169 I have increased the brightness in figures 1 - 5 in order to make their content more clear. 
Figure 3 – Tyler holds the Narrator at gunpoint Figure 2 – The Narrator looks past the gun barrel 
Figure 4 – Tyler obscures the Narrator 
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The first form of narration the viewer is presented with is that of the filmic mechanism. The 
audience uses this level of narration as the point of authority against which other forms of narration 
are authenticated.170 As Robert Burgoyne argues,  
In creating the fictional world, the impersonal narrator produces a type of discourse 
that is read directly as the facts of the ‘real world’ of the fictional universe. The 
impersonal narrator’s lack of human personality allows the viewer to imagine that he 
or she is confronting the fictional universe directly, putting aside any reflection on 
the form of the narrative discourse.171  
The impersonal direct narration of film therefore also creates the impression of objectivity and 
truthfulness, “putting aside any reflection” on the camera as a form of narration altogether. 
Burgoyne goes on to state that: 
 Because the narrator produces the discourse through which the viewer reconstructs 
the fictional world, this discourse comprises the facts of the fictional universe, which 
always carry the value of authenticity. Consequently, the discourse of the impersonal 
narrator in film is always reliable in the most basic sense: this type of narrator cannot 
lie about the fictional world, although the narrator can withhold information and 
cause the spectator to make incorrect inferences.172  
The viewer therefore believes that the camera is ‘telling’ the truth about the facts of the fictional 
world, imbuing the camera with the authenticating authority of the fictional world. Burgoyne posits 
here that the impersonal narrator of film “cannot lie about the fictional world,” which will prove to 
be false with respect to Fight Club, since the film clearly shows Tyler as a distinct character from 
the Narrator.173 Nonetheless, the audience does not yet have cause to doubt this level of narration, 
and so the camera is allowed to create a primary barrier between the critical reader and the reality 
                                                          
170 The camera as a false authenticating authority can be seen in the film Horse Girl (Baena 2020), in which 
the camera shows Sarah’s subjective experiences as her lucid dreams start to leak into her daily life. Unlike 
Fight Club, Horse Girl does not show an alternative to the unreliable camera, leaving the viewer unsure 
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173 Ron Howard’s A Beautiful Mind (2001) also uses a subjective focalisation on the character of John Nash 
to show manifestations of his delusions. The film shows the figments of Nash’s schizophrenia as if they were 
real, not questioning their existence until his wife tells him otherwise.  
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of the fictional world. The film’s narration is therefore able to act as an authenticating authority for 
the subsequent levels of narration.  
The next narrative level introduced is that of the voice-over. The voice-over provides the 
audience with an identifiable source of narration, the indirect filmic narrator being dismissed in its 
apparent mimesis. With reference to Marie-Laure Ryan’s theory of impersonal narration, Cornelia 
Klecker argues that “the central notion of this model is that the impersonal narration has two 
functions: it creates the fictional universe, and it can also refer to, select, and comment on it. The 
world-creating function combined with the impersonal narration’s lack of human characteristics 
makes the viewer believe in its factuality.”174 When juxtaposed with the “world-creating function” 
and “lack of human characteristics” of the impersonal narration of film, the first-person subjective 
voice-over narration seems even less authoritative. Klecker goes on to argue that  
The extradiegetic narrative instance […] delivers the film’s pictures and sounds; its 
truthfulness is taken for granted by the viewers. If other narrative agents – character-
narrators – contradict the fictional world created, viewers will automatically consider 
them false and unreliable. The character—narrator does not possess automatic 
authentication authority but must first be authenticated.175  
The narration by the voice-over is allowed to redirect any suspicion the audience might have over 
the veracity of the filmic narration as the film goes on, playing on the sort of subjective 
internalisation seen in the above section on Palahniuk’s Fight Club. It remains to be authenticated 
by the extradiegetic narrative instance (the cinematic medium), and so its narrative authority is 
subject to any discrepancies which might appear between the impersonal narration of film and 
states of affairs which take place. It therefore takes on any unreliable responsibility because of its 
subjective first person (“asking me if I know Tyler Durden”). Tim Burton’s Big Fish (2003) utilises a 
similar narrative effect, where the camera clearly shows the father’s fantastical experiences as a 
young man. The way in which the camera fails to clearly distinguish between the wondrous and the 
real foists the responsibility for unreliability onto the father’s extravagant storytelling style. 
 Next, the reader is introduced to Tyler Durden, who appears both as a diegetic voice and 
in physical form as a hand holding the gun (figure 3) and as a full body standing between the 
Narrator and the camera (figure 4). The viewer does not need to believe that Tyler is not real, 
                                                          
174 Cornelia Klecker, “Authentication Authority and Narrative Self-Erasure in Fight Club,” American Studies 
59, no. 1 (2014): 85.  Referring to  
Marie-Laure Ryan, “The Pragmatics of Personal and Impersonal Fiction,” Poetics 10 (1981): 517-539. 
175 Klecker, “Authentication Authority and Narrative Self-Erasure in Fight Club,” 85 
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because he is presented by the film mechanism, which seems more reliable than the first person 
narrator alternative. Anderson argues that the film is 
Misreporting diegetic events […] by adhering to cinematic conventions for 
storytelling while presenting Tyler as though he exists. A viewer is not inclined to 
doubt his existence any more than Jack’s or Marla’s. Indeed the viewer does not 
doubt it, not only because there is no reason to – there is nothing that needs 
explaining, but because there is direct evidence that he does exist. We see him 
walking around, talking to people, and punching them in the face.176 
The authority of the camera and the viewer’s complicity in its authentication confirms Tyler as an 
independent character, going so far as to introduce Tyler as an authority before the Narrator; 
Tyler’s voice is the first diegetic sound, speaking with awareness of events that are going to take 
place: “three minutes. That’s it.” Tyler has physical superiority with respect to the Narrator, 
controlling the space of the room with the threat of the gun, and physically looming over the 
Narrator while directly restricting with the camera’s ability to see him fully (figure 4). When the 
camera finally pulls away to show the two men completely, Tyler remains in control (figure 5). His 
body dominates half of the frame, his outstretched arm enabling a casually authoritative posture 
and increasing his physical area, while the Narrator remains a tiny figure in the other half of the 
frame. The overlay of the city mostly obscures the Narrator’s figure, while its upright lines 
accentuate Tyler’s posture. Even his face is concealed, preserving his control of the scene and the 
mysterious authority of his character while the Narrator’s was forfeit by the camera intruding in 
the very substance of his brain in the introductory 
sequence.177 With Tyler’s overt control of the 
scene, coupled with the vetting of the camera, the 
audience can attribute him with more authority 
than the as-yet unidentified man in the chair. In 
                                                          
176 Anderson, “Telling Stories,” 92. 
177 Brad Pitt’s hidden face has an opposing effect to Norton’s immediate reveal (see page 58, footnote 168). 
Pitt’s rebellious allure after his work in The Dark Side of the Sun (Nikolić 1988), Legends of the Fall (Zwick 
1994) and Seven Years in Tibet (Annaud 1997) is tempered with his much darker personas from Interview 
with the Vampire (Jordan 1994), Se7en (Fincher 1995), 12 Monkeys (Gilliam 1995), and Meet Joe Black 
(Brest 1998). Norton’s experience playing the Angry White Male (in two cases, a murderer) is 
complemented by Pitt’s dark roles (a vampire, a wrathful detective, a mental patient, and the devil) which 
are characterised by turmoil and moral ambiguity. By concealing his face, the cinematic narrator allows 
Tyler Durden to build his own dark authority and allure, which can then be drastically compounded by Pitt’s 
full reveal later in the film, inflected by his previous roles. Both Norton’s and Pitt’s star power feature 
prominently in the film’s marketing, although Tyler is usually more prominent than the Narrator, reflecting 
their narrative roles.  
Figure 5 – Tyler maintains control 
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addition, at times the camera occupies Tyler’s point of view, authenticating Tyler’s perspective by 
equating it (and the viewer) with the authoritative impersonal narration of the film.  
 Finally, the Narrator enters as a character. As he speaks his first lines, it becomes evident 
that the Narrator’s voice is that of the voice-over. This affiliation links the Narrator as a real 
individual within the fictional world with the lack of authentication and implied unreliability of the 
voice-over. The voice-over has some implicit authority through the act of narration, which 
“indicat[es] that the enunciator has given him the authority to relate the story.”178 However, as 
explored above, any potential unreliability directly undermines this authority. This is in part 
exacerbated by Tyler’s clear control and the Narrator’s established subjective perspective. In Fight 
Club, unreliability is therefore embedded into the medium itself, which acts as an authentication 
authority for subsequent subjective and misrepresenting or misreporting perspectives of the 
fictional world reality. Any aspects which can be verified by a consensus reality as belonging to the 
fictional world – such as the actions of the narrator – are mediated and undermined by Tyler’s very 
real presence, and the default authority of the film narrative, which is in turn given authority by its 
mimetic qualities. It is therefore problematic to use the film’s narration to make direct statements 
about the reality of the fictional world, since they are fundamentally authenticated by their 
relationship to the actual world via the text rather than the reality conditions and states of affairs 
within the fictional world. 
 Despite the hierarchy of authentication which enables a distancing of the representation 
of the narration and the fictional world, the fictional world can still act as a superior authentication 
authority.179 At the end of the film, the audience is shown the discrepancy between the represented 
and the real fictional world when the Narrator is trying to disrupt Tyler’s destructive plans. Tyler 
forcibly stops the Narrator from interfering with the blasting gel, starting a fight which brings the 
                                                          
178 Klecker, “Authentication Authority and Narrative Self-Erasure in Fight Club,” 86. 
179 In Zack Snyder’s Sucker Punch (2011), two realities are shown with equal authority by the camera: that of 
Babydoll’s traumatic experiences in a mental asylum, and that of her fantastical imagination where she is a 
powerful fighter who plans her escape. The camera does not give one narrative authority over the other, so 
the coherence of events and reality conditions in the mental asylum serve to identify the alternate narrative 
as unreal.  
Figure 7 – Our first glimpse of the fictional world Figure 6 – Tyler throws the Narrator down the stairs 
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two men through the building. The fight is shown directly by the camera (figure 6) and also 
indirectly, as the camera looks at a security video screen (figure 7). The direct footage shows Tyler 
assaulting the Narrator, while the security footage clearly shows the Narrator beating himself and 
throwing himself down stairs. This is the culmination of a series of ‘revised’ clips in which the 
Narrator replaces Tyler in scenes which have already happened. Temporarily, the viewer is being 
given visual access to a non-subjective representation of the fictional world. Klecker refers to the 
‘removal’ of Tyler from Fight Club as self-erasure, a “position between fictional existence and non-
existence” in which viewers are complicit “with the text when it comes to constructing fictional 
objects and worlds.”180 Conversely, I would argue that rather than self-erasure, Tyler’s removal 
from these scenes creates a representational point in which the viewer can visually imagine the 
reality of the fictional world. Tyler is not ‘erased’ from the fictional world, since he was never an 
individual part of the fictional world. To return to Margolin’s views on character (Part One, page 
23), an individual “can be uniquely identified, located in a space/time region, and endowed with a 
variety of physical and mental attributes and relations.”181 Textually speaking, this is the case with 
Tyler. Based on the information given by the film, he can be identified distinctly from the Narrator, 
largely due to the noticeable distinction between Brad Pitt and Edward Norton as representative 
individuals. According to the film’s visuals, Tyler occupies a distinct space and time (see the 
discussion of figures 4 and 5). He also is endowed with physical attributes (again, note his physical 
dissimilarity from Norton) and mental attributes (he formulates plans that the Narrator is not aware 
of). According to the text and the narration, Tyler is a full individual character.  
 This conclusion as to Tyler’s status as a real character changes, however, when viewed from 
within the fictional world. To other characters in the fictional world, Tyler looks like the Narrator. 
In the sequence of revised flashbacks, for example, the Narrator is shown hosting the underground 
fight club, whereas in the initial narration, the Narrator is in the shadows, watching Tyler do the 
introductions. The men present at these fight clubs would have seen the Narrator perform these 
speeches, unaware that Tyler’s personality is dominant. In the same way, Tyler does not occupy his 
own space and time. Finally, as in the previous two requirements, Tyler does not have his own 
physical attributes, although he does have his own mental attributes; he makes plans while the 
Narrator personality is blacked out. However, having failed the other two (and a half) attributes, 
Tyler is not an individual within the fictional world. He is, as Margolin refers to characters, non-
                                                          
180 Klecker, “Authentication Authority and Narrative Self-Erasure in Fight Club,” 91. 
181 Margolin, “Individuals in Narrative Worlds,” 844. 
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actualised, meaning that while he has a narrative role, he does not exist as a constituent of any 
reality.182  
 The collapse of the authentication hierarchy begins at the bottom – by the Narrator’s 
character learning the truth when other characters call him Tyler. The failure moves up the ranks 
of authority as Tyler acknowledges the union between the two men, and then the subjective voice-
over works through it. Finally, the film narration reveals its unreliability, forfeiting its authority and 
destroying the authentication hierarchy altogether. From an actual world perspective, this collapse 
in authentication spurs a circular reading, or an imaginative retrospective in which the ‘new’ 
information can be used to modify the ‘old’ narrative to more appropriately represent the fictional 
world.183 From a fictional world perspective, however, no review or revision is required, as it 
remains unchanged. The narration deceives the reader through misrepresentation and 
misreporting, but it has no sway over the reality of the fictional world. In the final scene of the film, 
the Narrator and Marla, holding hands, look out over the collapsing capitalist infrastructure. The 
camera, having recorded the process of the Narrator purging Tyler from his mind, once again seems 
objective and trustworthy. It no longer shows Tyler, and even avoids taking on the point of view of 
any characters, limiting its apparent subjectivity. And yet, as the buildings collapse and the viewer 
sees the Narrator and Marla turn to each other, the strains of “Where is my Mind” by Pixies floods 
the soundscape.184  The music is extradiegetic and smothers the sounds of the massive explosions 
occurring beyond the window. As the credits start to roll, an image of a penis flashes across the 
screen, referring to Tyler Durden’s pastime of splicing pornography into family films. With these 
last moments, the narration emphasises its inherent separation from the fictional world (through 
                                                          
182 Margolin, “Individuals in Narrative Worlds,” 844.  
183 Christina Wald, “Second Selves, Second Stories: Unreliable Narration and the Circularity of Reading in 
Ford Madox Ford’s The Good Soldier and Chuck Palahniuk’s / David Findcher’s Fight Club,” Symbolism: An 
International Annual of Critical Aesthetics 9 (2010): 217-241.  
184 Released in 1988, “Where is My Mind?” from the album Surfer Rosa is one of the signature songs of the 
band Pixies. Pixies were seminal in the grunge movement of the late 1980s and 1990s and influenced such 
grunge mega-bands as Radiohead and Nirvana. Mark Bedford argues that the use of a 1990s grunge 
aesthetic has a “dazzling” effect, which trades heavily on the social and political aura of grunge stars like 
Kurt Cobain. Beaumont argues that like “the classless grunge melting pot, Fight Club is similarly 
uninterested in class alignment,” and that the aesthetics of designer grunge contribute to the film’s 
incredible popularity. These elements are tied to the actual world intertextual resonances of the text, and 
here demonstrates the authority that the film’s narration has with respect to the actual world in opposition 
to its lack of authority with respect to the fictional one.  
Pixies, “Where is My Mind?,” Surfer Rosa (4AD, 1988).   
Mark Bedford, “Smells Like 1990s Spirit: the Dazzling Deception of Fight Club’s Grunge-Aesthetic,” New 
Cinemas: Journal of Contemporary Film 9, no. 1 (2011): 55-56.  
Mark Beaumont, “Inside the Cult of Pixies: Why They’re More than Just a Band,” NME, September 2016, 
accessed May 17, 2018. nme.com/features/inside-the-cult-of-pixies-why-theyre-not-just-a-band-797394.  
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the extradiegetic soundtrack) and the continued unreliable subjectivity through its reference to 
Tyler Durden’s continuing presence. The film’s supposedly impersonal narration therefore fails to 
regain its authenticating authority, leaving the viewer adrift, in search of the authentication of the 
fictional world. 
 Both Fight Clubs are therefore texts which feature highly unreliable narration. While it may 
at first seem that unreliable narration imposes a barrier for the reader between them and the 
fictional world, it can also recenter it in the critical perspective. Once a reader or viewer is aware 
that the narration they are receiving is unreliable, it becomes easier to see the reality of the fictional 
world; by undermining the illusion of narrative authority, unreliability encourages a deeper look 
into the fictional world, encouraging reader and viewer to look for the facts, and not the 
representation. In both cases, the fictional world is made accessible through characters. Whether 
they are fully realised individuals – like the subjective narrator whose unreliability encourages a 
subversive reading of the narration – or whether they fall apart as cohesive individuals under 
scrutiny – like Tyler Durden – characters and the ways in which they exist as part of the consensus 
reality help to centralise the fictional world in a critical perspective.  
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Chapter Two: Solaris in Triplicate - the Alien, the Art Object, and the 
Remake  
 
In Chapter One, I examined the properties of fictional world, exploring their boundaries as they are 
established by constructed narrative, as well as the access which is granted through fictional 
characters. In this chapter, I will look at the contextual knowledge which forms a pillar of critical 
theoretical responses to fiction in film and literature. Solaris is a 1961 novel by Polish author 
Stanisław Lem, a masterpiece of science fiction which influenced the genre for decades. The novel 
was adapted into a 1972 Russian film by Andrei Tarkovsky, lauded as a landmark example of Cold 
War art cinema. The most recent Solaris is the 2002 film by Steven Soderbergh. Coming out of the 
American independent tradition, Soderbergh’s Solaris is an exploration of the filmic medium, an 
experiment in adaptation and intertextuality. This chapter is chronologically structured with three 
sections, one for each Solaris. The analysis is cumulative, starting with genre forms and subversions, 
moving into authorial, technical and historical contextual readings, and finishing with the question 
of adaptation and individuation. Each of these texts seem to demand a contextual reading as genre 
fiction, as political fiction, and as part of an intertextual network. As such, they pose a potential 
challenge for my proposed methodology of reading fictional worlds. These texts are also potentially 
problematic because they challenge the idea of fictional worlds as the world of the character. In 
each Solaris, the characters struggle to come to terms with the incomprehensible alien, and in many 
respects, they utterly fail. The Solaris-es therefore provide a more nuanced view of the fictional 
world as a reality in which characters exist and as a reality that functions around the characters. 
Although I will be dealing closely with concepts from genre theory, Cold War studies, and 
adaptation theory, my intention is not to cover the critical field of these areas of research. Instead, 
I will be using these concepts as they define and structure our actual world responses as a critical 
point of departure. Doing so will help to identify how existing critical perspectives may (or may not) 
be productive in a fictional world-centric approach.  
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Solaris: 1961 – Let’s Talk About the Alien 
 
Stanisław Lem’s Solaris185 is a cult classic novel which explores the place of humans within 
the larger universe, asking large and important questions about what constitutes humanity and 
whether contact with the alien is possible or even desirable. These questions have been thoroughly 
and eloquently explored by scholars in a variety of disciplines, especially by those specialising in 
science fiction. For my critical reading of Lem’s Solaris, however, I will be looking specifically at the 
generic tendencies of science fiction, and in particular how these tendencies manifest themselves 
through genre-specific language. I have chosen science fiction language in Solaris because it is 
potentially problematic for a fictional-world centric reading. Not only are genre studies necessarily 
centred in the actual world (see Part One, pages 25 and 26), but in Solaris, the use of language as a 
science fiction hallmark is undermined by its inefficacy in properly conveying the experiences and 
realities of the scientists Kelvin and Snow in an internally coherent fictional world. When confronted 
with the utterly alien, Kelvin and Snow attempt to rationalise its presence by deploying referential 
linguistic systems within the fictional world which are traditionally reserved for actual world genre 
theory.  
When discussing genre, it has been historically difficult to describe and circumscribe 
precisely what generic hallmarks are, and what they look (or sound) like. The genre of science 
fiction, however, is arguably among the easiest genres to identify.186 When asked what constitutes 
science fiction, most people will identify space ships, aliens, non-terrestrial planets, interstellar 
travel, spectacular technology, and a futuristic setting. Other less formal identifying categories, like 
                                                          
185 In this chapter, I will be referring to the two central characters by the name most commonly used in the 
narration. For Lem’s novel, this is Kelvin and Harey, then Kris and Hari for the analysis of Tarkovsky’s Solaris, 
and finally Chris and Rheya with respect to Soderbergh’s film. Kelvin’s wife is named Harey in the original 
Polish novel, but has been changed to Rheya (an anagram of Harey) in the Kilmartin and Cox translation and 
in Soderbergh’s film. I will be using Harey here to help distinguish the visitor in the discussion of Lem’s novel 
from that of the two films.  According to Bill Johnston, the first English translator of the novel, Polish women’s 
names traditionally end in ‘-a,’ meaning that ‘Harey’ seems exotic in a Polish context. By changing her name 
to Rheya in the English edition, the distancing effect of ‘Harey’ is mediated, making it more palatable for 
Anglophone readership.  
Alison Flood, “First Ever Direct English Translation of Solaris Published,” The Guardian, 15 June, 2011, 
accessed February 1, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/jun/15/first-direct-translation-
solaris. 
186 In this chapter, I will be using the term “science fiction.” I have chosen not to use other naming methods 
for the genre under discussion, because “science fiction” coincides with the particular avenues of discussion 
I will be taking in this chapter, as well as being the term consistently used to discuss this genre in academic 
parlance throughout the decades in question. Other terms are often used to refer to science fiction, 
including “speculative fiction,” “scientifiction” (now archaic), “sci-fi,” and “SF.”  
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a utopian or dystopian outlook, tend to be culturally significant within the genre during certain eras. 
Spatially and referentially, science fiction is a genre at the most distant remove from the actual 
world.187 At first glance, this fact would seem to make it easier to take a fictional world-centric 
approach, taking advantage of the significant gap between the fictional and actual world. However, 
Marie-Laure Ryan’s principle of minimal departure (Part One, pages 19 and 20) complicates this 
assumption: “we [the reader] reconstrue the world of a fiction […] as being the closest possible to 
the reality we know. This means that we will project upon the world of the statement everything 
we know about the real world, and that we will make only those adjustments which we cannot 
avoid.”188 As such, no matter how great the logical or cognitive distance is between the actual world 
and the fictional world in a work of science fiction, linkages and bridges between the two worlds 
form the basis for our understanding of the narrative from our own unique point of view. The 
process of forming relational links to the actual world therefore form the basis of science fiction 
genre theory. 
 In his book Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, Darko Suvin explores science fiction as a 
genre, and proposes that is it a “literary genre whose necessary and sufficient conditions are the 
presence and interaction of estrangement and cognition, and whose main formal device is an 
imaginative framework alternative to the author’s empirical environment.”189 Suvin proposes that 
an estranged fiction is a fiction in which “an endeavor is made to illuminate such [actual world 
relations] by creating a radically or significantly different formal framework – a different space/time 
location or central figures for the fable, unverifiable by common sense.”190 He associates 
estrangement (the differences between the fictional and actual worlds) with innovation and 
cognition (science), which is required in order to make the logical connections between the fiction 
and the scientific premise for which the genre is named.191 Finally, he points out that the formal 
device of science fiction is “an imaginative framework alternative to the author’s empirical 
environment.”192 Suvin refers to the “author’s empirical environment” as the ‘zero world,’ which is 
a set “of empirically verifiable properties around the author (this being ‘zero’ in the sense of a 
                                                          
187 Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, 243-269. 
The dystopian trend is common in contemporary American science and speculative fiction, including films 
such as Neill Blomkamp’s Elysium (2013), which features most surviving terrestrial humans living in slums, 
and Bong Joon-ho’s Snowpiercer (2013), a film in which the world has fallen into a nuclear winter and the 
only surviving humans are trapped on a train.  
188 Ryan, “Fiction, Non-Factuals, and the Principle of Minimal Departure,” 406. 
189 Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, 7-8. Original emphasis. 
190 Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, 18. 
191 Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, 13. 
192 Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, 7-8 
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central reference point in a coordinate system, or of the control group in an experiment).”193 ‘Zero 
world’ refers to the actual world as it exists for the author. Like all types of fiction, science fiction 
necessitates a departure from the reality conditions (“empirical environment”) of the actual world. 
He also emphasises that science fiction is non-naturalistic and estranged, but at the same time “SF 
shares with naturalistic literature, naturalistic science, and naturalistic or materialist philosophy in 
common sophisticated, dialectical, and cognitive episteme,” meaning a scientific cognitive 
approach.194 Other scholars have a broader opinion of what science fiction might mean: Judith 
Merril proposes that science fiction falls under the term ‘speculative fiction’ which “makes use of 
the traditional ‘scientific method’ to examine some postulated approximation of reality.”195 Her 
categorisation of science fiction is oriented more towards the reader’s perception (“approximation 
of reality”) and cognitive attitude (“speculative”) than toward the content or tendency of the 
narrative.196 This position has an oblique relationship to Suvin’s: it links the scientific with the 
cognitive position of the reader, and puts these in a correlative relationship to the “imaginative 
framework alternative to the author’s empirical environment.” Unlike Suvin, Merril proposes that 
the speculative manner of thinking in combination with a scientific mode is more fundamental to 
science fiction than the formal and narrative elements themselves.  
Rosemary Jackson and Christine Cornea, following Tzvetan Todorov, see science fiction as 
a mode of the fantastic (Todorov’s theory of the fantastic will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 
Three). In this tradition, they see science fiction as a median genre, midway between fantasy 
(meaning the marvellous, or elements which are not part of the observable actual world) and reality 
(meaning the mimetic, mirroring the actual world).197 Their perspective on science fiction as a 
mediating position between the marvellous and the mimetic depends on an awareness of both 
poles: the marvellous exists in reaction to information which goes against mimesis, whereas the 
mimetic is notable as the least adherent to the marvellous possibilities afforded by fictional worlds. 
Critical analysis of the science fiction genre, exemplified by the above positions, therefore puts 
pressure on the dichotomies of actual world representation in fiction: dichotomies like naturalistic 
and non-naturalistic, mimetic and non-mimetic, realistic and unrealistic, and estranging and 
                                                          
193 Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, 11.  
194 Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, 20. 
195 Judith Merril, “What do you Mean: Science? Fiction?”, in SF: The Other Side of Realism, ed. Thomas D. 
Clareson (Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1971), 53-95.    
Quoted in Cornea, Christine. Science Fiction Cinema: Between Fantasy and Reality. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, Ltd., 2007), 2.  
196 Christine Cornea, Science Fiction Cinema, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, Ltd., 2007), 2. 
197 Cornea, Science Fiction Cinema, 4. 
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familiar. These approaches are useful in the context of this study, enforcing a distinction between 
the actual and fictional world by using the conventions of science fiction to act as a wedge (of 
cognitive estrangement, speculation, or marvellous thinking) between these two realities. 
However, pressure is unevenly placed upon the fictional aspects of the narrative (those as distanced 
as possible from the ‘zero world’) rather than on the way in which these non-naturalistic (non-
mimetic, and so on) aspects function within a fictional reality system. The result of this perspective 
is a closed relational loop in which critical importance is not only dependent on knowledge of a 
particular actual world context (the ‘zero world’ of the author) but also subsequently generates 
critical conclusions which are restricted to those same contexts. The potential of this pressure is 
therefore limited based on the prior knowledge and creative contributions of the reader to the 
narrative, and is independent from the fictional world itself. Flipping this pressure by considering 
how the estranging, non-mimetic, speculative elements function within the reality conditions of the 
fictional world enables alternative critical readings which are removed from the reflexive loop 
which positions critical conclusions within the actual world.  
The genre of science fiction and effects such as cognitive estrangement, its speculative and 
marvellous nature, non-mimetic characteristics, and iconography disappear into the fictional world 
when it is perceived from within. The reality of the fictional world is not bound by generic 
convention or contextual frameworks. In other words, the narrative, the text, and its intertextual 
existence may be science fiction, but the fictional world is not because its reality almost always 
accommodate for what the reader perceives as estranging, speculative, and non-mimetic. This is 
not to say that the experience of estrangement, or any other associated effects of science fiction, 
cannot or do not operate within the fictional world. These parallel experiences are related to the 
fictional world (relocating the zero world to that of the character rather than the text’s author) and 
not to the actual world.198 From the beginning of Lem’s Solaris, the reader needs to make 
increasingly significant modifications to the mimetic distance between the fiction and the actual 
world. Recalling Suvin’s formal dependence on the zero-world of “author’s empirical environment” 
and Ryan’s principle of minimal departure, the traditional framework for the reader’s cognitive 
positioning is either the zero-world of the author or the reality conditions of the reader’s actual 
world perceptions.199  In the first sentences of the novel, the terms “launching bay” and “capsule” 
                                                          
198 Like the above theories of science fiction, Tzvetan Todorov’s theory of the fantastic depends on the 
experience of the reader to define a genre. Also like the experience of estrangement and alienation in 
science fiction, the experience of the fantastic can be re-centered on the character within the fictional 
world. Such relocation of literary and generic effect is explored in relation to American Gods in Chapter 
Three, found on pages 108-110, 114 and 115. 
199 Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, 7-8 
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enforce a renegotiation of the reader’s understanding of the fictional world to include space travel 
as commonplace.200 The experience of these things also seem out of the ordinary for Kelvin: “there 
was a grinding noise and the capsule swayed. My muscles tensed in spite of myself, but there was 
no further noise or movement.”201 His anxious response manifests itself as physical tension, 
demonstrating his discomfort and potential unfamiliarity with space travel. His experience of 
estrangement seems to mirror the reader’s experiences, reinforcing the traditional critical linkages 
between actual and fictional worlds.  
The parallel experience of cognitive estrangement (Suvin) or of the not quite marvellous 
(Jackson and Cornea) continues over the first four pages of the novel, in which Kelvin describes his 
vertiginous experiences. The first-person narration of the novel seems to further enhance the 
connection between protagonist and author by settling the reader into the position of the one who 
is experiencing. Kelvin’s language is sensorial, and evokes a strong mirroring experience in the 
reader.202 He employs phrases such as “there was a shrill, grating sound, like a steel blade being 
drawn across a sheet of wet glass,” which inspires auditory imagination in the reader, as well as a 
cringing physical response.203 Kelvin describes a brightness which “receded, merging into a vague, 
purplish glimmer,” the “pale reddish glow of infinity,” “the coolness from the air-conditioning on 
my neck, although my face seemed to be on fire,” and the vibration which “penetrat[ed] my 
pneumatic cocoon” and which “ran through my entire body.”204 With first person narration and 
language rooted in hyper-stimulating sensory experience, the connection between the character’s 
and the reader’s experiences seem closer than ever. This is only enhanced with increasingly visceral 
and personal experiences, such as vertigo:  
The sun’s orbit, which had so far encircled me, shifted unexpectedly, and the 
incandescent disc appeared now to the right, now to the left, seeming to dance on 
the planet’s horizon. I was swinging like a giant pendulum while the planet […] rose 
up in front of me like a wall.205  
For the initial four pages of the novel, the fictional world-centric reading offers nothing to 
distinguish itself from the actual world experience of the reader (or the zero-world of the author), 
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and rather seems to enhance the alienating effects of science fiction by rooting the reader in 
Kelvin’s first-person embodiment of uncomfortable and intimate sensation. 
The alignment of the reader’s (actual world) and characters’ (fictional world) experience of 
the fiction breaks down, however, on page five. Despite the spectacular experience of space travel, 
Kelvin’s experience of the Solaris space station is precisely the opposite. The space station, while 
still new to Kelvin, is well established and even slightly run-down, with a floor “coated with heavy-
duty plastic. In places, the wheels of trolleys carrying rockets had worn through this plastic covering 
to expose the bare steel beneath.”206 As he further enters the station, he sees “open cupboards” 
which are “filled with instruments, books, dirty glasses, vacuum flasks – all covered with dust.”207 
The Solaris station is not only well-established, it is past its prime and unkempt. At this point, there 
is a breakdown between the reality of the fictional world, Kelvin’s experience of the fictional world, 
and their linkages with the actual world. Within the fictional world, the space station is clearly a 
well-established presence, although it is still slightly alien to Kelvin’s experience despite his previous 
knowledge of its existence. Despite the first-person narration which seems to tie the reader to 
Kelvin’s cognitive and embodied experience, there is a significant referential gap which requires a 
reconstruction of the reader’s understanding of the fictional world, based on the principle of 
minimal departure. Not only does the novel present interstellar travel, but there is an accessible 
space station which is not only comfortably inhabited, but is also in many ways unimportant and 
neglected.  
The fracture between the reality of the fictional world and the actual world only increases 
as the novel progresses. Ultimately, the cognitive estrangement and near-marvellous experiences 
of science fiction cease to be associated with Kelvin’s perspective on the Solaris station, and are 
only experienced by the reader. After settling in at the station, Kelvin reveals that “the discovery of 
Solaris dated from about one hundred years before [he] was born,” and there follows an extensive 
review (eleven pages) of the scientific field of Solaristics.208 For the reader, these eleven pages serve 
as an info dump which seems exhaustive, although it is not for Kelvin, who has spent his career 
studying Solaristics. For Kelvin, the info dump review serves as a reminder that it is the academic 
field which has been scientifically exhausted: “gradually, in scientific circles, the ‘Solaris Affair’ came 
to be regarded as a lost cause, notably among the administrators of the Institute, where voices had 
recently been raised suggesting that financial support should be withdrawn and research 
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suspended.”209 Solaris, the Solaris station, and Solaristics are therefore aspects of the reality of the 
fictional world. Despite Kelvin’s unfamiliarity with space travel and the Solaris station itself, his 
embodied reactions to the experiences of estrangement and the near-marvellous are related to his 
lived experience, and not to the fundamental characteristics of these things. Kelvin’s familiarity with 
everything around Solaris clearly predates the frame of the novel, so much so that he uses 
Solaristics as a touchstone to ground himself in reality:  
in an attempt to pull myself together, I took a chair over to the bookshelves and 
chose a book familiar to me: the second volume of the early monograph by Hughes 
and Eugel, Historia Solaris.210  
The estranging conventions so typical in science fiction are not estranging within the fictional world; 
rather, they are contributing elements to the historical and spatial understanding with which 
characters frame the reality conditions of their own existence.  
Genre in a narrative therefore does not necessarily equate to genre in a fictional world. 
Most often, as with Kelvin’s almost emotional familiarity with the knowledge surrounding Solaris, 
emblematic elements of science fiction are utterly unremarkable to characters within that world. 
In Iain M. Banks’ Culture novel Consider Phlebas, for example, Bora Horza Gobuchel encounters 
sentient shuttles, interstellar transporters the size of a planet, and the sentient drone Unaha-Closp 
which is “an Accredited Free Construct, certified sentient under the Free Will Acts by the Greater 
Vavatch United Moral Standards Administration and with full citizenship of the Vavatch 
Heterocracy,” with an “Incurred Generation Debt,” and which “has been accepted for a degree 
course in applied paratheology.”211 Faced with this impressive being, Horza becomes annoyed with 
its interruptions and threatens to “blast [its] synthetic fucking brains out.”212 The spectacular 
technological landscape established in Consider Phlebas and other Culture novels is utterly 
mundane to the characters who inhabit it. They are an established part of the universal reality to 
the point where Horza looks on these elements with distain, and would rather destroy a 
technological marvel rather than listen to it. In Solaris, the extensive inclusion of Solarist scholarship 
is alienating to the reader. Although it provides helpful historical and world-building information, it 
ultimately demonstrates clearly to the reader that the knowledge and experience (and by 
extension, the reality conditions) of Kelvin and other characters are fundamentally different to ours. 
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In contrast, Kelvin reads Solarist textbooks “in an attempt to pull [himself] together.”213 A Solarist 
scholar in the field of psychology, he is familiar with the hundred-year history of Solaris scholarship, 
so much so that he finds it helpful in rooting himself back into his concrete reality.  
Before Kelvin, generations of Solarist scholars had established a technical lexicon in order 
to categorise the manifestations of the planet. Terminology like “fungoids,” “mimoids,” 
“symmetriads,” “asymmetriads,” “vertebrids,” “extensors,” and “agilus” establish what Carl 
Freedman identifies as “the generic imprint of scientific and intellectual history” in the novel, which 
is so effective that “it is with something of a shock that the reader remembers that Solaristics do 
not, after all, really exist.”214 For Freedman, this genre-identifying language is “a counterfactual yet 
quasi-factual locus that is cognitively possible.”215 As such, it is a lexical system which helps to define 
the factual realities of the fictional world of Solaris as the characters understand it, despite its actual 
world counterfactuality. As Freedman points out, this discourse has a quasi-factual locus within the 
fictional world itself since it largely fails at understanding Solaris. In part, this is due to the 
impossibility of obtaining reliable data from scientific measurement: sometimes scientific 
instruments placed in the ocean “almost exploded under the violence of the impulses, sometimes 
there was total silence; it was impossible to obtain a repetition of any previously observed 
phenomenon.”216 As Solaris violently rejects scientific measurement, it also undermines the implied 
precision of scientific language. Reading a Solarist textbook, Kelvin reveals that tidy terms like 
‘extensor’ provide very little precise information regarding the manifestation under discussion: 
Various organic functions have been ascribed to the ‘extensors.’ […]. An infinite 
variety of hypotheses now moulder in library basements, eliminated by ingenious, 
sometimes dangerous experiments. Today, the scientists will go no further than to 
refer to the ‘extensors’ as relatively simple, stable formations.217  
The scientific authority of classificatory language is directly undermined by the language used to 
describe it in the textbooks from the fictional world: words like “various,” “variety,” and “relatively” 
embed doubt and imprecision into the classificatory system. Other excrescences and structures 
from Solaris are described poetically in the textbook because of the relative inadequacy of scientific 
language to represent them. As Kelvin points out, mimoids in particular are named for “their most 
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astonishing characteristic, the imitation of objects, near or far, external to the ocean itself.”218 The 
ocean can therefore create facsimiles of inanimate human-derived objects, such as toys or art. The 
formation of mimoids is described in language so evocative and poetic it is difficult to imagine 
exactly what it is describing: 
A large flattened disc appears, ragged, with a tar-like coating. […] The observer now 
becomes a spectator at what looks like a fight to the death as massed ranks of waves 
converge from all directions like contorted, fleshy mouths which snap greedily 
around the tattered, fluttering leaf, then plunge into the depths. As each ring of 
waves breaks and sinks, the fall of this mass of hundreds of thousands of tons is 
accompanied for an instant by a viscous rumbling, an immense thunderclap. The 
tarry leaf is overwhelmed, battered and torn apart […]. They bunch into pear-shaped 
clusters or long strings, merge and rise again, and drag with them an undertow of 
coagulated shreds of the base of the primal disc.219 
Although the formation process and the facsimiles are inanimate and alien in structure, the specific 
language used by Giese, the author of the textbook Kelvin is reading, demonstrates a dependency 
on the referential language of similes and metaphors. He uses the phrase “tar-like” to describe the 
surface texture of the nascent mimoid, ignoring the irony implied by the simile that tar is a carbon-
based liquid that comes from decayed organic materials, of which Solaris seems to have none. 
Despite this fact, Giese goes on to describe the mimoid with organic terrestrial imagery, such as 
“fleshy,” “leaf,” and “pear-shaped.” The mimoid is also anthropomorphised, although it has been 
made clear in a century of Solaristic study that the ocean of Solaris is fundamentally alien and 
potentially antagonistic towards the humans that explore it. Nevertheless, Giese attributes it with 
gladiatorial verve in a “fight to the death,” with “massed ranks of waves.” Even the adjectives used 
are evocative of the human condition, with “ragged” and “tattered” discs, and emotional “fleshy” 
and “contorted” mouths which experience greed.  
Giese describes the utterly alien in language which reflects Freedman’s quasi-factuality 
represented by the scientific lexicon of Solaristics. The descriptive analysis represents his 
understanding of reality but does not represent the reality conditions of the fictional world, perhaps 
in recognition that it is impossible to do so linguistically. Within the fictional world, this points to 
the cognitive independence of characters who are distinct enough from other contents of the 
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fictional world that they are able to contextualise or misrepresent it in accordance with their own 
experience. For the novel, this fracture of accessibility between reality and perception relates to 
Suvin’s concept of ‘novum,’ which functions within the parameters of cognitive estrangement. Suvin 
argues that the novum is scientifically and cognitively plausible innovation (and the means in which 
to understand it), and is a generic necessity in science fiction. He relates the novum to the zero-
world, arguing that innovation can only exist in comparison to established reality: “the alternate 
reality logically necessitated by and proceeding from the narrative kernel of the novum can only 
function in the oscillating feedback with the author’s reality […] because it is as a whole – or because 
some of its focal relationships are – an analogy to that empirical reality.”220 Suvin further states that 
“however fantastic (in the sense of empirically unverifiable) the characters or worlds described, are 
always de nobis fabula narratur,” so that science fiction, dependent as it is upon the contextually 
resonant novum, will always tell a story (fabula) of us (de nobis), and in particular of the us which is 
the same as the author. 221 Lem himself argues something similar in relation to his work:  
Only the outer shell of this world is formed by the strange phenomena; the inner 
core has a solid non-fantastic meaning. Thus a story can depict the world as it is, or 
interpret the world […] or, in most cases, do both things at the same time. As in life 
we can solve real problems with the help of images of non-existent beings, so in 
literature we can signal the existence of real problems with the help of prima facie 
impossible occurrences or objects. Even when the happenings it describes are 
totally impossible, science fiction work may still point out meaningful, indeed 
rational problems.222  
Lem implies that this outer crust is highly metaphorical, a simulacrum world which encases a 
discernible actual-world meaning. In this vein, the scientific discourse in Solaris is part of “the outer 
shell,” the “strange phenomena” or which functions “in oscillating feedback” with the actual world 
readership. This oscillating feedback is part of the fluid relationship actual world readers have with 
science fiction as genre and as narrative.  
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On the Solaris station, Kelvin’s relationship with the traditions of Solaristics create problems 
when he encounters a simulacrum of his own. Although Kelvin arrives on the Solaris station with a 
scientific understanding of his world, he is soon faced with a state of reality which cannot be 
contained within the established reality conditions of the fictional world. Solaris manifests itself on 
the orbiting station in the form of visitors who take the form of remembered loved ones, and 
Kelvin’s visitor is a perfect replica of his dead wife Harey. Kelvin’s understanding of reality seemingly 
needs to be altered in order to accommodate this impossible presence, but his ways of thinking are 
so terrestrially entrenched that although he is able to mimic a change, he is unable to actually 
convince himself.  
Kelvin’s fluid engagement with the facts of the fictional world undergoes a significant shift 
as his time on the Solaris station elapses and as his perceived familiarity with Harey deepens. In his 
initial encounter with the simulacrum of his wife, Kelvin establishes a cognitive distance from her: 
“I knew then that it was not [Harey], and I was almost certain that she herself did not know it.”223 
Kelvin takes on a particular and convoluted position in this statement. He fails to make a firm 
distinction between visitor Harey and his dead wife from Earth by using the pronoun ‘she’ in the 
second clause (meaning the visitor) to directly refer back to the proper noun “Harey” from the first 
clause (meaning his dead wife) rather than clearly shifting the object of the sentence. This failure 
of distinction is further intensified by “herself” following “she,” subtly indicating that he perceives 
that visitor Harey to have subjectivity, individuality, and internality. He does not think of her as a 
thing, a creature, or even an echo, but as an individual thoughtful being in the same way he 
considers himself. This stance is intensified by his margin of doubt, with “almost certain.” With 
these words, Kelvin indicates that there is a degree of unknowability, of personhood, about visitor 
Harey that directly undermines the authority in “I knew then,” and the subtle condescension in “she 
[…] did not know.” From his first encounter with visitor Harey, Kelvin’s perspective familiarises the 
alien, and establishes what Suvin would call a ‘zero-world’ that is de nobis fabula narratur, where 
Kelvin is the author and narrator of his own referential reality.224 It is from this perspective, from 
Kelvin’s own subjectivity, that he proposes to understand the simulacrum of his own longing, his 
novum, the outer crust of a previously unknowable new facet of his reality. Kelvin is confronted 
with the narrowness of his entrenched perspective, one that is heavily influenced by the quasi-
factual status of Solaristics. Unable to alter his own internalised understanding of the world around 
him, he constructs a new conceptual framework with the new facts around the reality of the 
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fictional world. Although Kelvin will not ultimately succeed in reconfiguring his cognitive position, 
he begins to create a conceptual basis using many of the same processes in which science fiction 
establishes and validates the alien and technological nova.  
According to Istavan Csicsery-Ronay Jr.,  
[Science fiction] characteristically transforms scientific and technological ideas into 
metaphors, by which those ideas are given cultural relevance. […] It takes a body of 
extratextual propositions believed to be true, with no inherent ethical-cultural 
significance, and endows it with meaning by incorporating it in fictional stories about 
characters representing typical values of the author’s culture.225  
Csicsery-Ronay indicates that science fiction allows scientific and technological concepts which are 
complex and inaccessible to a non-specialist readership to be emptied out, becoming metaphors 
for accessible cultural concepts. More so, it roots these concepts in the author’s culture, which 
provides a framing matrix of acceptable contextual linkages. Although this argument, formed as it 
is within the author’s and reader’s contextual spheres, is not productive when directly applied to a 
fictional world-centric reading, the process of emptying out a representative system in order to 
communicate alternative propositions manifests itself within the contextual sphere of the fictional 
world. Kelvin and his colleague Snow are unsuccessful at studying and understanding the visitors. 
They therefore empty out the incomprehensible aspects of the visitors to create referential 
metaphors to justify their own grasp on reality.  Although the scientists are not living in a science 
fiction text, they are living a science fiction. Faced with a simulacral novum, Snow and Kelvin need 
to re-adjust their understanding of reality in accordance to the principle of minimal departure in 
order to suit the newfound facts, using their understanding of reality as the point of deviation. 
However, as Frederic Jameson argues, this type of contact and understanding between humanity 
and the alien is difficult, if not impossible. Jameson refers to the readers of a text confronting an 
alien novum, but the statement also stands when applied to characters within fictional worlds, like 
Kelvin and Snow: it is “not whether we as readers are able to imagine the new colour, but whether 
we can imagine the new sense organ and the new body that corresponds to it. […] Whether we can 
really imagine anything that is not […] derived from sensory knowledge.”226 Jameson emphasises 
the experiential and sensory nature of a reader’s (and Kelvin and Snow’s) means of understanding 
of the world they inhabit, and by extension their dependence upon these basic referential systems 
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for relating with and rationalising that same world. Faced with a reality which challenges that 
framework, as Csicsery-Ronay Jr. says, “by incorporating it in fictional stories about characters 
representing typical values of the author’s culture.”227 For Kelvin and Snow, these fictional stories 
generate an intertextual context around the simulacra that reflects their dependency on relational 
concepts that is so evident in the persistence of the quasi-factual technical language of Solaristics. 
In the final chapters of the novel, Snow looks on the visitors as an attempt at contact by 
Solaris, saying to Kelvin that:  
“It [Solaris] is blind […] or rather it ‘sees’ in a different way from ourselves. We do not 
exist for it in the same sense that we exist for each other. We recognize one another 
by the appearance of the face and the body. That appearance is a transparent 
window to the ocean. It introduces itself directly into the brain.”228  
From the outset, Snow formalises an existential distinction between humanity and the alien, 
including a tacit demotion of status for the alien by referring to ‘it’ rather than by the proper noun 
Solaris. Like Giese’s description of the mimoids, Snow’s anthropocentrism undermines reality as it 
exists beyond the human scope. He refers to the ocean as something which ‘sees,’ the inherent 
assumption being that seeing is fundamental to perceiving true reality. This is emphasised by the 
use of “transparent window,” both of which constitute a visual metaphor for the interrupted act of 
seeing. This phrase further centralises the visual perception by stating that, although the ocean 
“introduces itself directly into the brain,” it does so through the scrim of one’s physical appearance. 
The overabundance of visual references forms a linguistic justification for imposing an 
anthropocentric reality condition upon the fictional world. This is done by implying that visual (or 
something similar) experiences are conditional for real existence by saying that “we do not exist for 
[the ocean] in the same sense that we exist for each other.” Snow goes on to posit that  
“Perhaps [Solaris] used a formula which is not expressed in verbal terms. It may be 
taken from a recording imprinted on our minds, but a man’s memory is stored in 
terms of nucleic acids etching asynchronous large-moleculed crystals. “It” removed 
the deepest, most isolated imprint, the most “assimilated” structure, without 
necessarily knowing what it meant to us.”229 
                                                          
227 Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., “The Book is the Alien,” 6. 
228 Lem, Solaris, 202. 
229 Lem, Solaris, 202. 
81 
 
When visual metaphors fail to account for Snow’s analysis of the ocean, he moves on to verbal 
references. Despite acknowledging that Solaris may not be “expressed in verbal terms,” he 
nevertheless refers to memories shared with Solaris as “a recording imprinted on our minds” and 
“etched,” bringing together both visual (imprinted, etched) and auditory (recording) metaphors. 
Imprinting and etching also imply auditory sensation, since this is the way in which vinyl records are 
made. Although scientific experiments and classificatory nomenclature have failed for a century to 
explain Solaris, Snow easily falls back into a scientific lexicon to contextualise his understanding of 
the visitors. Words such as “formula,” “nucleic acids,” “asynchronous large-moleculed crystals,” 
and “’assimilated’ structure” generate another “quasi-factual locus” as Freedman puts it by creating 
an atmosphere of authority through language which references established components of reality, 
without acknowledging that these components do not fully represent the elements of that 
reality.230   
Snow and Kelvin are taken in by the simulacral elements of the visitors: their human senses 
‘fall’ for the visual and verbal resonances between the visitors and their departed loved ones. Their 
inability to move beyond this sphere of experience is what dooms their intellectual pursuits to 
failure. As Jameson says, “the proliferation of theories […] runs wild in the void, since the ocean is 
not a human creation and can therefore by definition in advance not be understood.”231 This is true 
from the perspective of the reader, but requires an amendment to apply to the characters of a 
fictional world. I suggest that the novum within the fictional world cannot be understood from the 
perspective of the characters for whom it is a novum. It can still be understood because it is part of 
the fabric of reality within the fictional world, just not from the limited reality that forms the 
contextual spheres of the alienated characters. In this case, Solaris is part of the reality of the 
fictional world which exists beyond the margins of Kelvin and Snow’s referential linguistic sphere 
and foundation of knowledge.  
Establishing a fictional world-centric approach does not necessarily contravene theories 
and critical perspectives which are centred upon the relationship of the reader or author to the 
text. Indeed, these critical perspectives can be useful in reading the development of events and 
characters from within the fictional world. In Solaris, the characters are not living in a science fiction, 
since most science fictional elements are naturalised within their reality and extratextual history. 
They are, however, confronted with a simulacral experience of the alien which contravenes their 
established reality and the conceptual frameworks which they use to structure their understanding 
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of that reality. In their struggle to contact the alien, they employ linguistic, cognitive, and contextual 
references in a way which echoes the formal conventions and literary strategies of science fiction 
texts. The humans of Solaris then are not living in a science fiction, they are generating one as a 
means to relate to their expanded awareness of the reality conditions of their world.  
 
Solaris: 1972 – A Space Odyssey 
 
Like Lem’s novel, Andrei Tarkovsky’s film Solaris provides a rich case for testing a fictional world-
centric approach, because it seems to demand a contextual (actual world) reading. Tarkovsky’s 
Solaris is beset with contextually-driven readings which can problematise reading within the 
fictional world. Because of Tarkovsky’s auteur-like aura in film circles and his use of self-reflexive 
cinematic practices, Solaris is often discussed as a Tarkovskian artwork rather than as a fictional 
text. 232  Solaris therefore seems to be a text which exists almost exclusively for the actual world. In 
the following section, I will explore how these actual world-centric approaches can help to re-
contextualise the fictional world of this particular Solaris.  
 From the opening scene, the referential matrix of the film seems anchored within the actual 
world by emphasising terrestrial landscapes and using camera movement to emphasise the 
director’s control of the frame. According to Simonetta Salvestroni, images “surmount spatial, 
temporal, and biological barriers” and create a visual reference which brings “alien places near and 
humanise[s] them to the point that they come to life and participate in a communicatory 
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relationship.”233 Salvestroni argues that Tarkovsky provides minimal visual information to establish 
an understanding of what is clearly a functioning future world, and leaves the viewer “to infer its 
characteristics […] from the uninterrupted file of automobiles that appear to whirl by endlessly […]. 
Revealing itself obliquely, the Earth of the future emerges from a singular process involving not only 
the future expressly imagined in the film but also Tarkovsky’s own present, Soviet reality in the 
1970s.”234 Salvestroni is arguing that cinematic images shrink the conceptual distance between the 
fictional world and the representation of that world, making it closer and therefore understandable 
for the viewers by contextualising it to the actual world. Essentially, movies are filmed on Earth, 
and therefore visually resonate as actual world settings, albeit potentially foreign and futuristic 
ones. Salvestroni does indicate that these reference points are at times cinematic rather than 
actual; due to the cinematic mechanism and not a visual citation of an identifiable location, it is still 
anchored to the actual world by its physical and metaphorical resonances. Although contextual 
readings explicitly centralise the actual world (such as through audiovisual citations or explicit 
cinematic mechanisms) which seem to obfuscate a fictional world-centric reading, they can provide 
a point of departure for such a reading. These communicative images provide the critical reader 
with contextual information about the fictional world in a similar means through which they 
contextualise the film within the actual world.  
Contextually speaking, there are three distinct perspectives at work: that of the camera, 
that of the fictional world, and that based on the characters’ experiential reality. The first is dealt 
with by Salvestroni and is experienced by the viewer. The second is that which is shown in part by 
the camera, which exists ‘before’ the camera (the physical environment is necessarily present 
‘before’ the camera looks directly at it), and which exists ‘after’ the camera (the environment does 
not disappear after the camera looks away). Finally, Kris’ experiential reality differs from the 
camera’s and from the objective reality of the 
fictional world. The film opens with a medium 
shot of weeds waving in a clear flowing river 
(figure 8) that fill the frame with green, 
accompanied by the sound of water gently 
splashing. The camera slowly pans up the bank 
over a variety of flora, arriving at Kris’ foot. It 
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changes trajectory and pans up Kris’ body to eventually frame a medium shot of Kris looking away 
from the camera into the middle distance. For the viewer, this segment cinematically anchors the 
film and provides oppositional contrast for the upcoming scenes which centralise technology, 
mechanisation, and the alien Solaris. For Salvestroni, the camera’s exploration of the natural 
contextualises “the future expressly imagined in the film” as well as “Tarkosvky’s own present, 
Soviet reality,” emphasising that the image belongs to the fictional world, while simultaneously 
arguing that the river filmed is an actual river in an actual world location.235  This image therefore 
communicates the historical and spatial reality of the fictional world the same way in which the 
image contextualises the film itself within an actual world historical and spatial dimension. 
However, there is a third contextualisation that occurs in this moment that Salvestroni does not 
account for. Kris is also able to see the river and hear its splashing, although his perspective is not 
the same as that of the camera. For Kris, the river is contextually bound to his experiential history 
of his family dacha near which the river is located. This spatial and temporal context is utterly 
subject to Kris’ experiences, and is therefore inaccessible for the camera/viewer and is not part the 
objective reality of the fictional world. Contextual critical models that are oriented to the actual 
world (like Salvestroni’s) can therefore provide a point of departure for reading the fictional world. 
Access can be further reinforced by self-reflexive cinematic mechanisms, such as an active camera. 
As the opening scene continues, the machinery of filmmaking makes itself more evident, 
with a hard cut back to the river and grasses moving with the current, on which the camera zooms 
in to a medium shot, standing still for a moment before cutting to the broad-leaved plants of a 
meadow with the sound of plants rustling and birds chirping. The camera continues to move, 
panning upward to find Kris, who is turned away from the camera looking into the middle distance 
outside of the frame. The camera, continuing to slowly drift upwards, maintains a deep focus frame 
of the misty meadow while Kris wanders out of the right hand edge of the frame (figure 9). The 
active camera anchors the scene by making itself evident and indifferent to Kris’ subjective 
experience, emphasising the artifice of the film 
and the audience’s presence. This is the art and 
artifice to which Steven Dillon refers in his study 
The Solaris Effect, which examines the self-aware 
camera as it denotes what he calls “a 
fundamental aspect of the cinematic image” 
which is that the “cinematic image is both present and absent,” by which “self-reflexive films overtly 
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Figure 9 – Kris walks out of the frame 
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break cinematic illusionism in ways that most classical Hollywood films do not.”236 The roving 
camera in the opening sequence begins with absence (the camera is not made evident through the 
framing of the river in figure 8) and moves to clear presence (the movements of the camera make 
its visual control overt). Dillon believes that “reality can break into a fiction film through a 
documentary effect [;]” “above all, however, it is self-reflexivity that makes manifest the materiality 
of film, by breaking through the simulacrum. The Solaris effect keeps open the question of the 
real.”237 The Solaris effect, by which Dillon is referring to the reality-warping effect of the kind of 
alternately absent and present camera used in Solaris, therefore mediates the way in which 
realities, both that of the actual world and that of the fictional world, are being distinguished. In 
this sequence, the camera mechanism becomes evident and oppositional to the natural world that 
is being looked at. The meadow is a long shot from overhead and at an inaccessibly steep angle, 
emphasising the camera’s inhumanity and reinforcing the distinction between its (and the viewer’s) 
referential sphere and Kris’. Kris, once again looking into the fictional world as it exists beyond the 
frame, is therefore once again subjectively experiencing the objective reality of the fictional world 
from a different perspective and in a different means than the camera/viewer. The camera seems 
to have a different agenda than Kris, only meeting up with him occasionally and letting him ‘escape’ 
its frame (the impact of a character ‘escaping’ the camera eye is further discussed with respect to 
fictional world temporality with Aurora from the film Cronos, discussed in Chapter Four). The 
opening sequence of the film therefore demonstrates that an overt camera does not obfuscate the 
reality of the fictional world, but rather enables a continuous, coherent representation of the 
fictional world by physically representing its realities while enabling the characters to experience 
and demonstrate other conditions of that reality that are not contingent upon the camera 
mechanism.  In this way, the presence of the camera not only enables a fictional world reading, but 
also enhances the distinction between the three realities at play: the actual, the fictional, and the 
fictional subjective. 
Especially for films created by an ‘auteur’ director and during a fraught socio-political era, 
this clarity of tripartite realities can become more difficult to parse. Although it is a science fiction 
film, Solaris is conservative with its representations of technological wonder, bending instead 
towards the same naturalisation and mundanity that is in many ways expressed in Lem’s novel. 
Tarkovsky made this choice specifically, stating that he adapted the novel  
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Not at all a result of some fondness for the genre. The main thing is that in Solaris, 
Lem presents a problem that is close to me: the problem of overcoming, of 
convictions, of moral transformation on the path of struggle within the limits of one’s 
own destiny.238  
Johnson and Petrie neatly outline this perspective:  
Tarkovsky’s film follows the basic outline of Lem’s novel quite closely […]. Yet, while 
doing this, Tarkovsky alters the meaning of Lem’s novel almost beyond recognition, 
and some consideration of the way in which this happens will illuminate what is 
particularly ‘Tarkovskian’ about the film.239  
Tarkovsky eschews the overt trappings of science fiction, since his stated belief is that “the true 
cinema image is built upon the destruction of genre, upon conflict with it. And the ideas that the 
artist apparently seeks to express here obviously do not lend themselves to being confined within 
the parameters of a genre.”240 Ironically, Solaris occupies a socio-political contextual space in part 
because of the genre that Tarkovsky was trying to minimise. Lilya Kaganovsky argues that the film 
has socio-political resonances, that “the image of the Ocean – the seething alien mass that fills the 
screen – seems representative of the end point of humanity’s scientific advance.”241 She believes 
that the film belongs to a textual tradition in which “science [is] taken to its limits […], the 
magnificent and incomprehensible beauty of nuclear holocaust.”242 Kaganovsky, like many other 
critics, link science fiction created in the 1960s and 1970s with the Cold War, contextualising the 
fictional aspects of the world of Solaris to create a referential matrix to discuss the actual world.  
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The tension between a socio-political perspective, Tarkovsky’s self-proclaimed efforts to 
evade the hallmarks of the science fiction genre and the fictional reality is most evident in the five-
minute scene during which the disgraced Solarist Burton races down the freeway in a car. The 
sequence begins when Burton disconnects a video call with Kris’ father, warning him of the unusual 
and eerie occurrences related to Solaris. The sequence is predominantly shot from within the car, 
watching the roadways as they wind onward (figure 10). The extreme long shot reinforces the long 
distances travelled. The overhead lights rushing past denote the high rate of speed with which 
Burton is moving through the tunnels and over the overpasses, while the desaturate colours of the 
cityscape encourage the impression that the impressive urban vista is mundane and 
uninteresting.243 The prolonged travel sequence is interspersed with reverse medium shots of 
Burton in the centre of the frame looking down from the camera, with a blue tone (figure 11). 
Occasionally, the shots are not reversed, but the camera is positioned behind Burton to look past 
him and out the windscreen. The diegetic soundscape in Burton’s car is highly mechanical, with 
amplified road noise, mechanical scraping and beeping, muffled voices from passing cars, revving 
engines and mechanized shrieks. The passing signage and vehicular markings are in Japanese 
despite the characters speaking Russian, indicating a multilingual and multicultural urban 
environment (figure 12).244 The culmination of this five-minute sequence is an overhead extreme 
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Figure 10 – Tunnel lights convey speed Figure 11 – Burton in a blue frame 
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long shot of congested city streets which shows the overwhelming mechanical and technological 
progress of the megacity (figure 13).  
Contextual knowledge, including production and historical information, can help redirect 
actual world-centric readings towards the fictional world.  As explored in Chapter One, although a 
film’s narration does not constitute the fictional world, it does compose points of access through 
which the audience can glimpse the reality conditions of the fictional world. In the case of Solaris, 
Tarkovsky’s choices are curated and create the overall impression of control over the film, 
encouraging both a narrative- and production-centric approach. Actual world knowledge about the 
director’s influences and choices assist in identifying the elements of the film which speak directly 
to these influences, and therefore also assist in accessing the facts of the fictional world. The 
Japanese signage, for example, is because Tarkovsky shot the sequence in Tokyo to establish an 
alien and futuristic atmosphere for the contemporary Soviet audience who would be familiar with 
cities which are very different to the Japanese megalopolis.245 This production knowledge helps to 
isolate an otherwise tiny detail, which therefore encourages critical readings that would otherwise 
not take place. In this case, the signage helps to establish the city scape of the fictional world as 
part of a larger globalised socioeconomic culture, creating a visual citation which contextualises the 
local experience as it is represented by the film within a vast international world that exists beyond 
the camera’s scope. This process of recognition and exclusion is also helpful, for example, in reading 
the occasional reverse shots of Burton’s face (Figure 11). The perspective is changeable, with the 
camera either positioned where the windscreen should be, looking alternately outward at the road 
and inward at Burton, or positioned behind Burton looking forward. This emphasises the presence 
of the camera as distinct from the reality conditions of the fictional world, moving as it does in and 
around Burton.  The position of the camera is a mediator between the viewer’s reality, Burton’s 
subjective reality, and the objective reality of the fictional world, similar to the effect of the roving 
camera used in the opening sequence of the film.  The dull greys of the cityscape and the solemn 
blue tint of the interior of the car mark what Johnson and Petrie call the “particularly Tarkovskian” 
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touch of humanising the technologic aspects of science fiction, making them less spectacular and 
more mundane.246 Despite the overt presence of a directorial voice, directorial technique or 
cinematic mechanism does not obscure the reality of the fictional world. The blue tone inside of 
Burton’s car does not change to reflect the changing lighting conditions as his car moves in and out 
of sunlight and electric lighting. Because of this, figure 11 and other tinted scenes do not connote 
reality conditions of the fictional world because of their inconsistency and incoherence with other 
fictional facts.  
Tarkovsky’s hand is also evident in that these characteristic elements are mundane and 
terrestrial rather than spectacularly technological, as might be expected in the genre of science 
fiction, generating a cinematic image “built upon the destruction of genre, upon conflict with it.”247 
This is particularly evident in comparison to Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, to which 
Solaris is sometimes seen as a Soviet “kind of response to Stanley Kubrick’s cooly scientific” film.248 
Tarkovsky does not hold 2001 in high esteem: “Let alone that 2001: A Space Odyssey is phony on 
many points even for specialists. For a true work of art, the fake must be eliminated. I would like to 
shoot Solaris in a way that the viewer would be unaware of any exoticism. Of course, I’m referring 
to the exoticism of technology.”249 These two Cold War era films therefore evoke competition, 
where Burton’s car travel sequence is a direct parallel to the sequence from 2001 in which Bowman 
gets pulled through space. Like Burton’s travel scene (figure 10), Kubrick’s scene uses an extreme 
long shot to denote vast distances, with lights radiating outward from a vanishing horizon to mark 
movement (figure 16). The sequence is shot in neon kaleidoscopic colour, a stark contrast to 
Tarkovsky’s dampened greys. The camera looks forward, but the scene is interspersed with reverse 
shots of Bowman in varying depths of close up. 
Tarkovsky’s sequence is set on Earth with Burton 
clothed in rumpled casual clothing, whereas Kubrick’s 
is set at the extremities of space, with Bowman in a 
futuristic bright red space suit and the vibrant lights 
of his shuttle reflected in his visor (figure 17).250 
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Figure 16 – Interstellar speed as radiating colours 
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Tarkovsky’s soundscape is a mechanised version of 
Kubrick’s operatic one in which sustained choral 
notes fall down the scale to transform into a 
dissonant sustained orchestral crescendo, overlaid 
with metallic buzzing and scraping. Some of 
Tarkovsky’s choices in the production of Solaris are 
therefore clearly formulated response to 2001, making these particular resonances part of an 
intertextual sphere of Cold War science fiction cinema. Tarkovsky’s explicit presence therefore 
alters the way in which the fictional world is represented, but also enables a critical reading which 
emphasises the internality of characters and the respective impact that events in the plot may or 
may not have on the larger fictional world. Ultimately, understanding Tarkovsky’s intention and 
techniques with Solaris help to reinforce the tripartite perspective of the realities of the fictional 
world as it is seen by the viewer, as it is experienced subjectively by the character, and as it exists 
objectively. 
As suggested by Csicsery-Ronay Jr. and Frederic Jameson in the previous section, science 
fictions with their estrangement, nova, and technological dependencies are often read as a social 
parable, a constructed simulacrum which refracts contextual issues to make the issue and its 
consequences (or resolution) clear to the reader.251 In Cold War texts in particular, this simulacrum 
maintains the unresolved speculations which lead to texts which deal closely with abstracted 
concepts around the Cold War, rather than the realities of the War itself. Jacques Derrida comments 
on these constructed concepts, which include what he refers to as speed:  
People find it easy to say that in nuclear war ‘humanity’ runs the risk of its self-
destruction with nothing left over, no remainder. […] But whatever credence we give 
it, we have to recognize that these stakes appear in the experience of a race, or more 
precisely, of a competition, a rivalry between two rates of speed.252  
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Figure 17 – Lights reflected on a red space suit 
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This sense of rivalry which was especially popular in political action and thriller films including 
various films in the James Bond franchise such as From Russia With Love (Young 1968) and 
Moonraker (Gilbert 1979), The Manchurian Candidate (Frankenheimer 1962), and The Spy Who 
Came In from the Cold (Ritt 1965) hinges on privileged information, misinformation, and a race to 
thwart the opposition. Although it is a concept which reinforces the reductionist view of the 
standoff of deterrence, speed and competition has become a hallmark of Cold War texts such as 
Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964). Christine 
Cornea explains that in Soviet science fiction particularly,  
Media attention was focused upon developments in rocket science reputedly 
designed to enhance, rather than destroy, human life. In this sense, the ‘story’ of the 
Space Race helped reinvigorate the image and reputation of scientific and 
technological development in the popular imagination.253  
The successful launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union in 1957 and NASA’s successful moon landing 
in 1969 became part of the competitive “big ‘science story’ of the 1960s,” such that the public 
consciousness was as taken with the promise of scientific progress as it was with the uncanny 
anticipation of nuclear war. 254  
As a simulacrum, the scene in which Burton travels through the cityscape evokes the speed 
and momentum to which Derrida refers, particularly with the central vanishing point which radiates 
white road markings and overhead lights. Its intertextuality with 2001 evokes an atmosphere of 
competition as well as the revisionist and simplifying tendencies of Cold War texts. This revisionist 
tendency is also evident in the highly mundane expression of space travel. The Solaris Station, for 
example, is represented as a broken down and dishevelled poor copy of Earth, its austere white 
rooms dotted with leather chairs and homely amenities (figure 19), the wood library featuring 
artworks and candles (figure 20), and each of the residents of the Station are dressed in their casual 
clothes (figure 21). These aspects seem to directly undermine the expectation of achievement and 
wonder in space technology. The overall effect of these aspects of space travel are perhaps those 
most indicative of Solaris as a Cold War text, in that it reads itself out of the competition, anxiety, 
and fear brought about by nuclear threat. When embracing this perspective, it becomes clear that 
Tarkovsky’s disdain for the technologic trappings of science fiction, the pervading atmosphere of 
the Cold War, and the changing cultural perspectives of space-oriented development have no 
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bearing on the fictional world, and are indeed representative categories that enable the 
communication of a larger social metaphor such as auteurship or the Cold War. In recognising these 
representative processes at work within the actual world, it becomes easier to isolate the fictional 
world, including its associated facts. The viewer familiar with science fiction might experience 
dissatisfaction with the Solaris station, which is a poor and uncared-for version of the expected 
spectacular (or horrifying) examples of space travel in other similar films (like 2001: A Space 
OdysseyI), or even the cool clean lines of the rocket in Planet of the Apes (Schaffner 1968). 
Recognising that this disappointment is contextually linked to Tarkovsky’s aesthetic choices or a 
contextual response to Cold War consciousness allows for the critical reader to identify the 
elements which inspire this reactive reading, and to read apart from these actual world citations. 
The traditional library, the leather armchairs and leaden bookshelves, and the casual clothing 
therefore resonates instead against the historical reality of the fictional world. The station is 
decrepit because it is a physical remnant of a dying science that has failed to adequately balance 
the value of its proffered scientific findings with the financial and social cost of its continued use. 
Its consistent use resulted in its Earthly amenities and the mental distress of its current occupants 
is highlighted by its disorder. Actual world factors can therefore be helpful in a fictional world-
centric perspective by providing a lens through which it becomes possible to distinguish the 
simulacrum of contextually charged science fiction from the reality of the fictional world.  
 
 
Figure 21 – Casual clothing and comfortable furniture 
Figure 19 – Padded rooms and leather chairs Figure 20 – A Wood library full of art 
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Solaris: 2002 – A Colourful Remake 
 
The fictional world of Tarkovsky’s Solaris can be seen around and between the film’s 
considerable contextual resonances. Lem’s fictional world similarly pushes back against the 
constraints of genre frameworks, adapting those frameworks to operate within its own context. 
Steven Soderbergh’s Solaris exists in the critical sphere in a very different sense than do Lem’s and 
Tarkovsky’s, though it is almost always linked in scholarship with them. The film exists critically as 
a remake, an adaptation, and an intertextual iteration of an idea generated by Lem’s novel. In this 
section, I will not be arguing for a particular view of adaptation, or outlining an adaptation reading 
of Soderbergh’s Solaris. Instead, I will be looking at the ways in which adaptation does – or rather, 
does not – manifest itself within the fictional world, and how an adaptation-driven reading can be 
helpful with a fictional world-oriented approach. It might seem that comparative readings and 
adaptation studies are counter-productive for a close reading of the fictional world, since such 
readings are based on structural analysis,  generic tendencies, contextual information (both 
directorial and historical), and textual analysis. At the level of the fictional world, adaptation theory 
is largely ineffective, considering the independent and individuated nature of fictional worlds. 
However, the types of comparative analysis that have traditionally, now controversially, 
preoccupied adaptation studies are useful in opening an avenue through which the viewer can 
access the reality of the fictional world. The actual world relationships between adaptations allow 
for a unique type of comparison between fictional worlds, since they are distinguished not only by 
their differences but also by their similarities. I would like to note here that, as with most ‘fidelity’-
adaptation theory, cataloguing similarities and differences between fictional worlds in adaptations 
is of little use. However, comparative resonances can identify distinguishing elements in differing 
fictional worlds, therefore enabling the viewer to gain a unique engagement with the objective 
realities of the fictional world that the subjective experiences of the characters and even the camera 
may not identify.  
In an interview with Geoff Andrew, Soderbergh says that he “wasn’t at all of a mind that 
the Tarkovsky film could be improved upon [and he] thought there was a very different 
interpretation to be had.”255 He goes on to say that the analogy he uses “was that the Lem book, 
which was full of so many ideas that you could probably make a handful of films from it, was the 
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seed, and that Tarkovsky generated a sequoia and we were sort of trying to make a little bonsai.”256 
Despite Soderbergh’s protestations, Solaris scholars regularly compare his film with Tarkovsky’s, 
using its status as a remake to provide a contextual and intertextual foundation for critical readings. 
Dillon, for example, suggests that  
A movie that is called Solaris and that starts with rain has rain from Tarkovsky, not 
Lem. It rains on and off in the opening section of Tarkovsky’s Solaris, and through so 
many of Tarkovsky’s films that rain amounts to a visual signature.257  
Dillon’s reading clearly privileges an adaptive reading of Solaris. He does not imagine the ways in 
which rain might be of importance within the narrative of Soderbergh’s film, but asks instead where 
the idea for rain came from, subsequently limiting the potential responses to Lem’s novel and 
Tarkovsky’s film. Indeed, Dillon goes on to state that “Soderbergh’s Solaris is a remake of 
Tarkovsky’s film, and a much more interesting film if read that way.”258 Dillon is arguing here for an 
authoritative intertextuality. Although he does conclude by implying that the film can stand apart 
from Tarkovsky’s, he does also hint that the film would lose much of its impact should this be the 
case. Sven Lütticken argues that a ‘good’ remake brings attention to the differences between texts, 
and that any repetition should be “perverted from within, exacerbating the newness that disguises 
sameness until it changed its sign,” an “auto-deconstruction and reconstruction […] the result could 
yield a messianic now-time, anachronistic non-identity or any number of bewildering admixtures of 
the two.” 259 This type of remake – of which Lütticken argues Soderbergh’s Solaris is not one – would 
bind together the source and remake texts into a binary in which the admixture of old and new 
would generate meaning which would be otherwise opaque. Lütticken’s ideal remake is therefore 
not only critically dependent on its actual world relationships, but so is its content value, since its 
successful structure would depend on a self-reflexive metacommentary.  
Mark Gallagher is more expansive in his evaluation of Soderbergh’s success in remaking 
Solaris. He argues that the Soderbergh’s film is indebted to Tarkovsky’s film and to the conventions 
of Hollywood cinema both narratively and technically. He writes that, in contrast to Lem’s novel, 
“both films are distinguished by narrative ambiguity, limited interest in genre iconography, and 
manipulation of film-romance conventions.”260 Both films leave out the lengthy info-dumps from 
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Lem’s Solaris, set a high proportion of their screen time on Earth, and narratively centralise the 
psychological elements of the romance between Chris and Rheya. These resonances can structure 
a complex adaptive relationship between fictional texts which is most often medium specific. The 
pairing of colourated scenes, for example, are a visual cinematic effect which gives “viewers this 
momentary layering of Hollywood’s then-current technologies.”261 These layers are what Lütticken 
would see as an initial attempt at creating a meaningful “messianic now-time” in which both films 
structure a simultaneous binary viewing experience. Gallagher, in less extravagant terms, proposes 
something similar, in which narrative and formal layering provides  
Metacommentaries on cinematic redemption and mediated communication […]. [I]t 
metaphorically acknowledges its debt to the two previous versions of Solaris. In its 
narrative manipulation through editing and its emphasis on mediated images and 
memories, the newer Solaris emulates the reshaping processes of textual adaptation 
and film remakes.262 
 One such form of mediated communication in Solaris is the manipulation of colour, which echoes 
Tarkovsky’s similarly coloured screens such as the blue tint of Burton’s car travel sequence in figure 
4, and which also resonates with the popularisation of coloured screens around the turn of the 
millennium in such films as Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas (Gilliam 1998) (which features neon 
screens), The Matrix (L and L Wachowski 1999) (which is predominantly a desaturate green), and 
The Royal Tenenbaums (Anderson 2001) (where colour washes and lighting provide a rainbow 
palette). 
The visual similarity between films reinforces the medium-specific nature of the remake, 
and puts this in opposition to the narrative resonances of adaptation. In both films, the colouring 
helps to distinguish narrative categories, although the screen in Soderbergh’s Solaris is not tinted 
in the same way as Tarkovsky’s screen is tinted. The colouration is due largely to palette and diegetic 
lighting, rather than distinctive washes. There are three main colour schemes: desaturate green 
(figure 22) which demarcates Chris’ life on Earth after Rheya dies, saturate gold (figure 23) which 
demarcates Chris’ memories of Rheya on Earth, and icy blue (figure 24) which is the colour of the 
space station. These can be compared to Tarkovsky’s colour palettes, which include the rich greens 
of naturalistic scenes (figure 8), intense deep blue as seen in figure 11, and the warm yellows and 
browns associated with Hari and earthly comforts (figures 20 and 25).  In comparison, it is clear that 
                                                          
261 Gallagher, Another Steven Soderbergh Experience, 187. 
262 Gallagher, Another Steven Soderbergh Experience, 187. 
96 
 
there is a significant difference in colouration with respect to saturation (the intensity is significantly 
reduced from Tarkovsky’s bold tones), transparency, and technical application (the wash effect is 
evident in Tarkovsky’s film, whereas Soderbergh’s colouration is predominantly produced by 
lighting and set dressing). This difference does enable the metacommentary relationship discussed 
by Gallagher both aesthetically and technically, as Dillon points out: the tinted screen  
Has everything to do with his repeated performances of the Solaris effect. […] When 
our vision is mediated, not transparent, we are made aware of the artifact, of its 
construction. With the tinted screen and with other similarly self-reflexive gestures, 
Soderbergh repeatedly makes us aware of the cinematic medium.263  
This self-reflexive and medium-specific trait, which is also seen and discussed with reference to the 
intrusive roving camera in the opening sequence of Tarkovsky’s Solaris (pages 84 and 85) is a visual 
effect that does not (and cannot) appear in Lem’s novel because of the textual medium. Although 
these effects help to structure the viewer’s response to the subjective experiences of the fictional 
character, their metacommentary enforces the perspective of the director and the viewer to the 
same degree. The type of readings generated from the work of Lütticken, Dillon, and Gallagher can, 
however, be shifted in order to take advantage of the dominant voice of comparative analysis when 
discussing remakes and adaptation and use it to provide access to a fictional world otherwise 
concealed beneath colour and actuality. 
                                                          
263 Dillon, The Solaris Effect, 23. 
Figure 23 – Memory in gold 
Figure 25 – Hari in warm yellow 
Figure 22 – Kelvin in desaturate green  
Figure 24 – Ice blue on the Solaris station 
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With the dominance of actual world-centric analyses in criticism of adaptations – 
particularly with respect to contextual, medial, and textual considerations – it is helpful to centralise 
the character in any comparative reading. As discussed in Part One and in Chapter One, the fictional 
world is difficult to circumscribe, but is more readily described as the world of the character (pages 
18, 20, 21, and 29). The character, by virtue of being fictional, is precisely as real as the world around 
them, and as such can be discussed as individuals engaging with that world directly through 
subjective experience. In adaptations, however, this subjectivisation and individuation of character 
becomes more problematic. This is because the same or similar characters seem to appear in 
multiple fictional worlds, an effect which is more pronounced in very faithful adaptations such as 
The Green Mile (Darabont 1999), Sin City (Miller 2005), and Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone 
(Columbus 2001), in which characters are so similar to their source material, they seem to occupy 
both fictional worlds simultaneously. In the Solaris-es, the distinctions between characters are clear 
enough that this is less of a problem, although Dillon sees a clear affiliation between the physical 
traits of characters between the two films:  
George Clooney’s large round rugged head topped with short black hair, a head that 
bears a strong resemblance to that of Donatas Banionis, the original Kris. And 
Natascha McElhone is also not so far away from Natalya Bondarchuk, considering all 
casting possibilities.264  
Dillon is conflating the actors with the characters (see page 57 for more on representation) in order 
to emphasise the visual resonances between Tarkovsky’s and Soderbergh’s Solaris, but these 
similarities are not sustained at the level of the fictional world. Rheya, for example, undergoes more 
than a name change across adaptations (see footnote 185 on page 68). Her history with Chris is 
different in each text, as are her interactions with crew members and her non-dialogic behaviours. 
Nevertheless, Rheya is undoubtedly the same character in each text, displaying crucial transitive 
properties (qualities or characteristics which are the same in different versions) however narrative 
or superficial: she is Chris’ dead love who manifests to him aboard the Solaris station, struggles with 
her identity, and commits suicide twice. She has long dark hair, bare feet, and a dearth of self-
confidence. David Lewis argues that these similarities make each Rheya (and Harey and Hari) 
counterparts of each other. He argues that  
                                                          
264 Dillon, The Solaris Effect, 40. 
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Within any one world, things of every category are individuated just as they are in 
the actual world; things in different worlds are never identical […]. The counterpart 
relation is our substitute for identity between things in different worlds.265  
Lewis states here that, simply by virtue of being in a different world, things are distinct from each 
other, although they can be similar. The counterpart is therefore the character in an alternate 
possible world which is the most similar to that character in any other given world, relating the 
Rheyas despite their distinctions and differences. Although Lewis has formed his argument with 
relation to possible worlds theory, this relationship can form the basis for discussing individual 
subjective experiences of characters in adaptations.  
 In order for a comparative adaptation analysis to function in a fictional world-centric 
approach, two clarifications must be made, which Ruth Ronen points out: 
Two aspects of the mode of organization of fictional entities manifest the fictionality 
of the domain. These aspects correspond to the constraints imposed by the 
understander of fictional entities: (1) Every fictional domain is structured as a parallel 
and not a ramifying domain relative to reality or to its versions. The fictional domain 
of entities illustrates this parallelism in the fact that the centrality and actuality of 
entities in the fictional world is uncorrelated to the ontological status of these 
entities (to their being imaginary or real-world counterparts). (2) Every fictional 
domain has its unique mode of organization. The fictional domain of entities is 
organized by rhetorical modes of definitization that affirm the autonomy and self-
sufficiency of the world constructed. In the domain of entities, as in other fictional 
domains, modes of organization specific to fiction are activated in a context. Facing 
a text known to be fictional, the reader understands the world textually constructed 
as a world uncommitted to reality […]. The reader also understands the fictional 
world as a world constructing its own set of referents; understanding fiction hence 
requires the activation of definitization procedures.266 
Ronen takes as her point of departure that fictional domains (what I call fictional worlds) are distinct 
and autonomous, meaning that they are not contingent upon any other worlds, as I have argued in 
Part One, although we differ upon the categorisation of autonomy. In section one, Ronen agrees 
                                                          
265 Lewis, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic,” 114. 
For a more in-depth reading of counterpart theory in relation to my view of fictional worlds, see Part One 
pages 32 and 33.  
266 Ronen, Possible Worlds in Literary Theory, 143. 
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with me that characters central to the fictional world, and that their actuality (what I refer to as 
reality) is precisely as actual as the world itself. In short, characters share the same reality conditions 
as the world they live in, and since fictional worlds are independent, then similar characters across 
worlds are distinct from each other. This means that the analysis of Harey, for example, cannot 
stand for an analysis of Hari or Rheya. Ronen goes on to say that since fictional worlds, by the virtue 
of being fiction, are “uncommitted to reality” as a function of their construction (or its “modes of 
definitization”), Rheya, Hari and Harey are therefore distinct not only because they are central to 
their own fictional worlds, but also because they are fictional in themselves. She doesn’t deny that 
fictional characters don’t have to have actual world counterparts, but she also doesn’t confirm that 
a potential connection to the actual world is necessary for the “centrality and actuality of entities” 
in a fictional world.267 Ronen is here arguing that characters in adaptations (or remakes, in the case 
of Soderbergh’s Solaris) can – and should – be regarded and studied as unrelated and individuated 
characters (“fictional entities”), and that the similarities which make them counterparts are not 
fundamental to the fictional entity themselves.  
 With Ronen’s interventions, comparative readings can be productive for a fictional world-
centric perspective. The critical reader can therefore engage with the counterpart relationship, and 
even technical and narrative relationships between adaptations, while keeping in mind that these 
relationships are not of the fictional world and cannot alter the reality conditions of that world. 
Doing so can provide an actual world framework through which the reality conditions of the 
fictional world can be seen and discussed. There are few scenes which appear in all three Solaris-
es, but in each, the moment when Rheya first appears to Chris is as impactful for the audience as it 
is for the characters. When Harey first appears to Kelvin in Lem’s Solaris, she is seen from afar, and 
the narrative first person allows for a direct expression of Kelvin’s subjective impressions:  
The curtains were half drawn, and there, opposite me, beside the window-pane lit 
by the red sun, someone was sitting. It was Rheya. She was wearing a white beach 
dress, the material stretched tightly over her breasts. She sat with her legs crossed; 
her feet were bare. Motionless, leaning on her sun-tanned arms, she gazed at me 
from beneath her black lashes: Rheya, with her dark hair brushed back.268  
The room, lit with a red sunrise, creates a mediated perspective similar to the colourated screens 
of the films. Unlike the two films, in which the camera’s perspective creates a different view of the 
                                                          
267 Ronen uses the term ‘actual’ to mean fully realised, whereas I have used it in this project to refer to our 
reality as opposed to that of fictional worlds.  
268 Lem, Solaris, 54. 
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fictional world than the one Chris (or Kris) would have, because of the first person narration in the 
novel, the reader is granted limited access to the subjective view Kelvin has as he looks at Harey 
sensually from a distance. His eyes rove across her body in a familiar and covetous way, seeing how 
the material of her dress is “stretched tightly over her breasts,” moving down her legs to note her 
bare feet, which signal her physical comfort and familiarity in the space. Although her feet will 
eventually be a marker for Kelvin of her uncanny alien nature (“The skin was soft, like that of a 
newborn child. I knew then that it was not Rheya, and I was almost certain that she herself did not 
know it.”), at this moment, her bare feet are revealing and familiar.269 Kelvin also notes that he is 
the subject of her gaze, making her seem bold at returning his obviously objectifying look 
flirtatiously, looking at him “from beneath her black lashes.” Harey’s direct coy look differs from 
Rheya’s wide, blunt gaze and Hari’s sidelong look, emphasising the subjectivity of her own 
experience of events as much as the first person focalisation emphasises Kelvin’s. 
When Hari first appears to Kris in Tarkovsky’s film, she is lit with soft, even lighting, and the 
costuming and lighting has a warm yellow and brown palette (figure 26). In both films, the women 
are on the bed, but Rheya is propped upright on her right arm (figure 27), as if she were disturbed 
while asleep, whereas Hari is prone, resting undisturbed and calm on the pillow. Hari’s physical 
behaviour seems to show that she is at peace, unaware of Kris’ unease and her own simulacral 
nature. She takes up the majority of the screen, dominating the viewer’s visual field as she would 
similarly shock and overwhelm Kris’ senses with her sudden appearance. Out of the side of her eye, 
she peers upward past the frame to where Kris would be behind the camera. Her indirect gaze 
seems slightly coy, this impression redoubled by her very slight smile which contrasts Rheya’s direct 
wide-eyed gaze and neutral expression. The close up framing evokes intimacy and comfort, an 
impression reinforced by the soft pillow and her handmade crocheted shawl. The scene therefore 
emphasises Kris’ mixed emotions for Hari, promoting a subjectivised perspective while self-
consciously limiting the viewer’s visual access to the fictional world.  
                                                          
269 Lem, Solaris, 59. 
Figure 26 – Hari watching Kelvin Figure 27 – Rheya watching Kelvin 
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In Soderbergh’s film, Rheya is sidelit with direct low key lighting and high contrast, with a 
cold blue palette, echoing film noir (figure 27). The frame is asymmetrical, with Rheya on the right, 
evoking the void left by Chris on her left. She is looking up past the top of the frame towards where 
Chris is standing. Thanks to the lighting, the asymmetrical framing, and Rheya’s upright active body 
position, the close up does not evoke intimacy, but rather conveys an uncomfortable physical 
proximity. Although the framing belongs to the narration of the film, and therefore to the actual 
world, it provides a visual context in which the non-narrative aspects of the scene become evident. 
In this case, the camera eye suggests Chris’s perspective, although it doesn’t mirror it (the angle of 
Rheya’s gaze indicates that Chris is standing just above and to the left of the camera’s position). 
The asymmetrical frame and close up perspective also isolate and create a singular and 
individualised experience which permits the reader to sympathise with Chris’ view of Rheya: that 
her presence is unexpected and not entirely welcome. In comparison, these first encounters differ 
significantly. It is what Ronen calls “rhetorical modes of definitization” which resonate against each 
other.270 Noting and comparing these distinctions are productive in initiating Gallagher’s 
metacommentary relationship of Soderbergh’s film to the other Solaris-es or Dillon’s Solaris effect 
in which through the intervention of the cinematic medium “we are made aware of the artifact, of 
its construction.”271  
Conversely, these comparisons highlight the individuality of each visitor and the different 
reality conditions of each fictional world as distinct, rather than as adaptations. Harey’s flirtatious 
and slightly shy look from under her lashes directly goes against Hari’s coy and indirect look from 
the corner of her eye and Rheya’s blunt wide gaze. Although actual world elements such as 
narrative technique, contextual knowledge, and medium intervene in the presence of adaptation 
in the fictional world, it is possible to use the adaptive framework to examine the particularities of 
each fictional world, and use them to help re-orient the critical perspective to the fictional world. 
In each text, for example, the lighting creates an atmosphere which enables the audience to engage 
with the subjective experiences of the characters. In each scene, the lighting is motivated, meaning 
that the experience of the lighting and subsequent mood of the fictional world can be accessed by 
the viewer or reader. In Lem, the light of the red alien sun shines in through the half open window. 
In Tarkovsky, the room is flooded with morning light from another alien sun, although it is mediated 
by the thick radiation-proof glass of the Solaris station windows, making it gold. In Soderbergh, the 
harsh blue-white light is emitted from a small bedside reading lamp since the encounter happens 
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at night. This comparison not only demonstrates the distinctness of each fictional world and their 
experienced reality and individuates each visitor by visually representing states of affairs from their 
experiential fictional world, but also denotes their internality and subjectivity in a way that 
contradicts the visual. Rheya’s direct gaze contradicts the shadowy and turbulent atmosphere 
generated by the intertextual resonances generated by the noir-like lighting.272 She is guile-less and 
direct, the high contrast lighting having no effect on her professed happiness at seeing Chris. 
Although the blue palette and slanting light do evoke Chris’ perturbed state at seeing his dead wife 
lying on his bed in a space station orbiting an alien planet, her internal state is not subject to the 
film’s aesthetic or focalisation (which are oriented to Chris as the protagonist). The framing and 
lighting of the scene therefore create a narrative resonance which helps the viewer understand her 
upcoming narrative turbulence, and encourage a semi-subjective reading through Chris’ point of 
view. Although the tonality of the frame establishes a cool and unsettling atmosphere, it has no 
effect on Rheya’s subjective experience.  
Once Rheya’s subjectivity and individuality is established, it becomes easier to see the 
fictional world as it exists beyond the camera frame in its triplicate perspective of the subjective, 
the objective, and the actual. Subjectively, her experiences become as fundamental to the reality 
of the fictional world as Chris’, even though she is not the protagonist. Subsequently, it becomes 
easier to see that narrative events are only a partial representation of the character’s experience 
of the fictional world. Rheya’s experiences beyond the scope of the film therefore establish an 
objective reality in which she operates, and which has its own reality conditions. When Chris sends 
the first Rheya away in a shuttle, it is clear that she continues to experience the terror and pain of 
separation, even after Chris is no longer part of that experience. In figure 29, she can be seen in the 
                                                          
272 Film noir, well known for its femme fatale characters, communicative camera work and convoluted plots, 
amongst other traits, which feature in such films as The Maltese Falcon (Huston, 1941), with neo-noir films 
like Basic Instinct (Verhoeven, 1992) following this aesthetic and formal pattern. The conventions of film 
noir are initiated in the film, especially with respect to the lighting, the secretive atmosphere aboard the 
station, and Rheya’s powerful and threatening presence. Although Soderbergh maintains the direct high 
contrast low key lighting scheme, the other generic traits of film noir fall away as the plot unfolds, giving 
Solaris the visual resonance of noir without making it a neo-noir film. This visual resonance is particularly 
evident in figure 28 below, in which Chris is looking up a staircase. The asymmetrical framing, steep angle, 
geometric structure, low-key high-contrast lighting, and muted colours all point towards strong film noir 
influences in the film.       
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window of the shuttle behind Chris’ right 
shoulder. She is no longer relevant to the 
camera, narrative, and focalisation. She is in 
shadow in the deep background. She is out of 
focus and made nearly invisible as the audience’s 
eyes are pulled away from her face by the deep 
black of Chris’ shirt as it contrasts with the bright white lights of the airlock. And yet, despite her 
dismissal from the narrative and narration, her subjective experience continues. Although the 
shuttle is not shown in flight, it left the station and drifted away into the outer space of the fictional 
world. This type of technology is currently impossible within the scope of the actual world, and so 
the principle of minimal departure (see Part One, pages 19 and 20) dictates that the adjustment 
must be made to accommodate for this divergence from the actual world experience of the viewer. 
The specifics of space travel have not, however, been established within the scope of the film to 
make it easy for the audience to accommodate Rheya’s experience; Chris’ shuttle is shown docking 
at the station, but the mechanics of space travel are not shown. This therefore necessitates that 
the understanding of Rheya’s experience of space travel echoes that of Chris’, mandating reality 
conditions at play that the viewer cannot access or comprehend.  
Obliquely accessing Rheya’s subjective experience of reality creates an interesting extra 
dimension for the film which exists beyond the scope of the narrative, justifies a subjective reality 
in the fictional world which can be directly experienced, and establishes a set of reality conditions 
which are otherwise objectively inaccessible. Lastly, these conclusions provide insight into Rheya’s 
simulacral nature which Chris and Gordon are unable to grasp: that the visitors are real in the same 
way that the characters are real. In light of Rheya’s experience, we can return to Ronen’s 
statements about fictional entities, including those with counterparts; it can be said that “the 
centrality and actuality of entities in the fictional world is uncorrelated to the ontological status of 
these entities,” and that “the reader also understands the fictional world as a world constructing 
its own set of referents.”273 Rheya’s actuality and centrality, her ‘realness,’ is the same as the reality 
of the world she is in and the means by which she was created. Although Rheya is contentiously 
‘real’ for Chris, the humans aboard the station, and the audience, she is undeniably real and 
individuated in the objective fictional world. Rheya’s character is freed from the science-fiction 
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Figure 29 – Rheya in exile behind Kelvin 
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dependence on contact and explanation, from Chris projecting his own needs upon her, and from 
the narrative contexts in which the simulacrums of Solaris are restricted.  
 
Taken together, each of the frameworks set out in this chapter can be problematic for 
fictional world-centric readings as they critically prioritise the actual world’s genres, context, 
history, intertextuality and medium. However, as seen in first section of this chapter, generic 
aspects of the text encourage a distinct means of making sense of the fictional world and which 
centralises the experiential and referential realities of the character. Genre-driven criticism can be 
used to apply genre-specific critical methodologies to the realities and characters of the fictional 
world, creating a referential framework which enables the reader or viewer to access these 
realities. The contextual and intertextual relationships of a text were shown to be similarly 
productive, where actual world information enables a process of analysis and careful exclusion to 
isolate and examine the reality of the fictional world apart from the expectations formed by a text’s 
production context. Finally, the critical methods used with respect to the fictional worlds Lem’s and 
Tarkovsky’s Solaris-es come together in the comparative analysis of adaptations. Adaptations 
provide a useful comparative framework which is a productive starting point to orient a critical 
reading to the fictional world. Similarities, differences, and resonances across adaptations seem at 
first to obscure the individual reality of the fictional world, but with closer analysis, these elements 
can help direct a reading towards the fictional world and away from the potential subjective 
limitations of narrative focalisation. These comparisons help to isolate the character’s experience 
of the fictional world, identifying its reality conditions that enables them to be more easily critically 
read and explored.   
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Chapter Three: Keeping it Real – Myth and Myth-Making in American 
Gods and Anansi Boys  
 
American Gods and Anansi Boys are novels which deal closely with the mythic.  American 
Gods follows Shadow, a man caught in the midst of a war between the old gods of tradition and the 
new gods of technology and innovation. Anansi Boys follows Fat Charlie and his brother Spider, sons 
of the storytelling trickster god Anansi as they weave their way through their fictional world with 
the powers of mythopoeic voice.  
In this chapter, I will be looking closely at myth in literature and considering how the mythic 
is differentiated in a fictional world-centric reading. I will be building on the analyses of fictional 
worlds, characters, and intertextuality explored in Chapters One and Two in order to consider the 
experience of the mythic in the fictional world, and how the character motivates and experiences 
fictionality. In Chapter Two, I looked at how genre does – and more often, does not – operate within 
the fictional world. In this chapter, although I am looking at fantasy novels, I will not reconsider 
theories of genre. In many ways, the language of myth links to the way in which myth participates 
in the reader’s experience of a novel as a fantasy text, since myth is also functional and personal. 
In this sense, my exploration of myth will steer away from the formal and structural tendencies of 
myth scholarship and focus instead on the way in which the characters interact with the 
‘otherworldly’ within the reality of their own fictional world. Because fictional worlds are – 
necessarily – fictional, conditions which are referential, subjective, or transitory in the actual world 
have the potential to be established elements of the reality conditions of the fictional world. The 
fantastic, the mythic and the magical do not only lose their inherent impossibility, but can become 
integral to the cohesive reality experienced by the characters and partially expressed to the reader 
or viewer through the narration.  
Myth-Busting in American Gods 
 
 American Gods tells the story of Shadow’s experiences travelling across America in service 
of the mysterious Mr. Wednesday. Shadow encounters wastrel gods who have been brought to 
America by believing immigrants only to be forgotten by them with the passing of generations; he 
seeks to enlist them as soldiers in Wednesday’s war against the new gods of technology and media. 
The novel uses the language and symbols of the mythic in a way which is easily identifiable for the 
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reader. And yet, within the fictional world, these mythic elements lose their supernatural and 
sacred power. The mythic dimension of American Gods becomes an aspect of the real – an aspect 
that is secret and distinct from the average person – but real nonetheless.  
 Although her work focuses on the form and function of fantasy literature, Kathryn Hume’s 
study Fantasy and Mimesis provides useful terms and concepts for looking at alternate reality 
perspectives within fictional worlds. Hume distinguishes fantasy from other literatures on the basis 
of its mimetic qualities:  
Much literature does present lifelike actions and describe objects in the world we 
know. People, actions, and settings can be integrated in ways that we recognize as 
signifying or resembling what we consider reality. But literature has always been 
more than such a representation.274  
She points out that there is a coherent understanding of the world, and that literature at a 
significant remove from that coherent understanding becomes fantasy:  “Moreover, numerous 
works, past and present deliberately depart from the norms of what can be called consensus reality, 
the reality we depend on for everyday action.”275 Hume’s consensus reality can be linked with Darko 
Suvin’s zero-world which is addressed in more detail in Chapter Two (pages 69-71). As argued in 
Part One (pages 26, 35, and 38), this consensus reality is that of the actual world, and encapsulates 
experiences across individuals that are similar enough that they can be expressed as a singular 
verifiable reality. Within the fictional world, the nature of consensus reality is the same: it is the 
reality conditions of a world which are (to a significant degree) experienced similarly by different 
characters. The characters who form the consensus reality in the fictional world are those who are 
most similar to the reader and are therefore those through whom readers access the fictional world 
(see the principle of minimal departure in Part One, pages 19 and 20), those who present the most 
cohesive view of reality, and those whose perspective of reality best accounts for the events and 
states of affairs of the fictional world.276  
                                                          
274 Hume, Fantasy and Mimesis, xi. 
275 Hume, Fantasy and Mimesis, xi. 
276 In the case of Fight Club (Chapter One) Tyler is not part of the consensus reality because he does not 
exist for anyone in the fictional world except for the Narrator, even though Tyler’s existence is the most 
logical explanation for the Narrator’s erratic behaviour in the context of the narrative. The authority of the 
consensus reality is especially important when discussing fictional worlds of speculative fictions from genres 
such as magical realism, fantasy and science fiction. In Patrick Rothfuss’ novel The Name of The Wind 
(2008), for example, it is reasonable for the characters to see sympathy (a scientific form of magic) as 
responsible for the incredible feats achieved by practitioners in the novel, since they understand the laws of 
magic, see its effects, and it is a more rational explanation in the novel’s context than chance, coincidence, 
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The limitations of consensus reality are not clear until they are challenged by something 
which does not fall within that consensus sphere. Shadow’s first experience of the rupture of 
consensus reality is when his wife appears to him in a hotel room after having died and been buried. 
Shadow is so struck by what should be the impossibility of her presence that he is unsure whether 
it was a hallucination or real: “Maybe it was a dream – but it wasn’t – or maybe I inhaled some of 
the fat kid’s synthetic toad-skin smoke, or probably I’m just going mad…”277 Shadow experiences a 
departure from the consensus reality and immediately seeks to rationalise it. In doing so, he creates 
unreal alternatives only to undermine them. He opens the possibility of alternatives in his use of 
‘maybe.’ Rather than implying a potentiality, ‘maybe’ here indicates Shadow’s explicit awareness 
that the action described did not in fact happen: “Maybe it was a dream” directly implies that he 
considers this eventuality very unlikely, which is supported by his own contrastive interjection of 
“but it wasn’t,” stated definitively so as to shut down the hope that Laura was a dream. The use of 
‘maybe’ as a negative speculation also applies to the toad-skin smoke, its unlikeliness cemented by 
the more definitive speculation of ‘probably’. Shadow is unable to accept that the fictional world 
might operate with reality conditions of which he has no direct previous experience. Rather than 
looking outward at the fictional world, Shadow blames the subjectivity of his own experience for 
the inexplicable presence of his dead wife: a dream, a trip, madness. Despite Shadow’s incredulity, 
Laura was real and physically present. He notes that he can smell and touch her (“Her breath 
smelled, faintly, of mothballs. […] [Her tongue] was cold, and dry, and tasted of cigarettes and of 
bile.”) and the next morning, he sees tangible traces of her moving through his hotel room: “Laura’s 
muddy footprints had been visible on the motel carpet when he got up that morning, leading from 
his bedroom to the lobby and out the door.”278 Shadow is negotiating contradictory input. Hume, 
in defining subcategories of fantasy, names contrastive worlds which “are a special subset of the 
subtractive, in that they refine the complexity of reality down to two centres of interest; the tension 
between these two constitutes a comment on the nature of reality.”279 Although it is against Hume’s 
intention of discussing the formal genres of fantasy, this contrastive method of viewing worlds 
applies directly to the way in which characters might engage with aspects of their realities which 
contravene their consensus reality: they have contrastive perspectives which “refine the complexity 
of reality down to two centres of interest.” With Shadow’s experience of Laura, the two centres of 
                                                          
or acts of god. Sympathy is therefore part of the consensus reality. Other forms of magical reality, such as 
the existence of the Chandrian, is beyond the experience of nearly all inhabitants of the fictional world and 
so are not part of the consensus reality, even though the protagonist Kvothe has direct experience of them.  
277 Gaiman, American Gods, 65. 
278 Gaiman, American Gods, 64, 70. 
279 Hume, Fantasy and Mimesis, 83. 
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reality are captured in the semantic duality of “maybe it was a dream – but it wasn’t.” The inherent 
tension between hesitancy and certainty therefore constitutes a comment on the distance between 
the reality of the fictional world and the consensus reality.  
 Tzvetan Todorov discusses the importance of hesitation for precisely the conflict which 
Shadow experiences around Laura’s appearance:  
In a world which is indeed our world, the one we know, a world without devils, 
sylphides, or vampires, there occurs an event which cannot be explained by the laws 
of this same familiar world. The person who experiences the event must opt for one 
of two possible solutions: either he is the victim of an illusion of the senses, of a 
product of the imagination – and laws of the world then remain what they are; or 
else the event has indeed taken place, it is an integral part of reality – but then this 
reality is controlled by laws unknown to us. Either the devil is an illusion, an 
imaginary being; or else he really exists, precisely like other living beings – with this 
reservation, that we encounter him infrequently.280  
Shadow’s debate of maybes is precisely what Todorov describes: events “cannot be explained by 
the laws of this same familiar world,” where Shadow seeks to explain that he is “the victim of the 
illusion of the senses.” (“maybe it was a dream […] or maybe I inhaled some […] smoke, or probably 
I’m just going mad…”).281 He is also confronted with evidence that “the event has indeed taken 
place, it is an integral part of reality” (her smell, taste, touch, and physical traces). Todorov’s aim is 
to establish the parameters of the genre of the fantastic, which he argues is what  
Occupies the duration of this uncertainty. Once we choose one answer or the other, 
we leave the fantastic for a neighboring genre, the uncanny or the marvelous. The 
fantastic is that hesitation experienced by a person who knows only the laws of 
nature, confronting an apparently supernatural event.282  
Shadow’s reaction to his first encounter with his dead wife is one such “apparently supernatural 
event”; it does not adhere to the consensus reality which he takes to be “the laws of nature.” 
However, our goal here is not to establish American Gods as a fantastic novel, but to examine how 
the fantastic and mythic function within the fictional world. Todorov goes on to say that the reader 
is primary in the experience of the fantastic: “the reader’s hesitation is therefore the first condition 
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of the fantastic,” and that “this hesitation may also be experienced by a character; thus the reader’s 
role is so to speak entrusted to a character, and at the same time the hesitation is represented, it 
becomes one of the themes of the work – in the case of naïve reading, the actual reader identifies 
himself with the character”283 This type of hesitation – as experienced by Shadow – is certainly a 
dominant theme of the text, and his bombardment with both the “laws of nature” and “apparently 
supernatural event[s]” throughout the novel allows the reader to identify and empathise with 
Shadow’s novel-length engagement with hesitation.  
Within the fictional world of American Gods, however, hesitation becomes part of the “laws 
of nature.” In the final paragraph of the novel, Shadow “reached into nowhere, and took a gold coin 
from the air,” just as the ill-fated leprechaun Mad Sweeney taught him. He then goes on to flip the 
coin with his thumb, where  
It spun golden at the top of its arc, in the sunlight, and it glittered and glinted and 
hung there in the midsummer sky as if it was never going to come down. Maybe it 
never would. Shadow didn’t wait to see.284  
Shadow’s thoughts follow a similar trajectory to his ‘maybe’ hesitation when he first encounters 
Laura after her death, but rather than becoming progressively and authoritatively doubtful of his 
own senses (“maybe” he is dreaming or hallucinating becomes “probably” he is mad), he becomes 
increasingly dismissive of the importance of his own understanding of the “laws of nature.” Initially, 
his ‘as if,’ in “as if it was never going to come down,” suggests that the coin is going to fall, but the 
impression of weightlessness that an object gains at the apex of a parabolic arc suggests it has the 
potentiality of remaining aloft. Shadow goes on to think that “maybe it never would,” altering the 
certainty of the coin falling to even odds whether the coin will fall or not. He dismisses the 
importance of the coin’s gravitational state: “he didn’t wait to see”. He acknowledges that 
hesitation – as a simultaneous possibility of the laws of nature and a manifestation of the 
supernatural – can be not only an experience of reality, but also a condition of that reality. He comes 
to acknowledge that his subjective experience of reality – the reality of the fictional world – has not 
and will not be able to account for the realities of the objective world.285 In this way, in the fictional 
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world of American Gods, hesitation is no longer linked to the subjective experience of the character 
as a stand-in for the reader but is instead an aspect of the reality conditions of the fictional world.  
 The promotion of hesitation as a duality from a transitory condition (in that it is seeking to 
resolve between natural/uncanny and supernatural/marvellous) to a fixed reality condition can be 
particularly problematic when the overtly uncanny or supernatural is experienced by a character in 
a world where hesitation is a reality condition. In American Gods, this appears in that which seems 
to be the supernatural or marvellous, expressed as the mythic. The uncanny features less 
prominently in American Gods, but I will deal closely with the effect of the uncanny within fictional 
worlds in my discussion of The Devil’s Backbone in Chapter Four (pages 135-139). The mythic is 
common within the genre of fantasy. As Hume puts it, a “technique open to fantasy is the addition 
of a mythic dimension. This may introduce a divine or at least superior world, a demonic one, or 
even one that is superimposed upon our own, coexistive with it but invisible.”286 In Gaiman’s work, 
in addition to Anansi Boys, discussed in the next section of this chapter, his novel The Ocean at the 
End of the Lane (2014) reflects English, Scottish, and Irish ideas of fairy, and his graphic novel 
Sandman (2010) combines Greek and Roman mythologies with Western tropes of the 
personification of Dream (also known as Morpheus). Elsewhere, Charles De Lint’s The Onion Girl 
(2001), Hiromi Goto’s A Chorus of Mushrooms (1994), Gerald Brom’s The Child Thief (2009), and 
graphic novel series such as Brian Azarello’s Wonder Woman for DC (2012) engage with the content 
and form of national mythological systems to produce contemporary fantasy.  
The new gods in American Gods are those of everyday, the ones who are worshiped with 
peoples’ dedicated time and attention: “gods of credit card and freeway, of Internet and telephone, 
of radio and hospital and television, gods of plastic and of beeper and of neon.”287 These gods, of 
which there are many more, seem to echo Roland Barthes’ concept of contemporary myth. The god 
of media, for example, appears to Shadow as Lucy Ricardo in an episode of I Love Lucy on the 
television. Shadow asks who she is, to which she answers “I’m the idiot box. I’m the TV. I’m the all-
seeing eye and the world of the cathode ray. I’m the boob tube. I’m the little shrine the family 
gathers to adore. […] The TV’s the altar. I’m what people are sacrificing [their time] to.”288  
                                                          
possibility; its stillness is contingent on a particular reality. In the dreamscape, it cannot fall. In this way, the 
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286 Kathryn Hume, Fantasy and Mimesis, 87. 
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It would be tempting to approach Media as Lucy as a Barthesian myth, like Greta Garbo, 
but she is also a real character with physical properties within the fictional world.289 After 
Wednesday is murdered by the new gods, the old and the new gods agree to meet. Upon arrival, 
Media meets Shadow in a different physical form than the ones she has previously manifested: “She 
was perfectly made-up, perfectly coiffed. She reminded him of every newscaster he’d ever seen on 
morning television sitting in a studio that didn’t really resemble a living room.”290 She is a tangible 
part of the reality of the fictional world beyond her function within the text as a sign. She is a 
character, and as such has an internal and subjective experience, and interacts with other 
characters and objects which are part of the reality of the fictional world. It might however be 
argued that Media demonstrates that there is ideology of myth in the fictional world. In the actual 
world the mythic is distinguished from reality; in the fictional word, the mythic and the mundane 
can coincide. In American Gods, the mythic is distinguished by its departure from the consensus 
reality of the fictional world, but only so far as the experience of hesitation allows for the subjective 
experience of individual characters to not fully realise the totality of the real.291  
The confluence of consensus reality and the condition of hesitation necessarily manifests 
itself differently in oral tradition, in written forms like the novel, and in audio-visual forms like film. 
Eleazar Meletinski relates the importance of form in myth to the relationship between the 
importance of a symbol’s form and the cultural environment in which it exists: 
Mythological symbols function in such a way that social and individual behavior and 
world view, by which I mean an axiological model of the world, are reciprocally 
reinforced within a given system. Myth explains and sanctions the social and cosmic 
order that corresponds to a particular culture. By attempting to explain the nature of 
man and the universe, myth reinforces the status quo.292  
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As a result of removing a mythic tradition from its cultural context, either by retelling, adapting, or 
incorporation in an alternative media, part of its essential purpose would be lost, since that is 
fundamentally bound to “the social and cosmic order” and the “status quo” of the society from 
which it originated. Laurence Coupe also supports this position, arguing that “it is usually a good 
idea when dealing with a myth to consider what it is ‘doing’ as well as what it is ‘saying’: that is, to 
bear in mind the pragmatic impulse which would have occasioned it in the first place.”293 He 
believes, like Meletinsky, that myth is intrinsically bound to its context, ‘doing’ as much as ‘saying,’ 
and therefore myth’s relevance is at least in part inextricable from its environment. Brian Attebery 
argues that, especially with respect to myth, its medium and context are fundamental to its 
communication of meaning:  
There is an enormous difference between a bare text in a book and myth wrapped in 
its full cultural context. Much of the significance of a traditional story is implied rather 
than stated outright, many of the meanings depend on cultural knowledge external 
to the text itself, and the intentions behind any performance will vary according to 
the audience and the situation.294  
The medium of communication seems here to be linked to the efficacy and impact of myth. 
Attebery implies that the “bare text in a book” cannot convey the fullness of mythic thinking 
because myth is historically linked to a particular need or cultural context: “literary texts do not 
come immersed in belief systems, ways of life, and interpretive schemata, as do myths in oral 
cultures. That is the other part of fantasy’s mythic method, to provide living contexts to replace the 
ones stripped from mythic texts.”295 He sees the mythic in literary texts as a bare version of 
contextualised traditional storytelling and performance, seeming to imply that literary texts rob 
something from traditional storytelling in the process. He does, however, posit that the literary text 
as a medium establishes a different context within which the myths maintain an altered ideological 
and social power. Novels like American Gods “combin[e] romance forms with postmodern 
techniques to produce fantasies of framed or situated myth”; they use “narrative structures that 
mimic the disjunction of two or more worldviews. In their fiction, different mythic systems meet 
and clash. Each demonstrates an awareness of the incompleteness of any one source of vision and 
the inability of any one writer to claim complete ownership even of his or her own mythic 
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traditions.”296 In American Gods, Shadow’s narrative is interspersed with contextualising tales titled 
“Coming to America” which explain the origin of some of the American old gods. These seem to 
provide some actual-world context or ‘flavour’ for audiences unfamiliar with traditional tales, or 
who might not connect to a mythic logic. They give the reader a hint at the body of belief which 
informs the behaviour and desires of each American god, while contrasting them with Shadow’s 
wary perspective. Narratively, these techniques and structures provide a myth context which 
contains enough situating information to fuel the mythic components, but also generates an 
alternative worldview which localises the literary myth in an accessible contemporary voice 
(Shadow’s narrative).    
I would argue, however, that the way in which myth occupies a non-traditional 
contemporary context is significantly altered within the context of the fictional world, in large part 
because it is not part of the traditional mythic legacy of the actual world. The fictional world of 
American Gods is mythically self-referential. The American gods are real because they experienced 
real worship in America. In Wednesday’s case, voyagers arrived by boat to a strange land in A.D. 
813, where they built a wooden hall where, “in the smoky darkness of their hall, that night, the bard 
sang them the old songs. He sang of Odin, the All-Father” who was to become Wednesday.297  The 
newcomers then took a skraeling hostage, “carried him at the head of a procession to an ash tree 
on the hill overlooking the bay, where they put a rope around his neck and hung him high in the 
wind, their tribute to the All-Father, the gallows lord.”298 With this profession of belief and 
sacrifice,299 Odin the All-Father came to America, where he stayed: “It was more than a hundred 
years before Leif the Fortunate […] rediscovered that land […]. His gods were already waiting for 
him when he arrived.”300 The mythic existence of Wednesday, as a contemporary American Odin, 
is, in Attebery’s words, “wrapped in its full cultural context.”301 The fictional world is its own living 
and evolving mythic context – not in the way Attebery intends, in which contemporary mythic texts 
exists in a narrative and social intertextual sphere which informs their relevance – but as a living 
development of the ideological, social, and contextual needs of myth for the characters within the 
fictional world.  
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 The internal self-contextualisation of the mythic dimension is the final aspect through 
which consensus reality, hesitation, ideology and mythification are significant as they relate to the 
fictional world as it is experienced by Shadow.  Shortly after Shadow and Wednesday gather 
together a party of the most powerful old gods, they meet at a place of great latent power, upon 
which humans have unwittingly been compelled by this nameless power to build the World’s 
Largest Carousel as a roadside attraction. The gods use the power of the carousel to expand reality 
to include the reality of the mythic. As the consensus reality is warped, Shadow attempts to grasp 
the expanding scope of reality as he becomes able to perceive it:  
 Shadow turned, slowly, streaming images of himself as he moved, frozen moments, 
each him captured in a fraction of a second, every tiny movement lasting for an 
infinite period. The images that reached his mind made no sense: it was like seeing 
the world through the multifaceted jeweled eyes of a dragonfly, but each facet saw 
something completely different, and he was unable to combine the things he was 
seeing, or thought he was seeing, into a whole that made any sense.  
 He was looking at Mr. Nancy, an old black man with a pencil mustache, in his check 
sports jacket and his lemon-yellow gloves, riding a carousel lion as it rose and 
lowered, high in the air; and, at the same time, in the same place, he saw a jeweled 
spider as high as a horse, its eyes an emerald nebula, strutting, staring down at him; 
and simultaneously he was looking at an extraordinarily tall man with teal-coloured 
skin and three sets of arms, wearing a flowing ostrich-feather headdress, his face 
painted with red stripes, riding an irritated golden lion, two of his six hands holding 
on tightly to the beast’s mane; and he was also seeing a young black boy, dressed 
in rags, his left foot all swollen and crawling with blackflies; and last of all, and 
behind all these things, Shadow was looking at a tiny brown spider, hiding under a 
withered ochre leaf. 
 Shadow saw all these things, and he knew they were the same thing.302  
Mathilda Slabbert and Leonie Vilijoen might point to the events on the carousel as evidence 
of Shadow’s shamanistic status rather than as an extended experience of reality. Their 
definition of shaman as one who “possesses the ability to transcend the mundane and 
interact with beings and spirits on a higher level, without becoming their instrument or 
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being possessed by them” indicates that Shadow is a shaman because his “interaction with 
gods and demons, and his qualities as healer, saviour or mediator establish him as a shaman 
in the metamythology presented in American [G]ods and confirm his liminal role in the in-
between place he occupies in the world of the novel.”303 In many ways, Shadow’s experience 
of reality beyond the consensus reality seem to manifest as shamanic experiences as they 
are set out. This depends, however, on the mythological nature (or as Slabbert and Vilijoen 
put it, the “metamythology”) of the gods in the novel. In events such as those on the 
carousel, the gods manifest their multiple reality, but not their mythical power. Throughout 
the novel, the gods are at the whims of humans for transport, for strength, and in Shadow’s 
case, to enact change in the wider world. Shadow experiences Anansi as a multiplicity of 
contextual and ideological representations, a violation of the consensus reality which has 
Anansi appear as “an elderly black man wearing a bright checked suit and canary-yellow 
gloves. He was a small man, the kind of little old man who looked as if the passing of the 
years had shrunk him.”304 He does not experience him as a mythological figure, but as a 
singularity that can be thought of as a hesitation in reality. Although his actions and 
experiences can be expressed as shamanic in Slabbert and Vilijoen’s terms, the collapse of 
mythic iconography into the fictional reality renatures Shadow’s experiences as real rather 
than mystical. His departure from consensus reality results in Todorovian hesitation, and 
which resolves into his experience of reality outside of consensus reality as a permanent 
moment of hesitation in which both natural and supernatural reasoning are at play. Unlike 
Shadow’s first encounter with Laura – discussed above – he does not try to undermine his 
subjective experiences as dream, hallucination or delusion. He is initially unsure how he was 
receiving the information of the complete reality of Anansi – evidenced by the indefinite use 
of ‘thought’: “the things he was seeing, or thought he was seeing” – ultimately, however, 
he is convinced of their truthfulness: ‘thought’ is modified to the certainty of ‘knew’ in “he 
knew they were the same thing”. Although Anansi’s full reality is outside of consensus 
reality, Shadow becomes certain as he processes his experience of Anansi.  
 Within the fictional world, hesitation replaces the supernatural elements of the 
mythological. This is evidenced by Shadow’s temporal and physical experiences on the 
carousel. Because of the nature of the novel as a linear medium, the events on the carousel 
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manifest as dilation – both temporal and spatial. For the reader, Anansi on the carousel is 
experienced over multiple lines and in a linear fashion (one line of print at a time) so that 
the experience is protracted and Anansi’s selves are presented one after the other. This 
dilation allows for the reader’s hesitation to establish ground on both sides of the hesitation 
duality: the linear narrative resolves the impossibilities of time and space, whereas the 
mythological provides the marvellous explanation for the impossibilities of simultaneous 
multiplicity. For Shadow, the hesitation does not resolve in these ways, but enables him to 
experience reality as the gods do, as neither and both natural and supernatural. Shadow 
experiences temporal dilation as he comes to grips with the flaws in his understanding of 
the reality conditions of the fictional world: “Shadow turned, slowly, streaming images of 
himself as he moved, frozen moments, each him captured in a fraction of a second, every 
tiny movement lasting for an infinite period.”305 Shadow attempts to make sense of the 
carousel event using the tools he already has at his cognitive disposal, such as analogy and 
simile: “it was like seeing the world through the multifaceted jeweled eyes of a dragonfly”. 
These analogies fail immediately (“but each facet saw something different”), leaving him 
unable to relate his experiences to his known reality: “he was unable to combine the things 
he was seeing, […] into a whole that made any sense”. Although this process of attempted 
accommodation takes very little time in the fictional world, there is an extended durational 
experience for Shadow, who expresses his experience of time as arrested (“frozen” and 
“captured”) and never-ending (“every tiny movement lasting for an infinite period”).306 The 
expansion of time directly contradicts its instantaneity, described as “at the same time,” 
“simultaneously,” and “also.” Spatially, unlike the reader who is bound to print, Anansi 
appears as the colourful old man, the jeweled spider, the ritualised man, the impoverished 
boy, and the cunning spider who all occur “in the same place,” but this does not mean that 
they were indistinguishable. The “tiny brown spider, hiding under a withered ochre leaf” 
was also hiding “behind all those things” which “were the same thing.” These forms are 
therefore distinct parts of one multifaceted singularity which Shadow is only able to 
perceive because of his temporary “dragonfly” vision of the gods’ reality. Although Shadow 
and the audience experience hesitation at the same moment, their temporal and spatial 
engagement with it is distinct. This difference is reflective of Shadow’s temporary ability, 
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and the reader’s inability, to experience the effects of full fictional reality as it is available to 
Anansi and the other old ones.  
Shadow’s experience of explicit hesitation on the carousel does not resolve, as 
Todorov argues all hesitation must, because his experience cannot exist as natural nor as 
marvellous. The reality of the American gods is outside of his understanding of the laws of 
his world, as part of the consensus reality. At the same time, Shadow understands that the 
gods are a real, tangible aspect of his own world, and not envoys or manifestations of 
another. They are made by human believers who carried their practices and stories to 
America, and their behaviour is bound to their representative relationship to the people of 
America. The reader of American Gods is not granted access to the full reality of the fictional 
world because Shadow, the character who is closest in type and form to the reader, is not 
given this access. The behaviour and manifestation of the gods appear mythical because 
they are structured around mythical forms from the actual world: stories like those of Odin 
which remain in the eddas and sagas of the Old Norse cultures, and stories of Anansi which 
are retold and rewritten in the Akan tradition. It also appears mythical because, as a 
resolution to our experience of hesitation, we as readers resolve on the side of the 
marvellous, reflecting our living engagement with formulaic concepts like ‘gods’ and ‘belief.’ 
From within the fictional world, however, the mythic language and legacy of the actual 
world can become enfolded within its plastic representation of reality. This reality can be 
fractious or elusive, victim to consensus and subjectivity. However, the impact of American 
Gods is fundamentally altered when Shadow becomes the arbiter of reality. Characters who 
take control of their reality can sometimes alter it, generating realities and belief systems 
which echo the mythological elements of fantasy. This process, which I call mythopoeic 
voice, is an extension of Shadow’s role in American Gods, and plays out in the novel Anansi 
Boys, discussed in the next section.    
 
Anansi Boys – I Could be Talked Into it with Mythopoeic Voice 
 
Language and myth are often one and the same. Roland Barthes argues that the language 
of myth is mythic not because of its content, but because of that which it signifies: its ideological 
power:  
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Mythical speech is made of a material which has already been worked on so as to 
make it suitable for communication: it is because all the materials of myth (whether 
pictorial or written) presuppose a signifying consciousness, that one can reason 
about them while discounting their substance. This substance is unimportant [.]307  
This presupposed “signifying consciousness” of myth can be in the form of language, as in the first 
line of Anansi Boys: “In the beginning, after all, were the words, and they came with a tune. That 
was how the world was made, how the void was divided, how the lands and the stars and the 
dreams and the little gods and the animals, how all of them came into the world.”308 This clearly 
evokes the beginning verses of the Bible from the book of Genesis: “In the beginning when God 
created the heavens and the earth, the earth was a formless void and darkness covered the face of 
the deep, while a wind from God swept over the face of the waters. Then God said, ‘Let there be 
light’; and there was light.”309 The form, content, and subject of both quotations are the same, 
opening with “In the beginning,” and following the same structure to describe how words were 
instrumental in separating the void and speaking into being all of the elements of human 
experience. To use Barthes’ terms, the first lines of Anansi Boys “is made of a material which has 
already been worked on,” borrowing the gravitas and true-feeling of the Bible by mimicking its form 
and content to evoke power through mythic speech. Mythic speech in Anansi Boys is not, however, 
the ideological second-order system of signification proposed by Barthes; the act of speaking with 
authority and mythic intent in the novel results in acts of creation which alter the reality of the 
fictional world rather than evoke larger mythological concepts.  
 Anansi Boys follows Fat Charlie Nancy, a protagonist whose life is utterly unremarkable, 
until his enigmatic father dies and he learns from an old family acquaintance that he has a brother. 
In the days following his father’s death, Fat Charlie’s brother Spider shows up, manifesting all sorts 
of incredible objects and events simply by describing them aloud. Fat Charlie’s life rapidly begins to 
unravel into events of heartbreak, murder, and magic. Spider and his powerful speech is at the 
centre of it all, wielding the story and song power of their father, the Akan trickster Anansi.  
Spider’s power of speaking something into being is not one that is part of the consensus 
reality of the fictional world, although his manifestations are very real once they are created. In this 
way, the way in which characters like Spider can ‘speak-into-being’ is similar to the way in which 
mythopoeic literature occupies a quasi-mythic space. For this reason, I call this effect mythopoeic 
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voice. For instance, while Fat Charlie was sleeping off a hangover, Spider took his place at work, and 
convinced all of the workers there that he was Fat Charlie, simply by telling them that he was: “He 
wandered through the offices, and when anyone asked him who he was, he would say ‘I’m Fat 
Charlie Nancy,’ and he’d say it in his god-voice, which would make whatever he said practically 
true.”310 Spider’s use of language in this passage does not directly evoke a particular mythological 
reference, but the descriptor of his voice as “his god-voice” generates sufficient authority for it to 
be reasonable that Spider’s voice could “make whatever he said practically true.” The inclusion of 
mythic elements, forms and styles is characteristic of mythopoeic literature, which Laurence Coupe 
succinctly describes: “literary works may be regarded as ‘mythopoeic’, tending to create or recreate 
certain narratives which human beings take to be crucial to their understanding of the world.”311 In 
this sense, mythopoeic literature consists of narratives which structure a mythological - or 
mythological-like environment - which is fundamental to the way in which characters understand 
their world and affects the way in which they interact with it. These mythopoeic narratives evoke 
narrative forms, tropes, and symbols which are already imbued with mythic importance (such as 
the opening lines of Anansi Boys evoking the Bible) in order to establish their own mythic 
dimensions.312 Scholars like Andrew Von Hendy believe that this communicative function of 
mythology is “the hermeneutical activity of telling the stories allegorically,” and as such is 
representational: mythology is the interpretation of myth in narrative form.313  This is an extension 
of actual-world mythological traditions, which are based on continued interpersonal and 
intergenerational communication.  
There is therefore a link between mythology, mythopoeic literature, and mythopoeic voice 
on the basis of communication. Don Cupitt points out that language as a creative force is not 
exclusive to fictional worlds:  
In some measure, people already accept that language creates reality. They know 
that writers create. They know that saying ‘Done’ may create a contract, and 
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saying ‘I thee wed’ may create a marriage… […] Your vocabulary shapes your world 
for you and enables you to get a grip on it. Conversely, the limits of your language 
are the limits of your world. All this, people know already. We add a further 
consideration: the end of the philosophers’ dream, that the human mind could 
altogether outsoar the limits of language and history and lay hold of absolute 
speculative knowledge, is a great event. In religious thought it means giving up the 
attempt to transcend our myths and symbols, and returning into language.314 
Cupitt states that language is powerful as a symbol, but it also enacts and alters our engagement 
with others and our engagement with reality. When connected with religion, myth and symbol are 
intrinsic to the authority and power of language. Eleazar Meletinsky says of creative language that:  
The act of creation can occur in a variety of contexts and in different forms that 
mytho-logic regards as particular instances of the same uninterrupted continuum. 
Even the creation of objects when the gods speak their names, which is relatively 
rare in archaic myths, is not creation from nothing but a type of spiritual 
emanation of the god that is based on the mythological equation between the 
object and its name.315 
Here, he argues that in mythology, the creation of objects through naming (while rare) is 
fundamentally linked to divine power, and is therefore of the same stuff as other forms of 
creation.316 His description of creation through vocalisation is reminiscent of a symbolic reading of 
language, in which the concept of the signified is embedded within the signifier. Because of the 
direct relationships within language as symbolic communication, the addition of the divine allows 
for the signifier to manifest the signified.317  
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 Meletinsky’s views are useful for mythopoeic voice, particularly as Spider’s power comes 
directly from Anansi, the story-telling trickster god (“he’d say it in his god-voice, which would make 
whatever he said practically true”).318 The innate creative potency of language is easily transferred 
to the substance of mythopoeic literature. Within a fictional world, characters with a mythopoeic 
voice like Spider can use language to manifest or tweak their experiential reality. In their first 
acquaintance of each other, Fat Charlie and Spider are at a wine bar, toasting to their late father. 
Spider obtains an old, dusty bottle from the bar and proposes a toast:  
“To Dad,” said Fat Charlie, and he clinked his glass against Spider’s – managing, 
miraculously, not to spill any as he did so – and he tasted his wine. It was peculiarly 
bitter and herby, and salt. “What it this?”  
“Funeral wine, the kind you drink for gods. They haven’t made it for a long time. 
It’s seasoned with bitter aloes and rosemary, and with the tears of brokenhearted 
virgins.” 
“And the sell it in a Fleet Street wine bar?” Fat Charlie picked up the bottle, but 
the label was too faded and dusty to read. “Never heard of it.”  
“These old places have the good stuff, if you ask for it,” said Spider. “Or maybe I 
just think they do.”319  
This event is Fat Charlie’s first experience of Spider’s powerful voice, which in this case is focused 
on a particularly symbolic beverage. Initially, the mythic aspect of this excerpt seem to the evoking 
the common mythological trope of divine or magical beverages. In the Greek tradition, for example 
the human Psyche drinks ambrosia, which enables her to join Cupid as a god on Olympus.320 In 
Norse mythology, the mead of poetry confers the ability of a skald (court poet),321 and its power is 
suggested in American Gods as Wednesday insists that Shadow imbibes mead to seal his divine 
deal: “I brought you mead to drink because it’s traditional. And right now we need all the tradition 
we can get. It seals our bargain.”322 The trope of power-inducing drink is so prevalent in mythology 
that it appears renatured in mythopoeic novels like The Lord of the Rings, in which the hobbits 
Merry and Pippin drink Ent-draght, which makes them grow taller and more able to take on their 
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tasks.323 In each case, the drink is a catalyst or an enhancement which confers magical effects or 
abilities.  
Spider manifests a mythically symbolic object through speech while he is in the wine bar 
with Fat Charlie. However, despite the prevalence of the power-inducing beverage within actual 
world mythology, the drink does not provide Spider with power within the fictional world. The 
referential concepts around the trope of powerful beverages is inverted. It is Spider’s mythopoeic 
voice which creates the wine by generating a fictional mythic tradition in which the wine is a 
significant element. The drink itself holds no power other than as a token of the fictional 
mythological tradition constituted by Spider (“funeral wine, the kind you drink for gods.”). Spider 
requests the wine (“these old places have the good stuff, if you ask for it”) and it appears, even 
though it is nearly impossible that a contemporary wine bar would reasonably stock it. Although 
the tradition of funeral wine invokes trans-cultural traditions such libation, the ingredients of the 
drink sound like a parody of a mystical potion, as more practical ingredients like “bitter aloes and 
rosemary” are paired with “the tears of brokenhearted virgins.”324 Spider’s mythopoeic voice is 
therefore dependent upon a series of fictionalised imaginings, and not the direct association of 
concept and object. First, he has a concept of ritualised drinks, including ideas of what a beverage 
of mythic importance would contain. Then he asks for it with confidence (“if you ask for it”) and 
conviction (“or maybe I just think they do”), in so doing manifesting the drink precisely as he 
conceived of it. Finally, it appears, and he drinks with Fat Charlie. Spider internalises the mythic 
(and mythopoeic) trope of powerful beverages, constitutes a fictional self-referential conceptual 
network, and then creates the bottle by asking for it with a mythopoeic voice. 
Cupitt and Meletinsky’s ideas around mythological language are helpful in processing some 
aspects of mythopoeic voice within the fictional world. However, regarding mythopoeic voice as an 
exclusively linguistic function does fall short in Spider’s case. The flexibility of fiction allows for 
looser mandates when altering or constituting aspects of the reality of the fictional world. Von 
Hendy acknowledges that there is a distinction between seeing myth as fiction, as a ‘sibling’ to the 
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ideological understanding of myth, than in myth as pragmatic or a prescriptive form. Von Hendy 
states that “’myth’ is radicalized; its fictive nature presses into the foreground, and the basis of its 
perennial authenticity recedes to the vanishing point.”325 Where the “necessary fiction” of myth is 
prominent, “this conception of myth […] assum[es] that such fictions are without transcendental 
sanction. But it differs from its sibling in viewing neutrally, or even positively, their necessary 
fictivity.”326 He calls this a “constitutive”327 view of myth, which he exemplifies with W.B. Yeats’ 
poetry in A Vision that is attributed to communicators who spoke with him, dictating to him 
metaphors and “stylistic arrangements of experience.”328 Von Hendy points out that “the crucial 
point here isn’t the precise degree of Yeats’s belief, but his pragmatic commitment to a construction 
he knows to be obviously dubious.”329 The ideas of the mythic here are not ideological, sacred, or 
historical, but they are powerful because they are efficient in accessing power and authority. This 
conception of myth is a way in which creativity can make manifest a constructed form of fiction 
communication that contains the depth and authority of myth without claiming a specific 
mythological tradition. The constitutive elements of the fiction of myth is made literal in the novel 
and film Inkheart, where the main character Mo has the power of silvertongue.330 Whatever he 
reads aloud becomes part of his reality: characters are ‘read out’ of the book and are free to wreak 
havoc on Mo’s world. Mo’s voice alone doesn’t carry the power of manifestation, nor does the book 
itself. But Mo’s powerful voice, combined with constitutive powers of fictionalised myth (the print 
in the books themselves), manifests an alteration within the reality of the fictional world.  
In the world of Anansi Boys, the need for such a modified view of myth is evidenced by 
Spider’s ability not only to manifest objects but also space, altering limited pockets of the fictional 
world as it is described by the reality conditions experienced by (non-divine) characters.331 He does 
this by narrativising his ideas. After making Fat Charlie’s acquaintance, Spider moves himself into 
Fat Charlie’s spare room, which he describes as “might have been a good sized bedroom for a 
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normal-sized garden gnome or an undersized dwarf, but for anyone else it was a closet with a 
window.”332 However, after Spider moves in:  
There was a room, yes; that much as still true, but it was an enormous room. A 
magnificent room. There were windows at the far end, huge picture windows, 
looking out over what appeared to be a waterfall. Beyond the waterfall, the tropical 
sun was low on the horizon, and it burnished everything in its golden light. […] And 
there was more…333  
Spider’s mythopoeic voice has fundamentally altered the reality of the box room he occupies 
without altering the reality conditions of the world itself, and without altering anything other than 
what he directly speaks into being (the dimensions of the rest of Fat Charlie’s apartment are 
unchanged, for example). The room is now not only large enough to hold the few boxes and trinkets 
it previously housed, but a vast indoor space, which looks out onto an even more vast outdoor 
space. The literary form allows the reader to experience the broadening shock of Fat Charlie’s view 
of the box room. Consecutively increasing spatial signifiers mimic Fat Charlie’s gaze as “a room” 
becomes “an enormous room. A magnificent room.” Windows become “huge picture windows,” 
and there arises a massive outdoor space in where there “appeared to be a waterfall.” After noting 
the waterfall, Fat Charlie notes that there is further space “beyond the waterfall” which extends 
into “the tropical sun […] low on the horizon”. Within the tiny indoor space of the box room, there 
is an outdoor space and a horizon, implying a continuing depth. Fat Charlie’s sequential recounting 
of the space and substance of Spider’s guest room mirrors the process through which Spider’s 
desire became a bottle of wine, and exposes the narrative constitution which manifested the room 
to begin with. 
Spider’s mythopoeic voice mirrors the poetics of mythopoeic literature, playing on the 
symbolic properties of language, mythological tropes, and constitution through fictive 
narrativisation. Unlike myth and mythopoeic literature, mythopoeic voice does not fundamentally 
alter the reality conditions of the fictional world. Mythopoeic voice relates to Pavel’s “salient 
ontologies” model which is derived from his framework of possible worlds (see Part One, page 
36).334 To recall his position, Pavel argues that “we may distinguish between primary and secondary 
universes within dual structures, the former constituting the foundation upon which the latter is 
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built.”335 This model is helpful with respect to mythopoeic voice in that it establishes the 
connectivity between the fictional world and the mythopoeic reality. Spider pushes against the laws 
of reality in the fictional world, but he does not fundamentally alter them. In an amendment to 
Pavel’s structure, mythopoeic voice would more accurately be called a distention of the primary 
universe rather than a secondary universe. For small instances, like the bottle of funeral wine, 
Spider does not need to terminate the act of constitution which manifested the wine in the first 
place. The liquid was drunk, and the bottle could be disposed of and allowed to cease to exist. In 
the case of his guest room, however, Spider “concentrated on letting the bedroom stop existing, 
which is something that he hated to do, mostly because he was incredibly proud of his sound 
system, and also because it was where he kept his stuff.”336 Spider is “letting” the room disappear, 
and allowing the reality of the fictional world to re-establish its shape before Spider’s manipulation.  
Mythopoeic voice also differs from myth and its associated supernatural authority in its 
immediacy. As Meletinsky points out, the power of myth relates to ‘proto-time,’ a “mythical past” 
which is “not only a remote epoch but is the time of primordial creation, the proto-time (Ur-zeit), 
the time of all origin – all are valid descriptions – that existed before empirical time. In fact, myth 
marks the sacred time of origin and not the empirical time as special.”337 This proto-time is tied with 
a proto-space in Anansi Boys, which are caves at the end of the world: “There are mountains. They 
are the rocky places you will reach before you come to the cliffs that border the end of the world, 
and there are caves in those mountains, deep caves that were inhabited long before the first men 
walked the earth. They are inhabited still.”338 In these caves live the god-animals who make up 
traditional Anansi stories. These gods have always lived there – they “were inhabited long before 
the first men” – and always will: “they are inhabited still”. When this space is discussed in the novel, 
it is as if it exists in an eternal present. This is a space that Spider cannot change, because it is part 
of the mythology of the fictional world. At the conclusion of the novel, Fat Charlie discovers that he 
also has a mythopoeic voice. Using this ability, Spider and Fat Charlie can move in and out of the 
caves at the end of the world, and even succeed in transforming Grahame Coates, their ex-boss and 
the novel’s villain, into a stoat. They trapped this stoat in Tiger’s cave at the end of the world, as a 
punishment for his misdeeds. The brothers succeeded in changing a human into a stoat, and even 
succeeded in satirizing Tiger’s roar: “Charlie did the goofy roar again. Like any impersonation, like 
any perfect caricature, it had the effect of making what it made fun of intrinsically ridiculous. No 
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one would ever hear Tiger roar again without hearing Charlie’s roar underneath it.”339 What the 
boys cannot change is the proto-time in the proto-space which belongs to myth proper within the 
fictional world. Because of the limitations of mythopoeic voice, it is fundamentally distinct from the 
mythic and mythologies within fiction and mythopoeic texts. Mythopoeic voice distends reality, but 
cannot fundamentally alter it, or change the supernatural mythologies which are at work in the 
fictional world. 
 
As with American Gods, the resonances of actual world mythology can lose some of its 
mythical dimension within the fictional world. The mythic and the mundane can co-exist in the 
same reality, despite the inability of some to perceive its totality, resulting in a perpetual state of 
hesitation which is so prevalent it can form one of the reality conditions of the fictional world. 
Expanding on these views of myth established in American Gods, mythopoeic voice, evidenced in 
Anansi Boys, presses against the limitations of the reality of a fictional world. The power of 
mythopoeic voice works upon the symbolic properties of language, utilises the powerful aspects of 
mythology (including its tropes and archetypes), and proceeds to constitute a distended pocket of 
reality by narrativising a fictional mythological tradition without occupying the place of literary 
myth.  
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Chapter Four: Taking Their Own Sweet Time – A Child’s Experience in 
Cronos, The Devil’s Backbone, and Pan’s Labyrinth 
 
The three films by Guillermo del Toro discussed in this chapter each manifest fictional world time 
in different ways. Like the other texts discussed in this thesis, they are chosen for the complexity 
they bring to fictional world-centric readings. In each case, they present intricate temporalities 
which obfuscate the distinction between the actual world, narration, and fictional world. In Cronos 
(1993), Aurora’s self-assured stillness contradicts the rapid passage of time as it is measured with 
respect to the adults around her. In The Devil’s Backbone (2001), the ghost Santi manifests a 
trichotomy of time which seem to contain the past, present, and future. As other children draw 
closer to him, their own behaviour begins to reflect his unusual temporality as they live through the 
trauma of war. Finally, in Pan’s Labyrinth (2006), Ofelia uses her mythopoeic voice to escape to a 
mythic reality. Her misunderstanding of this mythic world results in time slipping away from her, 
leading to her death. 
Each of the below discussions will take as their point of departure the theories of time 
discussed in Part One. The theories of Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, Gregory Currie, Sarah Cardwell, 
and Matilda Mroz will be used as a framework within which to investigate how time is manifested 
within the fictional world. I will also consider in each case how the viewer can evaluate a character’s 
experience of time as distinct from our own.  
 
In the Nick of Time – Aurora’s Calmness in Cronos  
 
Cronos is a Mexican horror film following the life and death of Jesús Gris. Jesús is an Argentinian 
antiques dealer living in Mexico City with his wife and granddaughter, Aurora. He discovers a 
strange and ancient clockwork mechanism which pierces his skin, feeding the insect within and 
starting Jesús on the path to becoming a vampire. Jesús becomes known to the dying Dieter de la 
Guardia and his nephew Angel, who had been searching for the mechanism (named the cronos 
device) to give Dieter eternal life. Eventually, Jesús and Aurora kill Angel and Dieter, but not before 
Jesús nearly completes his transformation into a vampire. He makes the decision to die rather than 
drink Aurora’s blood and become fully immortal. Cronos was del Toro’s first feature length film, one 
which set the stage for transnational successes. The fictional world is itself transnational. The 
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characters are from diverse backgrounds: Aurora is Mexican, Jesús Gris is Argentinian, and the de 
la Guardias are Americans who are bilingual in Spanish and English. The environment establishes a 
transnational culture, hinted at by signage in Spanish, English, and Chinese. Conversely, the events 
of Cronos take place in a relatively small neighbourhood. As a result, Jesús and Aurora find 
themselves at a crossroads between the transnational and the local. This transnational culture is 
mirrored in its textual realities: Federico Luppi, who plays Jesús, is Argentinian and Spanish, Ron 
Perlman (Angel) is American, and Claudio Brook (Dieter) is Mexican. The production crew is 
predominantly Mexican (including del Toro himself, cinematographer Guillermo Navarro and 
composer Javier Álvarez) as are the production companies (which includes CNCAIMC, Fondo de 
Fomento a la Calidad Cinematográfica, and IMCINE).  
This transnational character of the film’s fictional and actual worlds is prevalent in critical 
responses to the film, which deal with questions of national identity,340 urbanity and 
globalisation,341 and neo-colonialism.342 While these approaches are not explicitly helpful in a 
fictional world-centric project, they do frame a discussion on time which proves a useful backdrop 
against which Aurora’s temporality can be read. Deborah Shaw ties the transnational identity of the 
film to the temporal disorientation that surrounds the concept of the vampire, metaphorically 
contained within the cronos device.343 She links the representation of vampirism in the film with 
history of Spanish colonialism in Mexico and modern US neo-colonialism, stating that “ideas of 
alchemy, immortality, and vampires provide the narrative mysteries and fantastic pleasures of the 
text, but ultimately the elixir or life is an unwelcome substance linked to insects, colonisers, 
addiction and possession.”344 The cronos device, developed by European alchemists and coveted 
by resident Americans, therefore becomes a cultural metaphor for globalisation, and a political 
metaphor for Mexican-American relations.345 It becomes an amalgam of destruction (related to 
Cronos, the Greek titan who ate his children) and time (as Chronos, the personification of time). 
Shaw points out that the device is a clockwork mechanism and that its rhythmic ticking sound is 
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prevalent throughout the film, binding together eternal life (endless time, Chronos) and death 
(vampirism, Cronos). The unity of Chronos and Cronos is therefore a comment “on the devastation 
that follows when humans try to manipulate the workings of time and interfere with its laws.”346 
For Shaw, therefore, the connection between the two, between destruction and time, is inherently 
transnational, represented in Jesús’ ‘possession’ by a foreign object which nearly forces him to 
consume his granddaughter.  
John Kraniauskas takes a similar position, arguing that vampire narratives like Cronos are 
“first and foremost narratives of the social configuration of the body” in which the return of the 
‘dead’ body is the ‘return’ of the postcolonial scenario through neo-colonial American capitalism.347 
He goes on to write that “Cronos is a fantasy of the contemporary body, technology, and of time in 
the accelerated age of late-transnational-capitalism,” in which capitalism is a parasite which feeds 
off Mexican nationhood just as the Cronos device feeds off of Jesús’ life force.348  Shaw and 
Kraniauskas thus read time in Cronos as embodied in the vampire. In these readings, the 
embodiment of time as vampire has spatial, political, and cultural meaning, derived from the 
transnationality of the film and its subject matter. These approaches clearly prioritise the reality of 
the actual world, but they also appropriately identify the importance of time within the fictional 
world. They identify Jesús and the vampire as points of temporal disruption, creatures who have 
the representational “capacity to join all spaces, places and times.”349 They also recognize that the 
transnational nature of the film, linking the fictional world and the text – can itself be related to the 
figure of the vampire. 
 Jesús moves in a predictable way through the fictional world, his behaviour reflective of 
chronological time as it is measured by the countless clocks in his antique shop. When his vampirism 
alters his relationship to time, his temporality continues to be chronological. When he is physically 
connected to the Cronos device, its cogs run backwards, but keep time as they do so.350 Instead of 
halting Jesús’ experience of time by imbuing him with immortality, the device reverses itself, 
measuring time backwards. He appears younger, healthier, and more energetic (figures 30 and 31), 
eschewing his reading glasses and moustache. After his first death, the Cronos device once again 
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runs forward, effectively capturing him in a chronological loop.351 After his first death, he appears 
to his family dressed in a tattered backwards tuxedo (his attempt to wear the funeral tuxedo in 
which he was to be embalmed and which had been slit up the back). In life, when he moved forward 
through time, he had a composed and calm demeanor and appearance. Subjected to this time loop, 
Jesús is unable to orient himself, and so becomes increasingly manic and dishevelled. As the Cronos 
device once again runs forward in time, he begins to show physical signs of decrepitude which 
parallel his previous juvenescence. His skin tatters and sloughs off (figure 32), marking his body’s 
transformation into vampire form.  
  
 
Aurora manifests a very different durational experience of time. As I noted in my discussion 
of Henri Bergson in Part One, duration is “the real, concrete, live present […]. What I call ‘my 
present’ has one foot in my past and another in my future.”352 It is the subjective experience of the 
passage of time, distinct from chronological time, since it cannot be measured, and is inconsistent 
in pace.353 Gilles Deleuze argues that time in film is similarly dependent on the sensory-motor 
experience of duration as movement through space.354  These two approaches are components of 
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Figure 30 – Jesús as an elderly grandfather Figure 31 – Jesús grows youthful 
Figure 32 – Jesús’ skin sloughs away 
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Gregory Currie’s view of time in film, in which time unfolds as “temporal relations between 
constitutive elements of the work.”355  
Aurora’s durational temporality, her unfolding present, is achieved in part because she is a 
child. In her study The Child in Film, Karen Lury takes as her primary position that children in films 
made for adult audiences are fundamentally different from the adult: “the child and childhood, and 
indeed children themselves, occupy a situation in which they are ‘other’: other to the supposedly 
rational, civilised, ‘grown up’ human animal that is the adult.”356 She quotes Owain Jones, noting 
that “otherness […] is a more subtle idea of the knowable and the unknowable, the familiar and the 
strange, the close and the distance, being co-present in adult-child relations.”357 Jessica 
Balanzategui argues a similar position: “it is largely through the child’s perceived lack of reason, 
socialization, and social constructedness that it is defined and established as the adult’s binary 
opposite, and is positioned as a pivotal cultural other.”358 The child is an adult “work in progress,” 
and as such the opposite of the grown adult.359 Unlike Santi in The Devil’s Backbone in the next 
section, Aurora is not supernatural or uncanny. She is a counterpoint for the adults around her, but 
not precisely in the ways argued by Balanzategui. Angel and Dieter – and particularly Jesús – are  
driven by emotion and desperation into an irrational frenzy.  Jesús is buffeted by his chronological 
reversals, intoxicated by the Cronos device and the advance of time. In contrast, Aurora is 
distinguished from the adults by her calm, rational reaction to the events around her. She acts with 
stillness and slowness, as if her experience of passing time is out of phase with the pace of those 
around her, with the measured counting of clockwork, and the forward momentum of the 
narrative. 
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The child as an incomplete adult and therefore at the mercy of time is evident with Claudia, a young girl 
turned into a vampire after the death of her mother in Neil Jordan’s Interview with the Vampire (1994). 
While her body remains young and beautiful, Claudia’s mind grows into that of a narcissistic woman, 
causing a direct conflict between her embodied experience of time passing and her durational experience 
of immortality. Without her body or mortality to measure time, Claudia becomes increasingly restless and 
violent in her frustration at her eternally childish body. She is doomed to be a “work in progress” forever, 
until she commits crimes which result in her execution.  
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Currie argues that the temporality of art is negotiated between “constitutive elements of 
the work”.360 In the case of Cronos, this negotiation emphasises the temporal distinction between 
Aurora and Jesús. This dichotomy is at its most overt when they infiltrate Dieter’s living space in 
order to find the missing information about the Cronos device. Upon entering Dieter’s room Jesús 
immediately goes to a writing desk and begins rifling through its contents. The scene is presented 
in a medium shot with a soundtrack of sustained strings and low key lighting (figure 33, 1:08:54), 
thus maintaining tension and momentum without instigating increased pace. Jesús’ hunched stance 
gives an impression that the moment is a fleeting one, his uncomfortable posture telegraphing an 
intention to move locations. At this point, the camera gently dollies back and pans left, showing 
Aurora walking forward through the room, clutching her teddy bear, her posture and composure a 
stark contrast to Jesús’ (figure 34, 1:09:17). She moves calmly and deliberately, placing one foot in 
front of the other, touching nothing. The restive camera moves about her, but she maintains her 
measured pace. Echoing the mood set by Jesús, the camera focuses on the strange contents of the 
room, losing interest in Aurora and allowing her to walk out of shot (figure 35, 1:09:26). She 
approaches a set of drawers in front of Dieter’s bed, reaches forward, and touches it. The first 
drawer she opens contains a steel box. Without hesitation, and in strong contrast to Jesús’ rifling 
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Figure 33 – Jesús rifles through Dieter’s desk Figure 34 – Aurora wanders away from Jesús 
Figure 35 – The camera loses Aurora Figure 36 – Aurora retrieves Dieter’s lockbox 
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hands, she calmly reaches in and pulls it out (figure 
36, 1:09:41). Mirroring the earlier shot of Jesús, 
Aurora is now shown in a medium shot, with the 
same sustained string soundtrack. Despite the 
tension and momentum of the narrative, she takes 
the box and moves towards her grandfather in the 
same slow, calm pace. Once again, the camera allows 
her to move out of shot (figure 37, 1:09:45). It centers on the quick, sharp movements of Dieter 
climbing out of his bed as he confronts Jesús. Aurora stands silently in the background, the 
embodiment of an opposing movement-time. The men stand and sit, rise and stoop, and move 
about the room. Their restlessly shifting bodies create the impression of time passing rapidly in a 
bodily Deleuzian way.361 The narration matches their tense momentum, as strings increase their 
rhythm, moving from long bowing to tremolo, and the camera begins to alternate between 
increasingly close shots of Dieter and Jesús. The men sink to on the floor, struggling to control 
Dieter’s knife and the cronos device. Behind Dieter, Aurora slowly approaches his ivory-handled 
cane lying on the ground and circles around behind him, maintaining the same measured pace. As 
Dieter struggles to overcome Jesús, Aurora calmly prepares to strike, all but forgotten by the 
camera that is distracted by the frenzy of the fighting men. She hovers out of focus and in the 
background at the bottom left of the frame (figure 38, 1:14:07). She strikes out at Dieter and knocks 
him unconscious (figure 39, 1:14:10); her face expressionless, she gently lowers the cane to the 
ground on the follow-through of her swing, the slowness of her movements belying the suddenness 
of her blow.  
Throughout this scene, Aurora’s actions are at odds with the narration and with the camera 
itself. After her strike, the camera takes a second to pull her into focus, giving the impression that 
it had not anticipated her act and the soundtrack maintains its earlier tension. The camera reverses, 
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Figure 37 – The camera ignores Aurora 
Figure 38 – Aurora readies her strike Figure 39 – Aurora’s expressionless follow-through 
134 
 
placing all three figures together in a full shot. Aurora 
stands completely still, sinking into her hip and resting 
her hands gently on the top of the cane as she 
watches Jesús struggle awkwardly to his feet (figure 
40, 1:14:26). Nineteen seconds have elapsed in the 
course of this struggle sequence; nineteen seconds, 
experienced differently by Jesús, Dieter and the 
narration, and by Aurora.  
The two struggling men thus exist within a shared temporal experience; the ‘fast’ time of 
which is evidenced by their frenzy, with frequent changes in posture (stooping, sitting, standing, 
kneeling, lying) and action (rifling, walking, grabbing, stabbing, defending, wrestling, crawling, 
clubbing, reeling).362 Their time unfolds, to use Currie’s conceptualisation, by “representing time by 
means of time,” emphasising the flux of their durational experience, echoing it in the relatively brief 
timeframe of the narration within the scope of chronological film time.363 Their fast temporality is 
the temporality of the film itself, as the narrative sweeps forward at the same pace, actively 
mirroring speed and momentum in camera and soundtrack. In comparison, Aurora’s slowness 
seems almost alien. Her durational experience, evidenced by her behaviour in relation to the other 
constituents of the fictional world and in relation to the narration, is entirely different. Her pace is 
slow, her actions deliberate, and she remains completely motionless when not actively pursuing a 
goal. Her calmness means that on several occasions, the camera simply moves on without her or 
allows her to exit the frame (figures 35 and 37), in order to keep pace with the events of the plot.  
This distance in experienced time between Aurora and the narration does not mean that 
she experiences a different chronology. All three characters – and the camera – experienced the 
passing of nineteen seconds between Aurora grabbing Dieter’s cane and watching Jesús stand. Her 
temporal dislocation from the narration does, however, indicate that the narration and the 
narrative does not represent her lived experience of the fictional world.  
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Figure 40 – Aurora is completely at ease 
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Stopping Dead – Time and the Uncanny Child in The Devil’s Backbone 
 
Aurora’s temporality in Cronos points to the experience of duration by characters within fictional 
worlds, as evidenced by the difference in her manifested temporality from that of other characters 
and the narration of the film itself. In The Devil’s Backbone Santi engages with duration and 
narrative in a more interventionist way. Santi’s temporality, like Aurora’s, is markedly different from 
other characters within the fictional world of the film. Unlike Aurora, however, his temporality 
directly affects time as it is experienced by other characters.  
The Devil’s Backbone takes place in an orphanage in a remote location in Spain, set during 
the Spanish Civil War (between 1936 and 1939). Run by the Argentinian expatriate Dr. Casares and 
the headmistress Carmen, this orphanage supports the children of republicans, teaching them to 
think for themselves and to act collectively. The young Carlos is brought to the orphanage where 
he encounters Santi, the ghost of a young boy murdered in the orphanage’s cellar. Despite his initial 
fear, Carlos becomes familiar with Santi, learning about his death at the hands of Jacinto, a former 
occupant of the orphanage. Influenced by the violence of the conflict beyond the orphanage’s walls, 
Jacinto learns that Carmen is hiding treasure. He destroys the orphanage and murders Carmen, Dr. 
Casares, and many of the young boys living there. Working together, the surviving boys lure Jacinto 
to the cellar, where the ghost of Santi pulls him down to his death in the cistern. The film ends as 
the surviving boys leave the orphanage and set out into the Spanish desert. 
Santi is a ghostly child, a horrific figure for characters and audience alike. The Devil’s 
Backbone is not the first film to trade on the inherent horrors of the (un)dead child. After the 
production of hallmark films in America from the 1960s through the 1980s such as Rosemary’s Baby 
(Roman Polanski, 1968), The Exorcist (William Friedkin 1973), The Omen (Richard Donner 1976), 
The Shining (Stanley Kubrick 1980), and Poltergeist (Tobe Hooper 1982), the child has come to 
occupy an important place in contemporary horror movies. In the following decades, the horrific 
child has become a generic marker in world cinema, with films such such as Ringu (Hideo Nakata, 
1998) and Ju-On (Takashi Shimizu, 2000) from Japan, and Låt den rätte komma in (Tomas Alfredson, 
2008) in Sweden. These (un)dead children are in large part horrifying because of their uncanny 
signification. Sigmund Freud identifies uncanniness as “that class of the terrifying which leads back 
to something long known to us, once very familiar.”364 “Once very familiar” encapsulates the 
sensation of the uncanny by illuminating the tension between the safety and comfort of the familiar 
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and the alienating awareness that that safety and comfort has the potential to be lost or taken 
away. Freud articulates this tension in the German words heimlich (the “‘familiar’; ‘native’, 
‘belonging to the home,’”365 or concealed366) and its opposite unheimlich (the “untrustworthy,” 
“uneasy,” and “bloodcurdling,”367 and “’everything that ought to have remained hidden and secret 
and has become visible’”368). The unheimlich also carries the meanings of heimlich within it, being 
its direct opposition (the prefix un-). In the above films, as in The Devil’s Backbone, the familiar 
becomes a site of alienation and danger. In The Exorcist, Regan’s exorcism and terrifying 
manifestations happen in her bed, a place which should be safe and comforting. In Poltergeist, the 
haunting first starts when the child Carol Anne (the centre of the haunting) watches static on the 
family television set and a ghostly hand emerges. In Ringu, the well in which Sadako’s murdered 
body was disposed of is concealed underneath the cabin where she lived, which in turn becomes a 
murder site because of Sadako’s psionic fury. In The Devil’s Backbone, Santi haunts the dormitories 
and the kitchens, both traditionally homely safe spaces. Carlos uncovers aspects of Santi’s story 
while in the dormitory, and the cistern where Jacinto disposed of Santi’s body is beneath the 
kitchens.  
 The uncanny child as a figure of horror is not only linked to physical inversions of the 
homely, familiar, or rightfully concealed. The uncanny child, and especially the (un)dead child, is 
the essence of Freud’s general definition of the uncanny as “something long known to us, once very 
familiar.”369 According to Balanzategui, the child is essentially an adult “work in progress.”370 
Conversely, the child is also an inherently nostalgic figure, an aspect of the adult’s earlier self: “while 
being a subject of the present external to adult consciousness, the child is also something every 
adult once was, and is thus bound to teleological linear narratives of the adult self as the adult’s 
origins and past history.”371 The (un)dead child is therefore the disruption of the fundamental 
linkage between child and adult, having died before his or her full adult identity could be reached. 
This disruption between adult (future) and child (past) is the uncanniness common among all 
(un)dead children in horror films. The experience of the ghostly, the uncanny and the distress of 
the adult child is conducive to deconstruction and psychoanalytic criticism, which provides several 
interesting perspectives in this area, of which Balanzategui’s is one. However, such approaches are 
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of limited use in fictional-world centric readings. They are typically oriented to the responses of the 
reader, and the physical markers of internal processes (such as those which are the focus of 
psychoanalysis) are difficult to pinpoint when looking at the experiences of characters, and so I will 
leave this to other scholars.372 This not to say, however, that I will be turning away entirely from 
the concept of the uncanny, since Santi is manifestly uncanny within the fictional world, and from 
the perspective of other characters.  I will be turning to Santi as a child ghost and temporal anomaly 
within the fictional world of The Devil’s Backbone.  
 Santi is a ghost. He is locked within the eternal instant of his death, with blood constantly 
streaming upward from his head and particles of dirt floating upwards past him as if he were still 
sinking through the water of the cistern (figure 41). At the same time, he engages with Carlos as 
though they were experiencing time passing at the same rate; Santi is somehow able to find Carlos 
specifically when he is alone, and wherever he is inside the orphanage. Santi’s simultaneous 
experience of past (his eternal sinking) and present (his ability to distinguish specific points in time 
and space) is blended with that of the future. Santi warns Carlos that “many of you will die,” a 
foretelling which proves true when only seven boys survive to walk out into the desert.373 According 
to Balanzategui, “cinematic uncanny children continually puncture linear continuity” by breaching 
“aesthetic practices that buttress such linearity,” and therefore “immerse viewers and adult 
characters into a dimension in which […] ‘time is out of joint.’”374 Narratives in films like Ju-On: The 
Grudge (Takashi Shimizu, 2002) are scrambled, with non-linear narratives breaking down narrative 
coherence until the viewer is as disoriented and unsettled as the characters. However, these 
uncanny and disorienting narratives do not reconstitute themselves on the level of the fictional 
world, where the uncanny child does not undermine the chronological progression of events. 
Instead, within the fictional world, the temporal 
anomalies associated with these uncanny (un)dead 
children are manifested in a more physical way which, 
while unable to affect the chronology of events, exert 
pressure on the durational experience of the 
characters around them, both adult and child.  
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Figure 41 – Santi’s eternal present 
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Santi’s temporal anomalies are not unique to him, and frequently manifest in similar child 
horror films as non-linear narratives and as physical character traits. As Karen Lury points out, 
temporal anomalies are physicalized in Dark Water (Hideo Nakata, 2002) and The Locker (Kei Horie, 
2004); the children don’t grow, and the “unnatural lack of growth on the part of the child is 
contrasted with the perversely excessive growth of dark hair.”375 Santi, like Mitsuko (Dark Water) 
and the little girl from The Locker, is a temporal paradox, his ever-bleeding head embodying an 
eternal past moment while engaging with both the present and the future of other characters 
within the fictional world. Like Aurora in Cronos, Santi seems at all times unhurried, yet consistently 
keeps pace with the other characters. Aurora’s aberrant temporality enforces a distinction between 
herself and the other characters (her stillness contrasts sharply with everyone else’s frantic 
behaviour), as well as between herself and the narrative (as when the camera seems to lose 
patience and move on without her). At first glance, Santi also seems to occupy the same still 
temporality as Aurora. Trapped in an eternally present experience of a past moment, Santi is often 
critically compared to the unexploded bomb which dominates the centre of the courtyard in the 
orphanage. The opening scene of the film shows a bomb being dropped on the orphanage from an 
overflying plane, which happens at the same fictional-world moment (though Santi’s murder is 
shown after the bombing in the narrative) as Santi’s murder and disposal in the cistern. The bomb 
did not explode when hitting the ground, and remained in the centre of the courtyard thereafter. 
Carlos is told upon his arrival at the orphanage that the bomb has been deactivated by the army, 
and so is dead and therefore safe. And yet, when Carlos knocks on its casing, he hears a groaning 
in response, and later hears a faint ticking sound coming from inside it. The groaning and ticking, 
like the clockwork mechanisms in Cronos, drive narrative time forward, constructing the ideological 
foundation for a narrative potential future. 
 The bomb in the courtyard gives substance to the political and personal stasis of war that 
is disrupts the lives of all of the characters. As Christopher Hartney phrases it, the “imposing 
unexploded bomb […] evokes an extremely strong sense of the uncanny throughout the entire 
film,” impaling the very centre of the orphanage with the visual and tangible violence of the Civil 
War.376  The Civil War, manifested in the bomb, leads to characters who “no longer seem in control 
of the environment in which they seek to find their home[,] for feelings of the uncanny can 
ultimately make us homeless in our own home. In this way the unexploded bomb becomes a symbol 
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for Spain in its unhomely civil slaughter.”377 Although Hartney intends these statements to reflect 
our actual-world engagement with the historical realities of the Spanish Civil War,378 the bomb, like 
Santi, seems to inspire the same uncanny and destabilized state in the characters who inhabit the 
orphanage. The orphanage is filled with boys who have lost family members in the war, and each 
adult is similarly affected, either by greed (Jacinto and his cronies) or by distress and isolation (Dr. 
Casares and Carmen). The bomb is a constant presence in the orphanage, reminding the characters 
of their endangered and ultimately temporary existence within the building. This is related to 
Jacques Derrida’s notion of the ‘fabulous textuality of nuclear war, which “has never occurred, 
itself; it is a non-event” which can therefore only be “the signified referent, never the real referent 
(or present or past) of a discourse or of a text. At least today apparently.”379 The bomb in the 
orphanage, while not nuclear, occupies the same space of having never occurred; it is the exact 
physical form of the “non-event.” While Derrida takes a deconstructive approach which is different 
to the fictional world-centric one I am taking, he usefully draws attention to the fact that the 
fictionalised concepts around something like a bomb or nuclear war can occupy a multiplicity of 
moments. The bomb represents an unresolved past in the incomplete bombing and a static present, 
having been officially disarmed. It is also an indeterminate future: despite its supposed 
disarmament, Carlos can still hear it groan and tick, an ominous manifestation of its aggressive 
potentiality.  
In many ways, Santi shares a temporal centre with the bomb, his murder having occurred 
simultaneously with the bombing of the orphanage within the fictional world. They even share a 
physical resonance; the bomb has coloured ribbons tied to its fin which blow in the wind and 
resemble the constant flow of blood streaming upward from Santi’s forehead wound.380 They both 
embody a tripartite temporal position of past, present, and future, and they both do so in a way 
which seems to inspire an uncanny frisson in other characters. However, Santi and the bomb are in 
many ways temporally distinct, particularly when it comes to their influence within the fictional 
world beyond their physical resonances. The bomb anchors a tripartite catastrophic potentiality: it 
fell in the past and did not explode, it may (and does not) explode in the present, and it might 
explode in the future (but not while the orphanage is occupied by anyone to experience it, since 
the film ends with the bomb unexploded and the last remaining boys walking into the desert). For 
the same reasons, the bomb is also a null temporality, an unresolved stasis. In contrast, Santi’s 
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tripartite temporality is active, and exerts a temporal influence over the other characters as they 
draw closer to him spatially and emotionally.  
The cistern below the orphanage’s kitchen in The Devil’s Backbone is the location of three 
major altercations. The first, which occurs before the diegetic time of the film, is when Jacinto 
murders Santi and disposes of his corpse in the cistern. The second involves Carlos being set upon 
by the older bully Jaime and two smaller boys. This sequence undergoes significant variation in 
pace, demonstrating the power of Santi’s aberrant temporality. It begins with an attack, and 
features four major movements, demonstrated by figures 42 through 45 below. It begins with 
Carlos crouched by the cistern, still and calm, riffling the water with his hand and attempting to 
speak to Santi (figure 42). By establishing a physical connection with the water, he forges first 
contact with Santi and his temporality. One of the smaller boys slowly draws up behind Carlos and 
grabs him, spinning him around to face Jamie and another boy (figure 43).  Separated from the 
water, the boys move quickly and intuitively. Carlos struggles, and the jagged sound of his breathing 
almost overcomes Jamie’s taunts as the older boy unfolds a pocket knife, initiating a crescendo of 
movement. Carlos is thrown to the ground, while the three assailants are clearly full of adrenaline, 
chests heaving, voices rising, and sweat standing on their faces, indicating that their experience of 
time will be quick and energetic. While on the ground, Carlos snatches an iron weight and throws 
it at Jaime, striking him in the face and causing him to fall backward into the cistern (figure 44). One 
of the boys shouts that Jaime can’t swim, and so Carlos leaps to his feet and jumps into the cistern 
(figure 45), seemingly without thinking. The entire attack scene elapses in thirty seconds (00:36:06-
00:36:35).  
Figure 42 – Carlos greets Santi in the stillness Figure 43 – Carlos is suddenly attacked 
Figure 44 – Carlos knocks Jaime back Figure 45 – Carlos leaps into action to save Jaime 
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The pace of the scene nearly halts and all diegetic sound stops (except the occasional gentle 
sound of rising bubbles) as Carlos enters the water where Santi died. Although Santi’s aberrant 
temporality has not yet been widely felt in the disjointed world of the orphanage, the cistern is 
saturated with his influence. This rescue scene is in three movements, divided as in the three figures 
below (figures 46-48). In the first, Carlos swims downward, slowly searching in all directions, 
hampered by the viscosity of the water, physically slowed by being fully immersed in Santi’s 
element. Carlos’ search is punctuated by shots of Jaime underwater, physically mirroring Santi’s 
eternal final moment drowning in the cistern: blood flows gently upward from a wound on the left 
of his forehead, and particles in the dirty water gently flow upward past him (figure 46). Jaime is 
unconscious, and gently floats downward in stark opposition to his earlier adrenaline-fueled attack 
on Carlos. Unable to find him, Carlos breaks the surface for air and the scene crashes back into its 
previous frantic tempo (figure 47). The sound of bubbling and splashing water is almost as loud as 
Carlos’ desperate gasps, and the two remaining boys shout directions to him. The keyed-up space 
outside of the water is established by contrasting sounds and fast movements, and is jarring when 
juxtaposed with Santi’s muffled and arrested cistern world. A few ragged breaths, and Carlos dives 
again, submerging in the cistern. He finds Jaime and drags him slowly to the surface as Santi looks 
on from below (figure 48). In all, the rescue sequence takes forty seconds (00:36:35-00:37:15), with 
only three of it spent above water. Compared with the action-packed thirty seconds of the attack, 
the underwater world seems to be entirely in slow motion. Underwater, the boys are powerless 
against Santi’s influence. Despite the driven chaos above water, Carlos is forced to slow to the same 
deliberate pace with which Santi moves through the halls of the orphanage. 
Figure 46 – Jacinto mirrors Santi Figure 47 – Carlos gasps as he breaks the surface 
Figure 48 – Santi looks on 
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This altercation at the cistern resonates across the film as events and as narrative form. 
Carlos’ crouched position from figure 42 directly mirrors a young Jacinto’s posture immediately 
after murdering Santi (figure 49); both boys, dressed in similar clothing crouch in the same spot 
next to the edge of the cistern. Although the lighting differs (Carlos’s experience takes place during 
the day and Jacinto’s at night), their physical position in the centre of the frame creates a formal 
resonance which draws attention to the fictional world similarities between the occasions. Santi’s 
position and movements while drowning (figure 50) resonate with those of Jaime in figure 46. Set 
in the same murky cistern, the shots are both deep amber. They boys both fall gently downward, 
with faces are upturned and dark hair floating wild. The blood flows upward from the wounds on 
the upper left forehead, and the camera follows their downward descent, creating the impression 
that the boys are suspended in the viscous water rather than sinking.   
The voice-over narration from the beginning and end of the film asks “what is a ghost? A 
tragedy condemned to repeat itself time and again? […] Like an insect trapped in amber.” The 
similarities between figures 42 and 49, as well as between figures 46 and 50, seem to resonate with 
this idea, a single moment or concept trapped within the fabric of the narrative which then repeats 
itself again and again. From a contextual or historical perspective, these resonances are a comment 
on the unfortunate cyclical nature of trauma and violence, as it is (broadly speaking) experienced 
by the child in historical recurrence of war (here represented by the Spanish Civil War). Anne E. 
Hardcastle effectively captures this doubled representation, stating that “the past invoked in the 
course of the film is double-coded: on one hand, for the characters, it is a specific instance of 
murder and betrayal; on the other, for the audience, it is a larger history of the national tragedy of 
Spain’s 1936-1939 Civil War during which the film is set.”381 Karen Lury takes a similar position, 
stating that “one child’s experience, or more accurately their presence as a small, emotive figure, 
can be used to ‘stand in’ for many deaths. In these instances, the child’s narrative function is 
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Figure 49 – Jacinto watches Santi sink Figure 50 – Santi sinks in the cistern 
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effectively to act as a metonym for wider suffering.”382 In these perspectives, the resonances are 
comments on the perpetuating nature of violence and trauma.  
 The narrative and historical resonances between the two first altercations at the cistern 
belong to the audience. For the boys involved, as Hardcastle points out, the moment is intensely 
personal, “a specific instance of murder and betrayal.”383 The war is their reason for being in the 
orphanage, and exists within the courtyard (the bomb) and their social sphere (Jacinto’s actions are 
reflective of the harsh realities beyond the orphanage), but does not figure directly in their fight. 
The fight at the cistern is instigated by first impressions, pranks, comic books and toys. The 
resonances between the first two altercations, then, are due to Santi. Colin Davis argues that the 
ghost is the embodiment of a secret, and this inherent mystery epitomises the ghost as a terrifying 
Other rather than a return of the past.384 Effectively, then, the ‘secret’ of the ghost, its reason for 
being, becomes part of the act of haunting. Although, as remarked above, deconstructive and 
psychoanalytic approaches are of limited direct help in a fictional world analysis, in The Devil’s 
Backbone, Santi’s ‘secret’ is related to his temporality. His secret unfinished business is centred on 
the cistern: it is the place where he died, where the moment of his death is enacted (with Carlos 
and Jaime), and where it must inevitably come to an end.  
Santi observes the events in and around the cistern, watching from below as demonstrated 
in figure 48. In this respect, Santi and the resonances around his death scene seems less 
representative of an Other than they do of an isolated and hurting child. He is not re-enacting his 
death scene or possessing others to do so (such as the episode “Waiting in the Wings” from the 
television show Angel).385 Santi also does not compel others to do his bidding through haunting, 
like the ghosts from A Christmas Carol.386  Santi does not seem to be orchestrating or controlling 
the altercation between Carlos and Jaime so much as he is observing it. I would suggest that it is 
Santi’s temporal influence, rather than his spiritual presence, alienating Otherness, or ghostly 
influence, which is responsible for the resonances. The events and movements of the first two 
altercations do not perfectly echo each other. Instead it seems that the present of the fictional 
world is a palimpsest of the past, where the actions and movements of the present are distinct from 
the past, but are not free of Santi’s subtle embodiment of it. Beyond the pace of actions and 
movements of the boys in the cellar, Santi’s temporality therefore is also manifest within the 
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fictional world as “a deformation of temporal linearity,” not through anachronism but through 
temporal multiplicity.387 Santi’s aberrant tripartite temporality therefore acts upon the reality 
conditions of the fictional world, which operates on a linear and causal manifestation of time 
outside of Santi’s sphere of influence. This sphere of influence acts around the reality conditions of 
the fictional world, seen in the impact it has on the behaviour and attitude of those who draw 
closest to him spatially and interpersonally without fundamentally distorting the reality of the 
fictional world.388  
The final altercation at the cistern brings together the unidirectional progression of events 
as they are experienced by other characters and expressed through the linear chronological 
narrative, with the culmination of Santi’s tripartite temporal influence. The sequence begins 
immediately after Jacinto destroys the orphanage and kills all but seven boys in his pursuit of 
Carmen’s gold. Despite his victory, Jacinto’s hands shake while he shoves gold bars into his pockets 
and ties them into a handkerchief and onto his belt. His tremor speaks to the intensification of 
sensory experiences through time, evoking Anne Rutherford’s statement that one “is not jolted into 
fleeting moments of awareness and sensation, and time here is not the passing of this intense, 
fleeting experience of the ephemeral moment, not its undoing, but the intensification of the 
experience through duration.”389 Although Rutherford is speaking to the viewer’s experience 
intensifying as cinematic time elapses, this sensorial resonance is equally effective on the level of 
the fictional world. Physical sensation, including chemical and emotive responses, can therefore be 
linked to the experience of time and the way in which that temporal experience manifests within 
the fictional world. Temporal dilations based on physical response is most commonly seen in slasher 
horrors like I Know What You Did Last Summer (Gillespie 1997), in which the walking assailant is 
able to keep pace with the frenzied running victim. Although sometimes considered an illogical 
generic quirk of slasher films, within the fictional world, such instances take on temporal relevance. 
                                                          
387 Peter Buse and Andrew Stott, eds., Ghosts: Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis, History (Houndsmills: 
Macmillan Press, 1999), 1.  Quoted in  
Balanzategui, The Uncanny Child in Transnational Cinema, 18.  
388 Unlike ghosts, the presence of the mythic and the power of mythopoeic voice can result in such 
distortions, explored with reference to American Gods and Anansi Boys in Chapter Three, and in the next 
section on Pan’s Labyrinth.  
389 Anne Rutherford, “Precarious Boundaries: Affect, Mise-en-scene and the Senses in Angelopoulos’ 
Balkans Epic,” Senses of Cinema 31 (2004), http://sensesofcinema.com/2004/feature-
articles/angelopoulos_balkan_epic/. 
Originally printed in the collection Richard Candida Smith ed., Art and the Performance of Memory: Sounds 
and Gestures of Recollection, Memory and narrative (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
Quoted in  
Mroz, Temporality and Film Analysis, 32. 
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Although the chronological passage of time relative to distance travelled is identical (the killer keeps 
pace with his victim), the victim’s frantic movements, screams, and ragged breath speak to the 
experience of extreme panic and fear, leading to the dilation of time. The victim seems to be moving 
faster, but although their experience would seem longer, it has the same chronological trajectory 
as a calm and controlled person walking. Critically reading temporal dilation in relation to the 
physical and sensorial realities of characters within the fictional world is directly manifested by 
Jacinto and the seven surviving boys in the orphanage. Like the boys’ ragged breathing, heaving 
chests, and sweaty faces in the second altercation at the cistern, Jacinto’s frantic and excited 
movements, his hands faintly shaking with adrenaline, establish a similar temporal position to the 
running slasher victim.   
Jacinto is distracted from his gold as Jaime and Carlos appear in the hallway, and call him 
“hijo de puta” (which translates to “son of a bitch”), before turning and leading him at a run down 
the stairs towards the cistern. In an inversion of the above mentioned slasher tradition, the fleeing 
boys appear calm, while Jacinto chasing them moves with intense speed, leaping over rubble where 
the boys calmly dodge it (figure 51). The boys run down the stairs barely ahead of the older and 
larger Jacinto, seen as a shadow on the stairs in figure 52.  And yet in the next shot the camera 
reverses, showing the boys disappearing into the depths of the cellar, well ahead of Jacinto (figure 
53). In the cellar, the boys stand still as Jacinto walks into their trap, easily spear him with their 
sharpened sticks (despite his loaded gun), and calmly herd him (at a walking pace) to the cistern 
(figure 54) where he falls in. Once in the cistern, dragged down by the stolen gold, Santi slowly 
Figure 51 – Jacinto dashes through the rubble Figure 52 – Jacinto’s shadow follows Jaime 
Figure 53 – The boys gain distance from Jacinto Figure 54 – Jacinto’s frenzy in an ambush 
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makes his way over to Jacinto’s form, where he embraces him as Jacinto drowns (figure 55).390 The 
boys, through proximity to Santi, are able to capture and defeat Jacinto with their education and 
their mastery of the slow durational present.391 In his final moments, Jacinto is plunged into the 
cistern, the heart of Santi’s past-present-future trichotomy, mirroring Santi’s moment of death and 
Jaime’s fall as his dark hair floats upward (figure 56), mingling with drifting blood, his screams 
muffled and drawn out by the water.  
 
Ultimately, in The Devil’s Backbone, temporality is not, as Deleuze argues, “spli[t] in two 
dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present pass on, while the other preserves all 
past.”392 Instead, Santi’s uncanny self as an (un)dead child realises a tripartite temporality, which 
influences those around him for good or for ill. Santi’s temporality is related to the realities of the 
war being waged within the fictional world, his traumatic fallout being bound in time to the 
undetonated bomb in the courtyard. Indirectly, Santi’s past-present-future becomes part of the 
experience of time for those who are closest to him, freeing them from their own trauma, 
experienced within the walls of the orphanage at Jacinto’s hands. In the next section, I will be 
exploring another film directed by Guillermo del Toro, also set during the Spanish Civil War, in 
another look at the temporality of children in the fictional world.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
390 This frame is murky, but Santi’s form can be seen on the lower right, partially obscured by the floating 
blood.  
391 Earlier in the film, the boys are taught about Ice Age hunting techniques, in which humans would work 
together to bring down a woolly mammoth with nothing but strategy and sharpened sticks.  
392 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 79. 
Figure 55 – Jacinto is slowly herded to the cistern Figure 56 – Jacinto drowns in Santi’s embrace 
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Once Upon a Time, Ofelia Used Mythopoeic Voice in Pan’s Labyrinth  
 
Both The Devil’s Backbone and Pan’s Labyrinth are set during the Spanish Civil War. Although a 
strictly historical approach is not conducive to a fictional world-centric reading, scholarship 
regarding texts which look back onto this historical setting (including The Devil’s Backbone and 
Pan’s Labyrinth) is well-developed and influential. For this reason, I will briefly look at the impact 
of the Spanish Civil War and its resonances post-1975. The Spanish Civil War lasted from 1936 to 
1939, pitting the country against itself as the fascist General Francisco Franco led National and 
Falangist forces to take control of the country. By the end of the war, Franco held power, and ruled 
a fascist regime over Spain until 1975. After Franco’s death in 1975, the country started its 
tumultuous path back to democracy, bolstered by the Pact of Forgetting. According to Omar G. 
Encarnación, this Pact was an informal institution,  
An agreement negotiated by the major political parties at the time of democratic 
transition, relegat[ing] the political crimes of the dictatorship […] to the ash heap of 
history. Accordingly, there would be no political trials for anyone associated with the 
Franco regime.393  
This Pact of Forgetting responded to the horror and trauma of the war on a personal scale as well 
as the political one. Surviving generations limited their first-person accounts, some of which were 
“not conveyed from generation to generation with the pride associated with great deeds, but with 
shame and fear.”394 The informal political and interpersonal institution of forgetting left a significant 
gap in the national consciousness, which contemporary texts are emerging to fill. These texts, what 
Paloma Aguilar Hernanadez calls postmemory texts, and Teresa Vilarós calls neo-memory texts, 
allow new generations to distance themselves from the shame of the war torn decades but which 
also address a need felt for individual and national historical identity.395  
                                                          
393 Omar G. Encarnación, “Peculiar but not Unique: Spain’s Politics of Forgetting,” Aportes 32, no. 94 (2017): 
150. 
394 Paloma Aguilar Hernandez, Memory and Amnesia: The Role in the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to 
Democracy, trans. Mark Oakley, (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), 140.   
395 Teresa M. Vilarós, “The Novel Beyond Modernity,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Spanish Novel, 
eds. Harriet Turner and Adelaida López de Martínez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 154. 
Hernandez, Memory and Amnesia, 140.   
Along with The Devil’s Backbone and Pan’s Labyrinth, many literary and filmic postmemory texts have 
emerged around the Spanish Civil War. Some examples include Dulce Chacon’s novel The Sleeping Voice 
(2006), and the films Painless (Medina 2012) and While at War (Amenábar 2019). Although postmemory 
texts are retrospective, many texts originating from the period of the Civil War heavily influence the 
aesthetics and content of many postmemory texts. One of the most influential films of this time is Victor 
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Pan’s Labyrinth and The Devil’s Backbone are such texts, and this approach to reading is 
highly influential in the critical response to both films. These approaches, dealing with the 
important themes of trauma,396 memory,397 and political identity which make postmemory texts so 
important.398 Many of these areas are found within the fictional world: Ofelia escapes into the world 
of fairy tales to escape her traumatic treatment at the hands of Capitán Vidal, and Santi is memory 
and vengeance embodied in response to his own traumatic experience. However, the concepts 
around postmemory do not necessarily belong to the fictional world. While the characters are 
dealing with trauma and political turmoil, their experience is present. The text exists as part of an 
important intertextual, political and historical network around postmemory within the actual 
world. Within the fictional world, the child is experiencing time passing, and not time as it has 
already passed as a historical moment. In addition, following on the principles of individual and 
independent fictional worlds (discussed in Part One, pages 12-20), it cannot be said that the war 
experienced by Ofelia, Santi, and the other characters in either film is the same Spanish Civil War 
that occurred in our world despite their similarities. The events and states of affairs around Ofelia 
did not occur in the actual world, and so actual world history is not definitive with respect to events 
of the fictional world. In the rest of this section, I will focus on time and temporality in the fictional 
world, and so I will look specifically at the ways in which Ofelia’s mythopoeic voice distends her 
experience of the fictional world.  
                                                          
Erice’s El espíritu de la colemna (Spirit of the Beehive, 1973) whose legacy of the wide-eyed child 
protagonist and its doubled world structure can be seen in Pan’s Labyrinth. Postmemory texts are not 
exclusive to the Spanish Civil War, although the politics and subsequent Law of Historical Memory (enacted 
in 2007) makes postmemory and forgetting an essential consideration in these types of Spanish texts.  
396 Adam Lowenstein, Shocking Representation: Historical Trauma, National Cinema and the Modern Horror 
Film, (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2005), 1-9.  Quoted in  
Antonio Lázaro-Reboll, Spanish Horror Film, 2012, 262.  
Donald Haase, “Children, War, and the Imaginative Space of Fairy Tales.” The Lion and the Unicorn 24, no. 3 
(2000): 360-377.  
T.S. Miller, “The Two Kings and the Two Labyrinths: Escaping Escapism in Henson’s Labyrinth and Del Toro’s 
Labyrinth,” Extrapolation 52, no. 1 (2011): 26-50. 
Lury, The Child in Film, 105-145.  
397 Ann Davies, Spanish Spaces: Landscape, Space and Place in Contemporary Spanish Culture (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2012), 22.  
Dolores Tierney, “Transnational Political Horror in Cronos (1993), El Espinazo del Diablo  (2001), and El 
Laberinto del Fauno (2006),” in The Transnational Fantasies of Guillermo del Toro, Ann Davies et al, eds., 
161-182 (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan U.S, 2014). 
398 Lázaro-Reboll, Spanish Horror Film, 259.  
Tierney, “Transnational Political Horror in Cronos (1993), El Espinazo del Diablo  (2001), and El Laberinto del 
Fauno (2006),” 169-172.  
Hartney, “With Spain in our Hearts, 200.  
Shaw, The Three Amigos, 68, 70, 80. 
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Pan’s Labyrinth is a temporally complex film. It has three distinct time streams. The fictional 
world temporality is one which consistently engages all of the characters in the film. It is the time 
of the mill, where Ofelia and her pregnant mother Carmen arrive to live with her new father and 
fascist leader, Capitán Vidal. This is also the temporal locus of the Republican rebels who are based 
in the woods just beyond the mill, and with whom the housekeeper Mercedes and the mill’s doctor 
are secretly affiliated. This strand is marked by chronological time. Vidal is obsessed with his father’s 
pocket watch, and images of cogs fill the space of the mill. The second temporal strand is that of 
the mythological realm. This one is a non-chronological temporality, much like that of mythology, 
discussed above in Chapter Three, or a child’s story. It includes Princess Moanna, the royal daughter 
of the king and queen of the immortal underground kingdom. She escaped to the surface world, 
where she died and was reincarnated as Ofelia. Princess Moanna’s task is now to find her way back 
home. The final temporality is Ofelia’s alone. In this temporality, Ofelia encounters a fairy and a 
magic faun. They tell her that she must complete three tasks in order to be returned to her position 
as the Princess Moanna, which are given to her by a magic book of fairy tales. Through mythopoeic 
voice, Ofelia manifests the creatures and places she reads in the book, but as a result, she alienates 
her mother, almost dies in the fulfilling of one of her magic tasks, and is asked by the faun to kill 
her baby brother. It is also in this strand that Ofelia dies, shot by her step father Vidal, only for Vidal 
to be shot and killed in his turn.  
It is the first temporality which is the most linked to the historical context of Spain in 1944. 
As Davies cautions, there is the “danger into which critics sometimes also fall, of seeing the text 
merely as a veneer for Spanish history to the extent that they do not ‘see’ the text itself, so eager 
are they to disinter the history beneath.”399 Despite the title card of the film noting that the setting 
is “Spain, 1944,” Davies correctly notes that the landscape of the fictional world is “devoid of 
Spanish specificity,”400 and that the forest is featureless and isolationist,401 cutting off the characters 
from the rest of the fictional world that lies beyond the forest. All of the characters are trapped in 
this featureless setting that could potentially be any boreal forest. Ofelia is trapped by her 
connection to her mother, Carmen is trapped inside her sick room, the Republicans are trapped in 
the band of forest just beyond sight of the mill, and Vidal himself is trapped by his duty (the act of 
slitting his own throat reflected in a shaving mirror shows that he wishes to escape like every other 
                                                          
399 Ann Davies, Spanish Spaces, 2012, 22.  
400 Ann Davies, Spanish Spaces, 2012, 32. 
This is also true with The Spirit of the Beehive. This classic Spanish film also deals with the conflicts of living 
under Franco’s regime. It, too, uses a delocalised space to throw a young girl in to flux, forced to navigate 
the traumas of a violent world on her own. 
401 Ann Davies, Spanish Spaces, 2012, 25. 
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character does). These trees cut the characters off from the more generalised Spanish context, 
seeming to indicate a de-nationalising and internationalising of its critical relevance.402 This 
indeterminacy helps the critical viewer to diffuse direct references of the film to the actual world 
Spain, while the title card gives a contextual reference for the viewer to anchor the events within 
the fictional world. The indeterminate landscape also traps the characters within the temporality 
of the fictional world. Vidal’s obsession with his broken heirloom watch hints at his obsession with 
chronological time, which is mirrored in the implacable progression of hours as it is experienced in 
the fictional world. Days and nights roll one after the other, indistinguished from each other. Even 
the rebel Mercedes is caught in this temporal trap, making exactly the same motions in exactly the 
same way at exactly the same pace as she collects the illegal resources which she smuggles to her 
brother and the Republicans in the forest.403 
The mythological temporality is opposed to the first in every way, even in its creation. Ofelia 
is the source of this world, speaking it into being through mythopoeic voice. To recall Chapter Three 
on Anansi Boys, mythopoeic voice is the process through which a character will speak aloud, and 
the contents of their speech becomes real within the world. Not only does the subject of their 
utterance become real, it appears to have its own mytho-logic, including its own mytho-
temporality. Although the film starts with a title card and date which establishes a chronological 
anchor (Spain, 1944), after the introductory text the film’s narration turns to a more mythic mode. 
A voice-over narration hints at this proto-time, opening the first sequence in the mythical world 
with: “a long [long] time ago, in the Underground Realm, where there are no lies or pain, there lived 
a princess who dreamt of the human world.”404 To recall Meletinsky from Chapter Three, myth is 
relative to a proto-time, which is “the time of all origin – all are valid descriptions – that existed 
before empirical time. In fact, myth marks the sacred time of origin and not the empirical time as 
special.”405 The voice-over narration therefore distinguishes between the ‘specialness’ of the 
                                                          
402 Ann Davies, Spanish Spaces, 2012, 26. 
403 Guillermo del Toro, “Commentary,” Pan’s Labyrinth (Estudios Picasso, 2006), DVD.  
404 The English subtitles of the film (written by del Toro) read “a long time ago,” whereas the Spanish 
original voice says “Cuentan que hace mucho, mucho tiempo,” which translates directly to “They tell that a 
long, long time ago” (translation my own). In the Spanish original, the introduction is a direct narrative 
invocation in the tradition of “once upon a time,” and redoubles the word “long,” in order to emphasise its 
proto-temporality.  
405 Meletinsky, The Poetics of Myth, 159. 
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historical moment denoted by the title card, and the “sacred time” of the myth which is utterly 
abstract.406  
The phrase “a long time ago” from the opening scene is the fairy tale opening line which 
resonates as “once upon a time.” While myth and fairy tale are distinct in form and content, as Jack 
Zipes points out, in many ways, “the fairy tale is myth. That is, the classical fairy tale has undergone 
a process of mythicization. Any fairy story in our society, if it sees to become natural and eternal, 
must become myth.”407 The time of this mythic fairy tale dimension is therefore depthless, and 
operates outside of chronology.408 The temporal designation of the introduction is linked to the 
fairy tale tradition; Ofelia uses the phrase to begin the story she tells to her unborn brother later in 
the film. It is also linked to what Meletinsky calls the “proto-time” of the Underground Realm, which 
is “the time of all origin” for Ofelia’s mythical world.409  
This mythical fairy tale world becomes so powerful for Ofelia that it functions exactly as a 
mythological system would in our real world, affecting the thought processes and behaviour of 
those who believe in it. Confronted with the traumatic reality of living with Capitán Vidal, Ofelia 
creates this fictional mythology based on the information that she gleans from her love of fairy 
tales.410 When Ofelia (as the reincarnation of Moanna) is not engaging with this mythological world, 
the chronology does not move on without her. This is indicated by the voice-over’s introduction of 
Moanna’s father, who waits in the Underground Realm for her soul to return “in another body, in 
another place, at another time. And he would wait for her, until he drew his last breath, until the 
world stopped turning…” Time in this space is without end, but simply exits in a perpetual state of 
stillness, waiting either for Moanna to return, or “until the world stopped turning.” This embedded 
mystical reality is what causes most critics to consider the film to be magic realist or (in the case of 
Lukasiewicz) neorealist. Lukasiewicz’ classification of this temporal space as neorealist is 
particularly interesting. She distinguishes it from magic realism; magic realism incorporates the 
                                                          
406 Although voice-over narration and filmic narration, discussed in Chapter One, are not part of the fictional 
world, they are tools which a critical reader can use to learn facts about the fictional world or against which 
the reality of the fictional world can be gauged.  
407 Jack Zipes, “Fairy Tale as Myth/Myth as Fairy Tale,” Children’s Literature Association Quarterly (1987): 
107.  
408 Haase, “Children, War, and the Imaginative Space of Fairy Tales,” 361, 362.  
409 Meletinsky, The Poetics of Myth, 159. 
410 A similar effect occurs in Taika Waititi’s JoJo Rabbit (2019), in which a young boy is so taken by the 
propaganda about Adolf Hitler that he imagines Hitler is his imaginary friend. As JoJo is confronted the 
realities of the world around him, primarily through conversing with a young Jewish girl who is hiding in his 
house, his relationship with his best friend Hitler sours. Eventually, JoJo is forced to acknowledge that the 
storybook world he imagined based on Nazi propaganda is false, in time to see his hometown fall to the 
Allied forces.  
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supernatural seamlessly into the fictional world (the primary fictional world).411 Instead, no one but 
Ofelia recognises the supernatural or magical at work.412 Although I disagree with Lukasiewicz’ 
classification on the grounds that Ofelia’s mythopoeic voice distinguishes the supernatural from the 
fictional world, her point is a good one. This world is one of opposition and one which demands 
reclassification, distinct from the primary fictional world. The distended temporality and complete 
lack of chronology in this mythic world of Ofelia’s own creation places it in a resistant position in 
relation to the fictional world.  
The third temporality is Ofelia’s own. This temporality takes place in the fictional world, but 
is modified by elements of the mythological fairy tale world. Miller calls this “an audacious effort 
to connect the fantastic mode with a higher function for narrative as the only means by which to 
order and reorder human existence.”413 If this is so, Ofelia’s experience of this time stream should 
not only be ordered and in her control, but should help her to contextualise and escape the trauma 
of the fictional world. Instead, Ofelia experiences this temporality in relation to the stimulus of the 
world around her rather than her own needs. When she is with her mother, the cycle of days and 
nights becomes routine and predictable. When she is engaging with her mythopoeic world, the 
measured temporality of the fictional world distorts through its proximity to the timeless proto-
time of the Underground Realm. This destabilisation may be due in part to Ofelia’s 
misinterpretation of her mythic environment. She believes it is a fairy tale, inspired by the books 
she reads (and which her mother dismisses), and not a mythic dimension.414 She behaves as if she 
believes that, as the child protagonist, she will be all right, convinced that “even as fairy tales 
ultimately debunk magical thinking, showing that it works only in the realm of story, they also affirm 
the magical power embedded in language, the way that the ability to use words can grant a form 
of agency unknown to the child who has not yet fully developed the capacity to use language.”415 
While Ofelia’s language influences her reality, she fails to note that it is mythic – and dangerous – 
                                                          
411 Tracie D. Lukasiewicz, “The Parallelism of the Fantastic and the Real: Guillermo de Toro’s Pan’s Labyrinth 
and Neomagical Realism,” in Fairy Tale Films: Visions of Ambiguity (Colorado: University Press of Colorado, 
2010), 62, 66. 
412 Lukasiewicz, “The Parallelism of the Fantastic and the Real,” 66. 
413 Miller, “The Two Kings and the Two Labyrinths,” 29.  
414 Ofelia’s rigid point of view echoes the classic novel Don Quixote, in which Don Quixote’s mythopoeic 
world is informed by the romances he reads obsessively. Although most scholars mark Don Quixote as mad, 
I believe that, within the fictional world, the Don is manifesting his own perceptual reality. In his failure to 
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windmill that everyone else sees.  
Cervantes, Don Quixote.  
415 Maria Tatar, “Why Fairy Tales Matter: The Performative and the Transformative,” Western Folklore 69, 
no. 1 (Winter 2010): 57.  
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and not magic. This is particularly evident when she crawls into the fig tree to complete the first 
task of retrieving a key from the stomach of a giant toad. 
 The episode of the toad seems typical of a fairy tale, which begins by entering the forest. 
As Ofelia first walks into the forest (figure 57, 0:31:56), she is prettily dressed, the afternoon sun 
shining golden and hopeful. She has no need to be distrustful that any negative effects will come 
as a consequence of her task, since the forest is a place which in fairy tales is traditionally where 
children “lose and find themselves. It is there that they gain a sense of what is to be done. […] No 
one ever gains power over the forest, but the forest possesses the power to change lives and alter 
destinies. In many ways it is the supreme authority on earth and often the great provider.”416 It 
therefore stands that in a fairy tale, deliverance and succor will come from saving a great tree of 
the forest. However, Ofelia soon discovers that the forest is not “the great provider.” When she 
crawls into the decaying fig tree, it is mid-afternoon in the fictional world, with the sun past its 
zenith, denoted by the slanting sunlight. She is in the tree for seven minutes, yet when she emerges, 
it is evening (the blue filter representing dusk), she has missed her dinner, and her special dress is 
destroyed (figure 58, 0:38:14).417 Her engagement with the disorienting temporality of the 
mythopoeic world has come into contact with that of the real world, throwing Ofelia into the wrong 
temporal experience.  
                                                          
416 Jack Zipes, “The Enchanted Forest of the Brother Grimm: New Modes of Approaching the Grimm’s Fairy 
Tales,” Germanic Review 62, no. 2 (Spring 1987): 66. 
417 When Ofelia emerges from the fig tree, she is covered in mud and her lovely dress is completely 
destroyed. Karen Lury argues that mud has “both a terrifying and absorbing just-is-ness; demonstrating 
what is exposed, what is left, when the world is turned upside down, when the fragile civilisation that the 
child has barely understood has broken down. The contact with inanimate matter enhances the visceral, 
bodily sense in which the child has been ‘thrown’ into an encounter with the world.” Lury’s argument is 
significant in the consideration of Ofelia as a postmemory figure, and also as a disruptive figure in her own 
fictional world. Lury’s view of mud is relevant in connection to the death of Artax in the Swamp of Sadness 
in Wolfgang Peterson’s The NeverEnding Story (1984), in which the swamp mud overcomes Atreyu, 
metaphorically and literally soiling his quest with sadness. 
Lury, The Child in Film, 133.  
Figure 57 – Ofelia’s magical forest Figure 58 – Ofelia loses time in the fig tree 
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The disjuncture between Ofelia’s experience of time and time passing in the fictional world 
is evidenced by a cross-cut to Capitán Vidal riding into the mountains to pursue the Republicans. 
The thundering of the fascist soldiers through the forest contrasts Ofelia’s magical view of the 
fictional world. Ofelia believes that her mythopoeic voice has fundamentally altered the reality 
conditions of the fictional world to make it like a fairy tale. According to Jack Zipes, in a fairy tale, 
“the forest is rarely enchanted, though enchantment takes place there. The forest allows for 
enchantment and disenchantment, for it is the place where society’s conventions no longer hold 
true. It is the source of natural right, thus the starting place where social wrongs can be righted.”418 
In this forest, however, the “social wrong” of the fascist presence is not only not righted, but is 
enforced and advanced, the soldiers hunting and eradicating the Republican rebels. This sequence 
elapses entirely in the mid-afternoon (figure 59, 0:33:23), matching the expected chronology of the 
fictional world as well as the elapsed film time. Although both Capitan Vidal and Ofelia durational 
experience seems to match the chronology of the 
fictional world (and the film’s narration), Ofelia’s 
chronological relationship to time warps. The 
distortion therefore does not originate in the reality of 
the fictional world, but in Ofelia’s subjective reality in 
relation to her created mythopoeic realm, one she is 
not wary of because of her mistaken misidentification 
of mythopoeic manifestation as fairy tale.  
Despite the distended temporality of Ofelia’s experience, she continues to experience a 
duration which she mistakes for chronology. Her temporality seems to be rigid, even when she 
strays into the mythopoeic. Her nearly deadly trial of the Pale Man, for example, is timed with an 
hour glass, and her failure to make it back to the safety of her bedroom in time almost sees her 
cannibalised. It becomes clear, therefore, that although Ofelia is indirectly in command of the 
temporality resulting from her mythopoeic voice, she does not control or even influence her 
experience of time relative to herself. Perhaps the best example of this is the figure of the faun. He 
is a creature emergent from Ofelia’s mythopoeic world, and gives her instructions on how to return 
to the underworld as Princess Moanna. It should be the case that the faun follows Ofelia’s 
temporality and chronology, as her mythopoeic voice makes her his originator. However, the faun 
moves in an opposing chronology to Ofelia, as del Toro points out in his commentary on the Pan’s 
Labyrinth DVD. When she first encounters him, he is very old and tremulous, covered in moss and 
                                                          
418 Zipes, “The Enchanted Forest of the Brother Grimm,” 67. Original emphasis. 
Figure 59 – Capitán Vidal at mid-afternoon 
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nearly blind (figure 60). However, as the film progresses, the faun becomes younger and more spry 
(figure 61).419 Not only is Ofelia not anchored to her psychic experience of non-measured time, she 
is not relative to the chronologies that intersect with her own. Instead of being a safe place for 
Ofelia, her own experiences of time become violent, oppositional, and dangerous.  
 
The fictional world does not resist the narrative as it appears on screen, and short of the 
unremarkable, internationalised spaces that Davies points out, the fictional world easily fulfils the 
expectations of an allegorical, political, historical reading, making the film an uncontroversial 
postmemory text.420 To the viewer, Ofelia’s magical world seems to fulfil the expectations of the 
fairy tale, including the utter timelessness of a fairy tale invocation, the presence of helpful fairies, 
the woodland setting, and even the cadence of three tasks.421 The eternal present of the mythic 
dimension and the fluctuating temporality of Ofelia’s experience does not conflict with the reality 
conditions of the fictional world. It does not interact at all with the fictional world. The narrative 
and the camera have little trouble keeping them distinct and in line with the linear checkerboard 
rhythm of the narrative by presenting them with a unified perspective.422 This is established from 
the very outset of the film, with the title card “Spain, 1944,” and is followed through with the 
expected context and historically linear chronology.  
Immediately after the introductory text, Ofelia is presented dying. A zoom in on her eye 
shows the mythic realm, narratively shown as if it were inside her head, indicating its exclusivity in 
Ofelia’s experience. The rigorous distinction between the subjective and objective realities is 
                                                          
419 Del Toro, “Commentary”. 
420 Davies, Spanish Spaces, 32. 
421 Donald Haase, “Children, War, and the Imaginative Space of Fairy Tales,” 362. 
Zipes, “The Enchanted Forest of the Brother Grimm,” 66. 
The number three often appears in fairy tales and fables, including Goldilocks and the Three Bears, and the 
three fairies in Disney’s Sleeping Beauty (1959).  
422 Del Toro, “Commentary.” 
Lukasiewicz, “The Parallelism of the Fantastic and the Real, 68.  
Figure 60 – The old mossy faun Figure 61 – The faun is youthful and spry 
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upheld on the levels of both temporality and chronology, as explored with relation to Ofelia and 
Capitán Vidal’s experience in the forest during Ofelia’s time in the fig tree. This neat demarcation 
fails, however, as Ofelia’s experiences occupy a resistant temporality. Ofelia’s experience of time is 
in a constant state of flux. Like Aurora in Cronos, Ofelia’s experience of temporalities and 
chronologies does not match those of the characters around her (such as Vidal). Nor does it match 
her understanding of temporal reality (marked by the proto-time of the mythic realm). Instead of 
submitting to either temporality, Ofelia becomes actively resistant in all senses. In the example of 
the trial of the toad, Ofelia removes the green dress that her mother had made for her (figure 62, 
0:32:23). The clear intention here is for her to engage with the toad, as her storybook instructed. 
Ofelia then planned to put her dress back on and attend dinner. This fails miserably. When Ofelia 
emerges from the tree, it is inexplicably night, and her dress had blown down into a pool of mud, 
ruining it (figure 63, 0:38:29). Her act of setting her dress aside, a small trial in controlling the world 
around her, is an utter failure. 
As the film continues, Ofelia struggles harder and harder against these disparate realities, 
but only succeeds in destabilising herself. She is helpless to change the temporalities so tightly 
controlled by the narrative and the proto-time of the mythic. Instead, Ofelia resists to the extent 
that her attempts become a matter of life and death. In the final scenes of the film, Ofelia’s struggle 
comes to a critical point at the heart of the labyrinth, the location of the symbolic katabasis into the 
underworld.423 Ofelia takes her brother to the centre of the labyrinth, as the faun requests. She 
knows that Vidal will try to follow her, to kill her and reclaim his son, so she drugs him with a 
sleeping tonic. With this action, she attempts to invert her and Vidal’s experience of time, to 
disorient him and pull him into her unpredictably slow temporality, giving her the time to escape. 
As she runs through the labyrinth, it magically opens for her and closes behind her (figure 64, 
1:44:41), giving Ofelia a shortcut into the heart of the labyrinth. Conversely, Vidal stumbles through, 
occasionally stopping and leaning against the walls to regain his equilibrium against the drug (figure 
                                                          
423 Miller, “The Two Kings and the Two Labyrinths,” 29. 
Figure 62 – Ofelia carefully hangs her dress Figure 63 – Ofelia clutches her ruined clothes 
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65, 1:44:20).424 Vidal’s disorientation and Ofelia’s supernatural assistance points to a disparity in 
time, where Ofelia can be expected to reach the heart of the labyrinth well before Vidal.  
However, in the heart of the labyrinth, Vidal overtakes Ofelia, impervious to her attempts 
to influence his own experience of time. He shoots Ofelia, and takes back the baby. Throughout 
Pan’s Labyrinth, Ofelia is constantly trying to escape, resisting the events and chronology of the 
fictional world. From the beginning of the film, the Princess Moanna escapes from the underground 
kingdom to the fictional world, moving from mythic time to the linear time of the rest of the fictional 
world.425 Upon arriving at the mill, Ofelia attempts to escape the claustrophobic house, a domain 
dominated by Vidal and his obsession with his pocket watch. She flees from this regimented 
chronology and into the labyrinth, as if the distended time of her mythopoeic experiences 
dominates the passage of time in the rest of the fictional world. In death, she attempts to escape 
into the mythopoeic world as the reclaimed Princess Moanna. Her constant drive for escape 
manifests itself in part as a temporal resistance that hammers against the rules of the more 
consistent temporalities. Ofelia’s acts of resistance and escape increasingly destabilise her, 
exacerbated by her inability to recognise the limitations of her own worldview. Ultimately, her 
inability to reconcile chronology and achronology in her own experience leads to her death. 
The narrative of Pan’s Labyrinth has no problems reconciling the two temporalities of the 
fictional world. They are clearly delineated visually: Ofelia’s mythopoeic world is filmed with soft 
curves and bright, saturate jewel tones (figure 66, 1:50:21) and Vidal’s world is full of harsh angles 
and greys (figure 67, 0:25:29).426 The two experiential realities are further distinguished by the 
method of narration. Ofelia’s mythopoeic world has voice-over narration and is ordered by Ofelia’s 
magical book of stories. The fictional world is not so contained, its narration is more impersonal 
                                                          
424 I have brightened the content of figures 64 and 65, in order to make their features more clear. 
425 Miller, “The Two Kings and the Two Labyrinths,” 33, 34. 
426 Many films use narration to distinguish between experiential subjectivities. This difference can be 
opposing forms of reality, such as in Pan’s Labyrinth, or they might be opposing perspectives on the same 
reality, such as in Tim Burton’s Edward Scissorhands (1990). Edward’s stone mansion is dismal and grey, 
despite being surrounded by vibrant topiary and gardens, evoking his loneliness and longing. Conversely 
Kim’s suburban world is soft and full of contrasting colours.  
Figure 64 – The labyrinth clear a way for Ofelia Figure 65 – Vidal stumbles, lost in the labyrinth 
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and transparent.427 On the level of the narrative, there is no fracture between the temporal 
experiences, distinguished as they are narratively, and being neatly organised within the linear 
chronology of the film. Instead, it is Ofelia’s need to escape and her inability to contextualise her 
own experiences which results in temporal slippage, and ultimately, her death.  
 
Cronos, The Devil’s Backbone, and Pan’s Labyrinth are all films whose narrative manifests a 
disjuncture between the durational and chronological experience of the fictional world. In each 
film, the figure of the child is the marker for this disjuncture. In Cronos, Aurora’s individualistic 
temporality contrasts those of the characters around her, as well as that of the narrative. In the 
Devil’s Backbone, Santi’s ghostly temporality distorts the duration of characters as they draw closer 
to him. Finally, in Pan’s Labyrinth, Ofelia struggles so hard to escape the reality conditions of the 
fictional world that she cannot reconcile the boundaries of her own experience, distorted by the 
influence of her mythopoeic voice.  
  
                                                          
427 George Wilson broadly describes transparency in film as narration in which “most of the shots in these 
movies are understood as providing the audience with ‘objective’ or intersubjectively accessible views of 
the fictional characters, actions, and situations depicted in the film,” and that where such a film does not 
mean to be objective, “there is a reasonably clear marking of the fact that they are, in one of several 
different ways, ‘subjective.’”  
George Wilson, “Transparency and Twist in Narrative Fiction Film,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 64, no. 1 (2006), 81.  
Figure 66 – The mythic world is bright and curved Figure 67 – Vidal’s world is grey and stark 
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Conclusion 
I have sought to respond in this thesis to the critical tensions between the reader and viewer’s 
intuitive responses to the fictional worlds of literature and film and the critical and theoretical 
paradigms of academic analysis. Readers and viewers discuss characters as if we know them to be 
real; they refer to them by name and speculate about their subjective experiences. When we apply 
critical theory, this disappears; characters become series of names, narrative qualities, quantities, 
representative factors, and narrative utterances. From the perspective of the theoretical models 
discussed in this thesis, immersion in fiction, in particular empathetic responses to characters and 
events, become theoretical. Centering readings of film and literature in the fictional world makes it 
possible to understand that our point of entry into them is, rather, the most human part of 
ourselves: our understanding of what it is to be human.  
 I have set out a view of fictional worlds derived from the literary tradition of fictional world 
theory of Lubomír Dolezel, Thomas Pavel, and Marie-Laure Ryan, alongside possible world 
philosophers David Lewis and Ruth Ronen. In the process, I have come to the conclusion that 
fictional worlds are individuated and independent, both from each other and from the actual world. 
I have sought to describe the contents of these worlds, but have discovered that the kind of 
information we might use to address texts and narrations does not account for the relationships 
we establish with characters, that which I have argued here is the most important element of our 
understanding of fictional worlds. Characters live within the domains of their stories; their places 
and spaces become clear to readers and viewers and they come and go through them. They are the 
point at which a coherent reality is offered for our experience, a reality of which the text that 
appears to enclose them represents merely a glimpse.  
 As we have seen, however, fictional worlds, like the actual world, can present problems. 
Chuck Palahniuk’s and David Fincher’s Fight Club are unable to offer their readers or viewers 
solutions to the seemingly intractable question of unreliable narration. Alice Jeličková, Gregory 
Currie, Cornelia Klecker, and Lars Bernaerts offer useful approaches to this problem, but close 
readings of the novel and film provided here suggest that fictional worlds become coherent only 
when narration is made secondary. If we allow characters like Marla to become authenticating 
authorities within their own fictions, they can generate a consensus reality against which the 
narration has no sway. Whether delusional or consensual, characters are always reliable.  
Critical approaches which prioritise the reality of the actual world – so dominant in 
academic textual studies – have proved obstructive to what I have argued here is a necessary 
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recognition of the central status of the fictional world in acts of criticism. With a text like Solaris 
which is situated across defining points of culture and history, it is easy to see why contextual 
approaches have preoccupied those who comment on it. Darko Suvin and Christine Cornea present 
an estranged model for reading science fiction that seems to account for the subjective experiences 
of characters like Kelvin in Lem’s novel. Simonetta Salvestroni and Steven Dillon have linked the 
narrative form of Tarkosvky’s film to readings in which the viewer’s knowledge of the cinematic 
apparatus, or director, or the film’s socio-political context are related directly to global political 
realities. Linda Hutcheon and Siobhan O’Flynn’s critical model of adaptation encourages a reading 
of Soderbergh’s Solaris as a palimsestuous synthesis of fictional worlds. But the close readings I 
provide here tease out the elusive realities that should be differentiated in every Solaris, and to 
which only an approach through fictional worlds is responsive. Certainly, aberrant fictional realities 
tested the approach I seek to offer here. Neil Gaiman’s American Gods and Anansi Boys appear to 
undermine the coherence of their own fictional worlds in their exploration of myth and the mythic. 
Applying the work of Kathryn Hume, Eleazar M. Meletinsky, and Brian Attebery, I have argued that 
the mythic dimension of each fictional world is more a defining reality than an ideological delusion 
to be deconstructed. Although the fullness of their reality is beyond the consensus of ‘human’ 
characters like Shadow, Gaiman’s American gods are real in terms of their own fictional world. As 
my discussions of Guillermo del Toro’s films has shown, reading film and literature for fictional 
worlds make it possible to understand characters as fully and individually subjective. In Cronos, 
Aurora has a fictional world that is strikingly and minutely distinct from the actions of the adults 
around her; she lives in a subjective order of time utterly different from that of the clock which 
controls her grandfather. In The Devil’s Backbone, Santi asserts a tripartite experience of the past, 
present, and future which provides a framework for the actions of the characters surrounding him. 
In contrast, Ofelia’s mythopoeic voice eludes her control. Time slips away from her and she is lost 
to the proto-time of myth.  
This thesis cannot provide an exhaustive study of the applications of the proposed 
methodology; indeed, it is not even a complete overview of the opportunities it offers for readings 
of the texts discussed here. There are significant omissions: in Anansi Boys, for instance, Fat Charlie 
and Spider are black Anglo-Caribbeans, but their race is never explicitly described.428 In conjunction 
with critical theories of race, a fictional world-centric reading might begin to explore the ways in 
                                                          
428 Gaiman deliberately flips the conventional critical assumptions that a ‘default skin colour’ in white: see 
his interview with Rachel Martin and Mike Pesca, “Neil Gaiman Takes Questions on Anansi Boys,” NPR, June 
9, 2008, npr.org/transcripts. 
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which fictional worlds can test and challenge racial assumptions in the actual world. Similarly, it 
provides opportunities to re-assess interdisciplinary questions of medium, relatively implicit here 
in my conjunction of literature and film. I have not, for instance, discussed graphic novels, a form 
which provides remarkable opportunities for further elaboration of the discussion of narrative and 
narration in Chapter One – the ‘multiverse’ structure of Marvel and DC, for instance, in which 
multiple story worlds are simultaneously present, or the open-world environments of video games, 
in which players are not bound by narrative control. My aim here has been to establish a theoretical 
basis on which reading for fictional worlds can take its place at the heart of the critical disciplines 
of literature and film, and to provide close readings that would demonstrate some of its advantages. 
I leave it to my readers to imagine the possible critical worlds of which such an approach could 
begin an exploration.  
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